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ARTICLE
INTERPRETING STATUTES IN
THE REGULATORY STATE
Cass R. Sunstein*
Discussing the judge's role in interpreting statutes, Justice Holmes wrote
that "if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."'
Critics of the view of the courts as passive agents of the legislature claim
that it understates the difficulty of interpretation,the indeterminacy of both
the language and the will of the citizens, and the resulting discretion of the
judge. Similarly, a vigorous debate continues over the proper role of the
traditional sources of statutory interpretation - the text, the legislative
history, the purpose of the enacting Congress, and the structure of the statute.
Professor Sunstein suggests that both the conventional understandings of
interpretation and the recent critiques are seriouslyflawed. Because interpretation inevitably involves the application of "backgroundnorms" - often
controversial, value-laden, and not found in any text - the traditional
theories are incomplete. These theories, however, properly stress the democratic primacy of Congress. When congressional instructions are clear and
do not create absurdity, courts should follow them. Often, however, the
instructions are ambiguous, and judges must choose from a number of possible background norms.
Suggesting that many disputes over statutory meaning are in fact disagreements over appropriatebackground norms, Professor Sunstein contends
that the debate should center on whether the proposed norms express a good
understanding of constitutional values; are properly responsive to contemporary institutional arrangements involving the making, monitoring, and
enforcement of law; and are sensitive to the aspirations and functions as
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political

Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to many colleagues and friends for their help
with this essay. Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Douglas Baird, Jack Beermann, Frank Buckley,
Frank Easterbrook, Jon Elster, Richard Epstein, William Eskridge, Richard Fallon, Philip
Frickey, Stephen Gilles, Don Herzog, Stephen Holmes, Donald Horowitz, Benjamin Kaplan,
Larry Kramer, John Langbein, Howard Latin, Larry Lessig, Jon Macey, Geoffrey Miller,
Martha Minow, Richard Posner, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frederick Schauer, Richard Stewart,
Geoffrey Stone, David Strauss, Lloyd Weinreb, Robin West, James Boyd White, and John
Wiley offered valuable comments on all or parts of the manuscript. I am also grateful to
participants in helpful workshops at the University of California at Los Angeles, Harvard
University, the University of Michigan, New York University, Princeton University, Tulane
University, and the University of Virginia. D. Gordon Smith, Gamhk Markarian, and Catherine
O'Neill provided research assistance and useful comments. Finally, I am grateful to the Law
and Government Program of the University of Chicago for generous support.
Some of the material in this Article is also included, in different form, as parts of chapters
4 and 5 in C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE REGULATORY STATE (forthcoming I9go).
1 I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 249 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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well as the shortcomings of regulatory statutes. Professor Sunstein concludes
by outlininga series of norms - some based on current interpretivepractices,
others reflecting his own normative vision. All the norms are designed to
focus disputes over statutory meaning more sharply on the underlying issues
and to deepen understandingof the regulatory state.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem

TN the early part of the twentieth century, courts often treated
Iregulatory statutes as foreign substances. 2 Starting from principles
of laissez-faire, judges saw statutory protections of workers, consumers, and others as unprincipled interest-group transfers supported by
theories that were at best obscure and often disingenuous. 3 By contrast, judge-made doctrines of property, contract, and tort seemed to
create a system with integrity and coherence.
The role of the courts in this period was one of damage control.
The most important organizing principle for interpretation was that
regulatory statutes should be construed narrowly - so as to harmonize
as much as possible with principles of private markets and private
rights. 4 This approach grew out of the idea that courts should nar5
rowly construe statutes in derogation of the common law.
The New Deal period marked an enormous change in the size and
character of the national government. 6 The decade between 193o and
2 See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 9 (1928) ("The truth is that

many of us, bred in common law traditions, view statutes with a distrust which we may deplore,
but not deny.").
3 See, e.g., United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1936); FTC v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 623-25 (1927); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305o6 (1924); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1920).
4 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3; F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 165-82 (1930) (exploring the federal courts' nullification of the Clayton Act); see also
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 22 HARV. L. REV. 383, 387-88, 4o6-07 (I9o8) (criticizing

use of interpretive principles that are out of touch with contemporary social and economic
thought); Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM. POL.-ScI. REV. 361, 374-75 (1913) (same).

This principle of narrow construction, like many others of the past and present, was not
always invoked explicitly. Often it operated invisibly or in the background. When interpretive
principles are not referred to expressly, their use is often reflected in the court's treatment of
the statutory language.

See infra pp. 437-41; see also infra pp. 464-66 (discussing when

controversial substantive and institutional norms should be applied).
5 See, e.g., Shaw v. Railroad Co., 1oi U.S. 557, 565 (1879); Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co.,
117 F. 462, 466 (8th Cir. 2902), rev'd, x96 U.S. I (1904); see also Fordham & Leach, Interpre-

tation of Statutes in Derogationof the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438, 450-5I & nn.73-

74 (i5o) (listing cases in which courts ignored statutes instructing them not to construe statutes
narrowly).
6 On the pre-New Deal developments, see S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING THE NEw AMERICAN
STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 408 1989-1990
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1940 saw the creation of as many agencies -

seventeen - as had
been created in the entire period between the framing of the Constitution and the close of the nineteenth century. 7 During the "rights
revolution" of the 196o's and 1970's, the national government substantially increased its regulatory responsibilities by moving to protect
the interests of consumers, the national environment, and victims of
discrimination. 8 The emergence of the regulatory state represents a
shift in both the substance of law and the institutions through which
law is made and enforced, 9 and the sheer volume of federal statutes
and regulations has dramatically changed the business of the federal
courts.' 0 In particular, the work of federal judges has increasingly
involved the interpretation of federal enactments.
The demands of the modern administrative state ultimately made
it impossible for courts to sustain a theory of interpretation rooted in
nineteenth-century common law. As a result, interpretive practices
have changed. Courts have often repudiated private-law baselines for
interpreting public law and have been less antagonistic to regulatory
statutes. 11
In many respects, however, the theory and practice of public law
have not outgrown the understandings that underlay the initial period
of judicial antagonism. 12 That period is unmistakably recalled by

7 See FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 7-I1 (1941).
s For comparisons between the New Deal and the rights revolution, see R. HARRIS & S
MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE 53-96 (x989); and Vogel, The "New" Social
Regulation in Historicaland Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 155 (T.

McCraw ed. I98I).
9 See generally Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, ioi HARV. L. REV. 421,
437-46 (1987) (discussing substantive and institutional reform in the New Deal period).
10 The proliferation of statutes in modern law has been widely observed both on the bench,
see, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 53, 83-84 (1985); Traynor, Statutes Revolving in
Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 402 (1968) (observing that cases "increasingly
involve the meaning or applicability of a statute"), and in academia, see, e.g., G. GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) (describing an "orgy of statute making").

Recent

statistics confirm these intuitions. In 1985, for example, nearly 20% of all civil filings involved
four regulatory areas -

social security, labor, tax, and civil rights.

See ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS at a-16
to a-17 (1985) (table C-3). Moreover, because most commercial disputes have been absorbed
into the regulatory arena through the Uniform Commercial Code, and because "contract cases"
account for nearly 40% of all filings, see id., the federal courts probably hear many more
statutory than common law claims.
11 See, e.g., Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (denying

judicial review of agency decision); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) (deferring to agency
interpretation of law).
12 Over 8o years ago, Roscoe Pound voiced similar complaints about the persistence of
judicial adherence to common law principles. See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra
note 4, at 385-86; accord Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213, 213 (1934).
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recent suggestions that courts should indulge a presumption in favor
of private ordering and should interpret regulatory statutes so as to
intrude minimally on the private market. 13 The nineteenth-century
view that regulatory statutes should be viewed against a background
of common law property and contract rights and hence as naked
wealth transfers also finds a modern home, in the increasingly prominent idea that statutes should be seen as unprincipled "deals" among
self-interested private actors. 14 Similarly, those who emphasize the
findings of public choice theory would treat statutes as lacking coherent normative underpinnings.' 5
The initial judicial skepticism about the legitimacy and' coherence
of statutory law is also recalled by both poles of the contemporary
debate over the possibility of constrained or objective legal interpretation. At one extreme, some courts and observers see the text or
"plain meaning" of statutory language as the exclusive or principal
guide to meaning. 16 At the opposite extreme, other commentators
claim that legal terms are quite generally indeterminate 7 or have the
meaning that those with authority choose to impose on them.' 8 Despite their differences, the two camps share a number of assumptions.
Both treat regulatory statutes as an undifferentiated and unprincipled
whole, without distinct and accessible purposes. Because members of
both camps see no way to mediate the sharp ideological disagreements
that sometimes underlie interpretive disputes, some are driven to the
13 See, e.g., J. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC
POLICY (1989); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 5o U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-5I (1983). Many
recent decisions appear to respond to a principle in favor of private ordering. See, e.g.,
Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989) (discussed below in
note 305); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (discussed below at pp.
484-85); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 24-25 (i98i) (discussed
below at pp. 500-02).
14 See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, z983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984).
'S For a discussion of public choice theory, see Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An
Overview and Interpretation,in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY? 231 (B. Barry &
R. Hardin eds. 1982). See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(1951); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCx, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (x962).

The treatment in

H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958), runs into severe problems because
of its failure to appreciate the difficulties raised by work of this sort. My ultimate goal, however,
is to revive important elements of the treatment in The Legal Process, rather than to celebrate
its demise or to emphasize its occasional nalvet6 about politics and interpretation.
16 This view is currently enjoying a renaissance in the courts. See cases cited infra note 29;
see also Easterbrook, supra note 13 (advocating a presumption against applying a statute unless
it expressly addresses the issue in question).
17 See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 88-oo (1975).
18 See, e.g., S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 87-102 (1989); S. FISH, IS THERE
A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 338-55

[hereinafter S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?].
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pretense that words quite generally have "plain meanings," others to
the uninformative view that meaning is a function of authority, others

to the demonstrably false claim that statutes are usually indeterminate
in meaning, and still others to the open-ended suggestion that statutes
should be interpreted so as to be "reasonable" or "the best that they
can be." 1 9 In the face of contentions of this sort, debates about

statutory interpretation, in and out of the judiciary, often dissolve
into fruitless and unilluminating disputes about the constraints sup-

plied by language "itself" (as if such a thing could be imagined).
B. Interpretive Principles
My project is to develop a theory of statutory construction that

not only sheds light on current practices but also might claim to be
worthy of adoption. In carrying out that task, it is first necessary to

set out the proper relationships among the traditional sources of interpretation, including text, structure, purpose, intent, and history. A

large part of the solution, however, lies in the identification and
development of interpretive principles with which to approach regulatory statutes. 20 The meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the
precepts with which interpreters approach its text. Statutes do not
have pre-interpretive meanings, and the process of interpretation requires courts to draw on background principles. These principles are
usually not "in" any authoritative enactment but instead are drawn
from the particular context and, more generally, from the legal culture.2 1 Disagreements about meaning often turn not on statutory
terms "themselves," but instead on the appropriate interpretive prin19 See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 337-38 (x986) (arguing that judges should interpret
statutes "in the best light overall"); Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399
(1950) (suggesting that courts interpret statutes to "make sense").
20 It is important to emphasize that my approach is directed to regulatory statutes. I refer
to other measures, including criminal law, largely by way of analogy. Much of the discussion,
however, bears on statutory interpretation in general.
21 The illuminating treatment in Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007 (i989), presents a number of these background norms, including the idea that
courts should defer to administrative interpretations of law if Congress has not clearly addressed
the issue, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984); that criminal statutes should be construed in accordance with the "rule of lenity,"
see Eskridge, supra, at 1029; and that statutes and treaties should be construed favorably to
Indian tribes, see id. at 1047.
Eskridge's treatment is flawed, however, by the implicit assumption that the role of "public
values" in interpretive disputes is to add to ordinary interpretation, or to bend the meaning of
statutes in various directions. See id. at 1045-47. For reasons suggested below, see infra pp.
416-25, ordinary interpretation is also pervaded by "public values"; the dichotomy between
interpretation that rests on fidelity to text and interpretation that is based on extratextual values
greatly oversimplifies the problem and is in important respects a false one.
HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 411 1989-1990
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ciples. Courts sometimes make the governing norms explicit, but
frequently leave them unarticulated and latent. The principles are
often misdirected or at least controversial.
In these circumstances, it is important to identify the prevailing
principles and to subject them to scrutiny. The ultimate task is to
develop norms of statutory interpretation that grow out of, and do
not collide with, the basic purposes of the constitutional framework,
of contemporary institutional arrangements, and of modern social and
economic regulation. Above all, it is important to develop principles
that improve the performance of modern government, and that are
not based on pre-New Deal understandings, which seem to have
overstayed their welcome.
To carry out this task, it will be necessary to develop distinctive
understandings about both the nature of legal interpretation and the
character of modern public law. Because interpretation is a function
of background norms and cannot proceed without them, theories
about statutory "meaning" cannot be separated from theories about
how the modern regulatory state does and should operate. When
interpretive norms are contested, and when neither the Constitution
nor the Congress has specified the proper norms, there is no alternative
but to base the inevitably value-laden choice among them on their
role in improving or impairing governmental performance.
In the course of the discussion, I reject a number of generally
accepted understandings about statutory construction:
o courts must always adhere to the original meaning of the statute,
or the original intent of the enacting legislature;
o courts are or can be mere agents of the Congress;
o statutory meaning remains constant over time;
o statutory meaning is equivalent to legislative intent;
o controversial views about public policy are never and should
never be part of statutory construction;
o canons of construction, or background interpretive norms, are
an outmoded and unhelpful guide to the courts.
All of these aspects of the conventional wisdom, I suggest, are inconsistent with actual judicial behavior. Moreover, they provide incomplete instructions and often produce perverse results.
The discussion proceeds in three stages. Part II rejects the usual
understandings of how courts do and should construe statutes. It also
suggests the proper uses of the traditional sources of interpretation:
text, structure, purpose, congressional intent, and legislative history.
The recent emphasis on the primacy of the text is a step in the right
direction, but structure, purpose, intent, and history sometimes help
HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 412 1989-1990
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to clarify ambiguities or to prevent unnecessary or unintended irrationality and injustice. I also suggest that the traditional sources offer
incomplete guidance and that their incompleteness reveals the inevitable failure of the agency conception of the judicial role. At the same
time, I reject the view that statutory disputes produce "indeterminacy"
in most or all cases and the related idea that such disputes are resolved
on the basis of conventions that are not subject to evaluation. Finally,
I criticize, though on quite different grounds, the use of certain widelyheld extratextual norms to resolve statutory disputes: private autonomy, deference to agency interpretations, and conceptions of statutes
as "deals."
Part Ill attempts to understand statutory construction by means
of a general defense of the much-maligned "canons" of construction,
understood as background principles designed to help discern statutory
meaning. I defend the use of such principles by disaggregating their
various functions and by suggesting that the use of background norms
is desirable and in any case inevitable. I also suggest that several
current substantive norms can be supported through an understanding
of the ways in which they incorporate constitutional principles, promote deliberation in government, and respond to New Deal reforms
of the legal system.
Part IV proposes a series of interpretive principles for judicial
adoption in the regulatory state. I argue that many such principles,
whether existing in current law or proposed here, can be defended by
reference to constitutional norms; that others are based on assessments
of the performance of various governmental institutions; and that still
others are an effort to counteract some of the failings in regulatory
systems. A general purpose of Part IV is to describe and defend
principles that will serve the purposes of deliberative government and,
in particular, will alleviate rather than aggravate the defects in modern
regulatory programs.
Although these suggestions are designed principally for reviewing
courts in hard cases, their implications extend to administrative agencies attempting to implement statutes, and to Congress in its efforts
to design and reform social and economic regulation. Debates over
statutory meaning are often disputes over interpretive principles; these
debates reflect broader divisions over the nature and performance of
the regulatory state and, indeed, about the character of American
22
democracy and constitutionalism as a whole.
22 The study of statutory construction is therefore one part of a more general effort to
understand the performance of modern regulatory institutions - an effort that will ultimately
make it necessary to focus more on Congress, the President, and the bureaucracy than on the
courts. For discussion in this vein, see J. MAsHAW & B. HARFST, THE FREEDOM MACHINE
(forthcoming 19go); C. SUNSTEIN, cited above in note *; and Rubin, Law and Legislation in
the Administrative State, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 369 (1989).
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II. STANDARD APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In the conventional account, the tools of statutory construction are
language, structure, and history. The weight of each of these has
been sharply contested, especially in recent years. 23 Disputes over
questions of this sort have produced a range of approaches to statutory
construction, all with support in the case law. Each, however, is
flawed. My purpose here is to explain how these approaches fail,
both as positive accounts of how courts in fact approach statutes and
as normative theories of interpretation.
This Part is divided into three sections. The first deals with
theories that see courts as agents of the legislature and that charge
courts with the duty to implement legislative decisions. These theories
fail because they ignore the inevitable use of interpretive principles in
the process of construction. Arguing that it is possible to choose
among interpretive principles, the second section rejects both conventionalist accounts of meaning and the view that statutory interpretation produces "indeterminacy. '24 The third section considers three
prominent approaches that do invoke supplemental principles; it suggests that these approaches also fail, largely because the relevant
principles are difficult to defend.

23Compare Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d x, 7-8 (D.C. Cir.
i985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing use of legislative history) and B. ACKERMAN & W.
HASSLER, CLEAN CoAL/DIRTY AIR 1o8-o9 (198i) (same) with Farber & Frickey, Legislative

Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (x988) (arguing in favor of attention to legislative
history).
24 All interpretation involves the application of norms. Some of these "norms" are not open
to change or even to discussion. There is a difference, at least in principle, between the sorts
of understandings that make ordinary words intelligible and the sorts of interpretive principles
that give meaning to statutory gaps or that resolve cases that are otherwise in equipoise - as,
for example, in the norms in favor of state autonomy or judicial review. Participation in the
set of practices that make ordinary words intelligible is probably best conceived of not as
interpretation but as understanding. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
§ 2O, at 81 (G. Anscombe trans. 1972) (discussing a way "of grasping a rule which is not an
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'
in actual cases" (emphasis in original)). This point holds even though one's participation in
those practices is conditional on a wide range of background understandings that are not "part"
of words "themselves."
The distinction is important because it is sufficient, for purposes of background understandings of this sort, that there be a social consensus on their behalf. Communication is possible
only because of that consensus. But with respect to interpretive principles that are part of
interpretation - for example, the idea that silence on the question of federal preemption means
that state law continues to exist - a consensus may be inadequate if there are no good arguments
on behalf of that consensus. In these latter cases, interpretive principles are at least in theory
subject to evaluation and to replacement by alternatives. A pervasive problem with conventionalist accounts of meaning is that they treat all interpretation as akin to the sorts of understandings that make ordinary words intelligible. See infra pp. 442-43 (discussing conventionalism). I am grateful to Thomas Nagel for help with this point.
HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 414 1989-1990
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A. Courts As Agents
According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts
in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. 25 On the agency view, courts should say what the statute
means, relying on its language, structure, and history. Background
norms, policy considerations, indeed all "outside sources," are immaterial. The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by
others, most notably the legislature.
The agency view is usually defended by a claim of judicial legitimacy.2 6 In a democratic system, with an electorally accountable legislature and separated powers, it is said to be the appropriate and
indeed constitutionally prescribed role of the courts to apply legislative
commands; it is thus impermissible for them to invoke considerations
that cannot be traced to an authoritative text. The claim of illegitimacy is buttressed by (and perhaps reducible to) a range of prudential
considerations: the use of outside sources will tend to increase judicial
discretion, decrease legislative attentiveness, produce uncertainty, and
risk usurpation by judges of powers reserved for legislative and executive actors. 27 Justice Holmes provided a particularly crisp expression of the agency view: after describing a regulatory statute as "foolish," he added, "if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help
28
them. It's my job."
The agency view appears in several competing forms, and much
of the history of statutory construction consists of shifts and disputes
among the various possible sources of the instructions of the courts'
"principal," the legislature. I discuss several variations here.
i. Textualism. - It is sometimes suggested that statutory language is the source of judicial power and the only legitimate object
of judicial concern. Textualism appears to be enjoying a renaissance
in a number of recent cases, 2 9 and perhaps in the academy as
25This conception has strong roots in the American legal tradition, see, e.g., Schooner
Paulina's Cargo v. United States, I U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 6o (1812) (Marshall, C.J.) ("In
construing these laws, it has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention
of the legislature."). For more modern advocates of the agency conception, see cases cited in
note 29 below.
26 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 534 n.2 ("If statutes' words do not convey
meaning and bind judges, why should judges' words bind or even interest the rest of us?").
27 In this sense, the debate resembles the debate over formalism in constitutional law. See
generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 6o B.U.L. REV. 204
(198o).
28 1 HOLMEs-LAsKI LETTERS, snpra note i, at 249.
29 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2573-74 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, iog S. Ct.
1814, i818-i9 (i989); Chan v. Korean Airlines, io9 S. Ct. 1676, 168o-gi (i989); Pittston Coal
Group v. Sebben, 1o9 S. Ct. 414, 419-21 (1988); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., Xo8 S. Ct.
677, 1681-82 (1988); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
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well, 30 partly because of dissatisfaction with alternative interpretive
strategies, taken up below, which counsel courts to rely on "purpose"
31
or to produce "reason" in regulatory regimes.
Several considerations argue in favor of textualist strategies. First,
textualism contains an important and often overlooked truth. Statutory terms are the enactment of the democratically elected legislature
and represent the relevant "law." Statutory terms - not legislative
history, not legislative purpose, not legislative "intent" - have gone
through the constitutionally specified procedures for the enactment of
law. Second, resort to the text promotes goals associated with the
rule of law: citizens have access to the statutory words and can most
readily order their affairs in response to those words. Third, the
words of a statute, considered in light of widely shared conventions
about how they should be understood, often have only one plausible
interpretation, or at least sharply constrain the territory of legitimate
disagreement. Finally, an emphasis on the primacy of the text serves
as a salutary warning about the potential abuses
of judicial use of
32
statutory "purpose" and of legislative history.
Some textualists emphasize the "plain meaning" or dictionary definition of statutory terms; others are more sensitive to the particular
settings. In its purest form, however, the textualist approach is inadequate. The central problem is that the meaning of words (whether
"plain" or not) depends on both culture and context. Statutory terms
are not self-defining, and words have no meaning before or without
interpretation. 33 To say this is emphatically not to say that words
452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J.,concurring in the judgment). In Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
1o9 S. Ct. I98I (i989), however, all nine Justices refused to follow the dictionary meaning of
the text because it would have produced an absurd result. See id. at 1984-85; id. at 1994
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at i995 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Public Citizen, lo9
S. Ct. at 2565-67 (I989).
30 For example, once-Professor and now-Judge Easterbrook has defended textualism with
insight and vigor. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 13.
31 As we will see, strategies of that sort were suggested by commentators who disregarded
or downplayed the existence of controversy about what "reason" required or about the "purposes"
of statutory regimes, and who failed to come to terms with the existence of sharp, ideologically
based disagreements on such questions. See infra pp. 426-28, 435-36. Textualism relies on
firm linguistic anchors to control ideological divisions. It is here that there is a commonality
between those who believe that legal interpretation is inevitably indeterminate - because of
ideological strife - and those who, embracing textualism, do so for essentially the same reason.
32 See infra pp. 427-28 (purpose), 429-31 (legislative history).
33 Consider Learned Hand's view: "Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have
only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but
all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used . .. ." NLRB
v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 194); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of
Revenue, log S. Ct. 278, 281 & n.6 (I989) (quoting Federbush).
The dependence of meaning on culture and context is a conventional point in both AngloAmerican and Continental philosophy. See, e.g., L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 24 (AngloAmerican version); H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (trans. 2d ed. 1975) (Continental
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used in statutes or elsewhere can mean anything at all. 34 But it is to
say that statutory terms are indeterminate standing "by themselves,"
and, even more important, they never stand by themselves. The
significance of congressional enactments necessarily depends on the
context and on background understandings about how words should
be understood. Moreover, reliance on ordinary or dictionary definition, without reference to context, will sometimes lead to interpretive
35
blunders.

Usually the context does not prevent reliance on ordinary meaning,
and usually the background principles are so widely shared -

for

example, that Congress is speaking in English, that Congress is not
joking or attempting to mislead, that statutes have purposes, or that
judges should not decide cases simply according to their predilections
- that they are invisible. Even in easy cases, however, courts must
resort to background principles. For example, the question whether
the enactment of federal environmental statutes preempts all of state

tort law is an easy one, not because of the statutory text "itself," but
because of shared understandings about the limited preemptive effect
36
of federal enactments.

version). For legal writing on the inadequacy of textuaism, see R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 217-27 (1975); S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS

CLASS?, supra note 18, at 356-7r (discussing law as well as literature); H. HART & A. SACKS,
supra note I5, at 1I5o-58; 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2470, at 234-38 (J. Chadbourn ed.
ig8i); Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 97 YALE
L. J. 777, 778-80 (1988); Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1263-64 (I947); Horack, The Disintegrationof Statutory Construction,
24 IND. L.J. 335, 338 (I949).
34 But see, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 8r9 (1983) (arguing, unpersuasively, that a good
lawyer can always find an argument for the result he wants).
35 Courts have conspicuously rejected literalism on many occasions. See Missouri v. Jenkins,
109 S. Ct. 2463, 247r (r989) (holding that "attorney's fee" should be read to include award of
paralegal fees); and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2, 433 (1983) (observing that
under § 1988, which provides attorney's fees to the "prevailing party," prevailing plaintiffs may
recover if they prevail on any significant issue, but defendants may recover only if the plaintiff's
suit was groundless) (dictum); United States v. Colon-Ortiz, 866 F.2d 6, iI (ist Cir. 1989)
(refusing to adhere to an obvious drafting error); In re House Bill No. 1,291, 178 Mass. 605,
6o N.E. 129 (IgoI) (holding that a requirement in the Massachusetts Constitution of a "written
vote" allows a voting machine involving no writing); Riggs v. Palmer, IIs N.Y. 506, 22 N.E.
188 (1889) (refusing to allow a testator's murderer to recover under the will); R. DICKERSON,
supra note 33, at 23o. For other examples, see note 44 below.
36 See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 440-41 (1978); see also
Mansell v. Mansell, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 2027-28 (1989) (observing that Congress must specifically
preempt state law, especially in the area of domestic relations); Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer
Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1350, 1353 (1988) (requiring evidence of clear and
manifest congressional purpose to preempt state law regarding gasoline price regulations); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 715 (I985) (discussing the
assumption that states' powers to regulate health and safety are not preempted by congressional
acts). Similarly, a law that says nothing about whether administrative action is reviewable is
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Those who accept textualist approaches might agree that the meaning of words is partly a function of the context and of background
norms about how texts should be approached. Indeed, we may define
an easy case as one in which the context produces no dispute and
there is a consensus about the governing norms. 3 7 In many hard
cases, however, the source of the difficulty is that the particular
background norm and the nature of its application will be highly
controversial. Textualism or "plain meaning" approaches can resolve
these questions only by covertly introducing background principles,
which are often controversial.
Consider the question whether a statute creating a regulatory
agency to police racial discrimination in employment implicitly authorizes victims of discrimination to bring private suits against employers who allegedly have engaged in discrimination. If the statute
and its history do not resolve the question, the introduction of background norms is necessary to discern the meaning of the statute. It
should thus be unsurprising that judges skeptical about implied causes
of action have relied not on statutory "text" but instead on a highly
controversial background assumption, traceable to a particular, contestable understanding of separation of powers, that only the legislature may create such rights, and that statutory silence should be
assumed not to do So. 38 Without that assumption or a different one,
statutory silence on the existence of an implied cause of action has no
meaning.
Background norms are ubiquitous in any legal system, and indeed
in grammar itself; they are necessary to make reliance on "text" an
intelligible concept. These considerations account for the pervasive
difficulties with textualist approaches to statutory construction: ambiguity or vagueness, overinclusiveness, underinclusiveness, delegation
or gap-filling, and changed circumstances.
(a) Ambiguity or Vagueness. - The most familiar problem with
textualism is that statutory language is sometimes ambiguous or
vague. To say that courts should rely on the words or on their

unambiguous, not because of the text "itself," but because of the strong presumption, created
by courts but now widely shared, in favor of judicial review of administrative behavior. See
infra PP. 475-76.
37 Cf. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 413-14 (x985) (suggesting that easy
cases arise when the relationship between legal norms and human behavior is uncontroversial).
38 See Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2720-22 (x989); Karahalios v.
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 109 S. Ct. 1282, 1286 (x989) (describing a
"canon" of construction against implied causes of action); Thompson v. Thompson, io8 S. Ct.
513, 520-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).

See generally P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, D.

SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 943-50

(3d ed. 1988) (recounting the changes in the Supreme Court's treatment of implied causes of
action).
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the plain meaning approach -

is unhelpful when

statutory words have more than one dictionary definition, or when
the context produces interpretive doubt. It is not clear, for example,
whether the term "feasible" contemplates a cost-benefit analysis, or
whether a prohibition of "discrimination" bars voluntary race-conscious measures designed to counteract the effects of past and present
discrimination against blacks. 39 In both of these cases, moreover, it
is uncertain whether the language should be taken to refer to the
original meaning of those words for the enacting legislature (assuming
that idea can be made intelligible in light of the problems of aggregating the views of numerous actors) or should instead take account
of contemporary understandings of what the words mean. Indeed, it
is not even clear what bearing the desires, or interpretive instructions,
of the enacting legislature should have for judicial interpretation. By
itself, textualism cannot answer these questions. Nor can the agency
conception of the judicial role resolve such problems.
(b) Overinclusiveness.40 - If textualism is taken, as it often is, to
call for reliance on the literal4 1 language of statutory words - their
dictionary definition or meaning in ordinary settings - it will sometimes suggest an outcome that makes little or no sense. For example,
suppose that a state law says that no vehicles are permitted in public
parks, and a city proposes to build in a park a monument consisting
of tanks used in World War l.42 The literal language must yield, for
the statute could not reasonably be taken to forbid a monument, which
causes none of the harms the statute could be thought to prevent.
A passage from Wittgenstein indicates the basic difficulty: "Someone says to me: 'Shew the children a game.' I teach them gaming
with dice, and the other says 'I didn't mean that sort of game.' Must
the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind when
he gave me the order?" 43 The example shows that sometimes the best
interpretation of a textual command is one that runs counter to its
apparent literal meaning - even if the author did not have in mind
the case at issue, or make a judgment about how that case should be
resolved.
39See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(198o) (plurality opinion) (interpreting "feasible"); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 201-02 (,979) (rejecting an interpretation of "discriminate" that would bar affirmative
action).
40 "Overinclusiveness" and "underinclusiveness," as used in the text, refer to the fact that
the best interpretation of a word, all things considered, sometimes calls for a restriction on or
a departure from a word's dictionary meaning.
41 The notion of "literal" meaning is a crude one. It usually refers to the meaning of words
in "most" contexts, but because meaning is a function of context, it is wrong to suggest, as the
concept of "literal meaning" does, that words have context-independent meanings.
42 This famous example comes from H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 121-32 (1961).
43 L. WITTGENSTEIN, su ra note 24, at 33.
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Courts encounter the problem of overinclusiveness frequently. 44
The Supreme Court recently held that a statute exempting state and
local public housing obligations "from allt taxation . . . imposed by
the United States" should not be interpreted to include an exemption
from federal estate tax. 4 5 The Court held that the exemption did not
mean what it appeared to say in light of the contemporaneous understanding that an excise tax was not ordinarily comprehended within
the category of "taxation. '46 As another example, suppose that the
legislature has said that an employer may discharge an employee "for
any reason." Is the employer thereby authorized to fire workers who
have refused to commit crimes on his behalf ? If a state law says that
one spouse will inherit from another "in all circumstances," may 47a
husband who has murdered his wife make a claim against the estate?
These are examples of what might be described as the overinclusiveness of a prominent version of textualism:48 the possibility that statutory language, read without sufficient regard to context or its intended field of application, will reach situations that it could not
reasonably cover.
(c) Underinclusiveness. - Although it arises less frequently, there
is also a possibility that textualism will be underinclusive. Justice
Holmes warned that "[c]ourts are apt to err by sticking too closely to
the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes
beyond them."'49 A particular difficulty here is that a statute may be
44See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 1o 9 S. Ct. 2558, 2573-74 (1989);
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987); Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 43-44 (1986); O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 31 (1986); Offshore Logistics,
Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1986); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 201 (979); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (194o);

Armstrong Co. v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 333 (1933); Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, io8 S.W. 641

(1go8); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 568-75 (1963) (finding that despite the
interstate compact's express inclusion of the "Colorado River System," Arizona could not be
forced to give up water from a portion of that system entirely within its borders because
legislative history shows Congress intended to include mainstream water only).
45 See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, io8 S. Ct. 1179, i182, 2284 (2988).
46

See id. at 1182.

47 See

Riggs v. Palmer, 225 N.Y. 5o6, 22 N.E. x88 (1889); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart,
429 n.2, 433 (1983) (discussed above in note 35).
48 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2573-74 (2989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Riggs, 115 N.Y. at S16, 22 N.E. at 191 (Gray, J.,
dissenting).
49 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Missouri v. Jenkins, 209 S. Ct. 2463, 2471 (2989) (holding that "attorney's fee" should be read
to include award of paralegal fees); Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16693
(No. 88-3043, 7 th Cir. Oct. 31, 1989) (Posner, J.) (holding that although § x988 specified recovery
for an "attorney's fee," a proper interpretation of Congress' instructions allows no distinction
between paying for an attorney and paying for an expert witness).
461 U.S. 424,
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"evaded" by private ingenuity. The literal language of the statute does
not cover the situation, but because the private conduct causes all of
the harms that the statute could be thought to prevent, courts sometimes hold a statute applicable notwithstanding its literal terms. 50 The
problem of evasion should not be an excuse for judicial stretching of
statutes (to be sure, a most ill-defined concept in this setting), but the
problem has elicited judicial responses in a number of areas, most
5
notably taxation. '
(d) Delegation, Gaps, and Implementing Rules. - The incompleteness of textualism is most conspicuous when Congress has explicitly
or implicitly delegated lawmaking power to the courts or when Congress has simply left a gap. In cases of delegated power or gap-filing,
the problem is not that words are susceptible to more than one construction, but instead that the words necessarily require courts to look
52
to sources outside of the text.
The Sherman Act, for example, raises a serious gap-filling problem. The language of the Act does not answer the question of what
practices amount to "conspiracies in restraint of trade." The legislative
history is suggestive but unclear,5 3 and the courts have inevitably
taken the Act as a delegation of policymaking power pursuant to quite
open-ended criteria. 5 4 Similarly, section I983 s5 is silent on many im50 See, e.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 8o9 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (x935).
S See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (i945); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. I966); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809. Outside the area of
taxation, there are many examples as well. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 49; Stoner v.
Hudgins, 568 S.W.2d 898, 902-03 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (holding that despite a narrow verbal
construction, a statute providing for credit against damages for advance payments made to tort
claimants should be read to mean that the credit should be applied after the damage award is
reduced to account for comparative negligence). See generally Isenbergh, Musings on Form and
Substance in Taxation (Book Review), 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 859 (1982). Johnson v. Southern
Pac. Co., 1I7 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902), rev'd, 296 U.S. i (29o4), which held that the term "cars"
in a statute requiring cars on common carriers to be equipped with automatic couplers did not
extend to locomotive engines, is persuasively criticized by Hart and Sacks on the ground that
the literalist court interpreted the statute too narrowly. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note
15, at 1173-74.
52 The problems of delegation or gap-filling must be distinguished from a "gap" that is best
taken as a legislative decision not to prohibit conduct or not to change the status quo. Here
silence is a straightforward absence of law, and one that allows private coilduct to go on as
before. This latter sort of gap - which is essentially an exclusion or exemption from a statute
- is confused with the sort of gap that requires judicial elaboration of the law in Easterbrook,
cited above in note i3; and OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND
MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EvALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

100-04 (1989) [hereinafter USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. The confusion produces a version of the old idea that statutes in derogation of the
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

common law must be narrowly construed.
53 See i P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
io6, at 14-16 (1978).
54 See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
55 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (i982).
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portant questions, including available defenses, burdens of pleading
and persuasion, and exhaustion requirements. Because of the textual
silence, judges must fill the gaps. To this extent, the statute delegates
56
power to make common law.
Judicial implementation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
I9645 7 can be understood in similar terms, though this example is
more controversial. The basic prohibition of "discrimination" provides
no guidance on the role of discriminatory effects, the appropriate
burdens of proof and production, and the mechanisms for filtering out
discriminatory treatment. Judicial answers to these questions sometimes purport to be relatively mechanical responses to congressional
commands, 5 8 but in fact they amount to judge-made implementing
devices that reflect the judges' own, inevitably value-laden views. In
light of the existence of textual gaps on many questions, this approach
is hardly an embarrassment or a usurpation, but instead an inevitable
part of interpretation. Much of the law of title VII is an unavoidable,
and therefore legitimate, norm-ridden exercise in developing gap-filling
rules.5 9 In this respect, the Sherman Act and title VII are closely
analogous.
When the language of a statute does not specify its implementing
rules, textualism is incomplete: courts must look elsewhere. When
Congress has delegated power or left a gap, the line between interpreting and creating federal common law 60 becomes quite thin.
(e) Changed Circumstances. - The discussion thus far has assumed that circumstances have not changed significantly since the
statute was enacted. Textualism becomes even more problematic

56 The C6urt has sometimes indicated that gaps should be filled by reference to the common
law of the time. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (ig8i);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (I975).

Frequently, however, it has filled gaps in

accordance with its own views about how best to implement the statute - an approach that is
probably consistent with the drafters' own understanding about how courts would act. See
Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources Qf Law, 42
STAN. L. REV. 5i (1989); Kramer & Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section r983: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 263-66.
57 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to 2oooe-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
58 See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (x98x);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 8oo-o
402 U.S. 424, 431 (197I).

(1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,

59 See, e.g., Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2737-38
(1989) (deciding that, under title VII, attorneys' fees may not be awarded against nonfrivolous
intervenors, largely because of courts' perceptions about the social consequences of such a rule).
60 Federal common law is usually thought to involve judicial lawmaking when little or no
guidance has been supplied by the legislature. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 410-1I (2964).

Statutory interpretation,

by contrast, is usually thought to involve a decision about the meaning of ambiguous enactments.
For the reasons stated in the text, this distinction is far too simple.
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when time has affected the assumptions under which the statute was
originally written. Changed circumstances may produce ambiguity or
interpretive doubt in the text where neither existed before.
Consider the Delaney Clause, which forbids the use as food additives of substances that "induce" cancer. 61 The Delaney Clause was
enacted at a time when carcinogenic substances were difficult to detect
and all detectable carcinogens were extremely dangerous. These facts,
however, no longer hold true, and under current conditions the Delaney Clause almost undoubtedly increases health risks by keeping
relatively safe substances off the market and by forcing consumers to
resort either to noncarcinogenic substances that pose other risks or to
substances that were approved by earlier administrators using the
cruder technology of their day. Because the factual premises under
which the enacting Congress operated are now demonstrably false,
might the word "induce" allow the government to exempt from regulation carcinogens that pose trivial risks? 62 Similarly, would a "public policy" exception to the charitable deduction in the Internal Revenue Code require the government to deny the deduction to schools
that engage in racial discrimination, even if those who enacted the
Code many decades before believed that such discrimination was
perfectly consistent with public policy? 63 In short, it is by no means
obvious that the statutory text should be understood in accordance
64
with its "original meaning," even if that concept were unproblematic.

The discussion thus far suggests two principal points. First, and
most fundamentally, there is no such thing as an acontextual "text"
that can be used as the exclusive guide to interpretation. In easy
cases, interpretive norms - on which there is wide or universal
consensus - and context both play a part in the process of ascertaining statutory meaning. Because such norms are so widely shared,
they are invisible and are not an object of controversy. Only in these
cases can meaning ever be said to be "plain." With these qualifications, textualism is generally appropriate. In hard cases, however,
courts must resort to a highly visible background norm, 65 or a con61 See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982).
62 See infra pp. 496-97.
63 See infra note ioo (discussing Bob Jones University v. United-States, 461 U.S. 574 (I983)).
64 Indeed, I will be offering reasons to suggest that it should not, be. See infra pp. 493-97;
accord Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988).
65 In hard cases, a claimed reliance on the text often disguises the actual basis for decision,
which does not turn on text at all. In these cases, discretion is inevitable. For a powerful
demonstration in the context of environmental law, see R. MELNiCK, REGULATION AND THE
COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 371 (2983), which shows that the constant resort
to statutory text in cases in which text is at best indeterminate can lead judges to act on the
basis of unarticulated and uninformed policy considerations.
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testable one, or some gap-filling device in order to resolve an interpretive dispute. In these settings, and in this sense, textualism is incomplete.
Second, it is by no means obvious that courts should always rely
solely on the text or on the "plain meaning" of its words even in cases
in which such reliance leads to determinate results. Although textualism properly draws on the democratic primacy of the legislature,
legislative instructions are often unclear and the claim of a command
is a myth. An interpretive strategy that relies exclusively on the
ordinary meaning of words is precisely that - a strategy that reflects
a choice among competing possibilities - and it will sometimes pro66
duce irrationality or injustice that the legislature did not intend.
Textualism of this sort is not incomplete but instead pernicious.
In cases of overinclusiveness, underinclusiveness, changed circumstances, or divergence between ordinary meaning and contextual or
legislatively intended meaning, textualism - with its disregard of the
irrational, unjust, and often unintended outcomes produced by literalism in hard cases - is best defended as a fighting faith, an inference
from the system of separation of powers, rather than as a necessary
understanding of statutory interpretation. On this view, reliance on
ordinary meaning and indifference to context, irrationality, and injustice will discipline the judges, limit their discretion, hold them to
Congress' actual words, and warn the lawmakers to be careful about
statutory language.67 It is by no means clear, however, that a system
of textualism, so defended, will lead to a superior system of law, and
there is considerable reason to suspect otherwise. 68 Even the most
attractive form of textualism, emphasizing not literalism but the meaning of words read in context and against shared interpretive norms,
is inadequate in light of the need to use contestable norms in hard
cases and the interpretive difficulties produced by unintended irrationality and injustice.
2. Contextual Approaches. Sometimes those who rely on the
agency theory stress not the statutory text alone, but text as understood in the light of the context and background of the statute. Contextual approaches provide at least partial responses to the problems
with textualism, mostly by helping to resolve ambiguities or fill gaps.
The traditional efforts to supplement text with context, however, have

66 Consider, for instance, the examples of overinclusiveness mentioned earlier: a law allowing
spousal inheritance "in all circumstances," invoked by someone who murdered his wife; or a
law allowing employers to discharge employees "for any reason" invoked by an employer who
fired a worker for refusing to commit murder. See supra p. 42o; see also cases cited supra notes
35 & 44.
67 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 1o9 S. Ct. 2558, 2573-8o (198 9)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
68 See infra pp. 438-4o.
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problems of their own.

Sometimes they reproduce the failings of

textualism, sometimes they operate at the expense of the text, and
sometimes they depend on poor understandings of the legislative pro-

cess and the constitutional background. The most prominent efforts
to adhere to the agency theory while venturing beyond the text of the

provision at issue involve structure, purpose, intent, and legislative
history.
(a) Structure. - Courts often respond to the various problems in
textual approaches by reference to other parts of the text and, more
importantly for our purposes, to the structure of the statute. On this

view, an interpretation should be disfavored if it would make the
disputed provision fit awkwardly with another provision or produce

internal redundancy or confusion. An interpretation that would make
sense of the statute as a whole should be adopted. Structural argu69
ment has proved helpful in many cases.
Structural approaches to statutory construction are entirely unob-

jectionable -

on the contrary, they provide significant interpretive

guidance. Such approaches promote fidelity to congressional instruc-

tions and at the same time help to make sense of complex regulatory
enactments. If an interpretation of one provision works against or
makes meaningless another provision, there is good reason to reject
that interpretation.

Structural approaches, however, suffer from two problems. First,
they depend on an assumption that statutes are in fact internally

consistent and coherent -

an assumption that recent theories of leg-

islation have questioned in light of the influence of interest groups,

compromise, and irrationality. 70 If that assumption is false, the court's
treatment of statutes as internally consistent wholes cannot be justified

69 See, e.g., Carlucci v. Doe, 1o9 S. Ct. 407, 412-14 (1988); Milwaukee v. Yeutter, 877 F.2d
540, 544 (7th Cir. 1989). Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989)
is an instructive example. In Reid, the Supreme Court was asked to construe the "work-forhire" provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). Section 2oi entities an
artist to the copyright of her work unless the work was "made for hire." In § 1i, work for
hire is defined in two provisions: under the first definition, it is "a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment"; under the second definition, "a work specially
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work" or under any of eight
other enumerated categories. See 17 U.S.C. § io (1982).
The Court considered the claim that when the buyer retains the right to control the work,
the artist is a common law employee under the first definition of work for hire. The Court
rejected this claim because it would make the exceptions to the second definition superfluous:
Congress could not have intended a right-to-control test for employment because that "would
mean that many works that could satisfy § 101(2) would already have been deemed works for
hire under § ioi(i)." Reid, iog S. Ct. at 2173.
70 See, e.g., Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor PoliticalInfluence,
98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. i, 27-31; Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3 (1971).
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as an accurate way of implementing legislative instructions. If the
concern with promoting rationality is to be supported, it must be on
independent grounds. 7 1 Second, structural approaches offer only partial help. In many cases, an examination of structure will reveal
ambiguities, silences, or delegations. 72 In the hardest cases, the characterization of structure depends largely, not on structure itself, but
on a value-laden idea about what conception of the statute works
best. 73 To resolve these problems, it will be necessary to look elsewhere.
(b) Purpose, Intent, and History. - In addition to consulting
statutory structure, a natural and time-honored response to the problems of textualism has been to look to the purpose, intent, and history
of a statute.
(i) Purpose. - Resort to the "purpose" of the statute was especially
popular among academic commentators in the 195o's and I96O's.
Steeped in legal realism, these commentators disparaged approaches
-

such as reliance on text alone -

that substituted mechanical rules

for more functional and purposive inquiries. 74 Their resort to purpose
was an effort to maintain the role of the courts as agents of the
legislature while at the same time acknowledging the inadequacy of
textualism. Thus, in the case of the war memorial in the park, the
question whether the memorial is a "vehicle" within the meaning of
the statute might be answered by asking whether the memorial creates
harms (such as noise or pollution) that undermine the purposes for
which the statute was enacted. Because the memorial does not, the
case is an easy one, and the statutory proscription does not apply.
In some cases, then, reliance on purpose will be a valuable way
of providing a context within which to understand statutory terms.
Purposive interpretation is, however, far from a complete solution to
the problem of statutory construction, for it reproduces all of the
problems of textualism in slightly different guise. For example, the
purpose may be ambiguous or may reveal a gap or delegation. Are
the antitrust laws designed to promote consumer welfare in the economic sense or to protect small business? Is a statute forbidding racial
71 See infra pp. 437-41.
72 Cf. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (I968) (holding that
the FCC could regulate new technologies not on the list of regulated activities enumerated in
the Communications Act of 1934).
73 The same criticism applies to the most well-known justification of structural analysis, C.
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(i969). Black's characteri-

zation of the Constitution's structural commitments generates a number of controversial conclusions; many of them are not clearly supported by constitutional structure and rest instead on
value-laden assumptions of his own.
74 See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 15, at 1148-79, 12X8-26; Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 63o, 661-69 (x958); see
also infra pp. 451-52 (discussing legal realism and statutory construction).
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discrimination designed to proscribe all distinctions on the basis of
race, or only those distinctions that burden members of minority
groups? 75 Often the legislature itself will not have anticipated such
questions. The characterization of legislative purpose is an act of
creation rather than discovery.
All of these problems would be formidable even if the legislature
consisted of one or a few persons. In the face of multimember institutions, the problem becomes even more troublesome. There will be
not one but many purposes in any statute; those purposes will sometimes conflict with one another; legislators will have complex and
conflicting views on purposes; the purposes could be described at
different levels of generality; and purposes will have been compromised and traded off in complex ways. A statute designed to protect
workers might also be intended to help union at the expense of nonunion employment; a statute designed to protect the environment
76
might also be intended to protect eastern coal producers.
Purposive interpretation may also suffer from overinclusiveness or
underinclusiveness. By taking the purpose of a statute out of context,
one might broadly read a provision to prevent behavior that under
the most plausible reading the statute should not reach. 7 7 Similarly,
an unduly narrow categorization might prevent a statute from reaching a situation that should fall within its scope. 78 Advocates of purposive interpretation sometimes disregard the fact that purposes are
expressed through and have no life independent of statutory words.
The words represent the law.
When circumstances change, reliance on the statutory purpose
becomes even trickier. Assume, for example, that Congress enacts a
statute imposing significant procedural requirements on regulatory
agencies engaging in adjudicative tasks but lenient requirements on
agencies engaging in rulemaking, and that Congress thought almost
all important administrative business would be done through adjudication. But thirty years after enactment, those assumptions no longer

75 Cf. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-08 (1979) (holding that
title VII does not forbid voluntary affirmative action plans).
76 See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 23, at 26-54. Those who emphasize the
ambiguity and multiplicity of statutory purposes often stress as well the intractability of the
ideological disputes that sometimes lie beneath interpretive questions. See Easterbrook, supra
note 13, at 544-51. Textualism thus provides a natural refuge from purposive approaches even if the refuge itself is ultimately doomed.
77 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-93 (ig8i) (interpreting "enterprise"
in RICO to encompass both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, even though legitimate
enterprises were not within Congress' original contemplation).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1936) (finding'no violation
of the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act where a railroad company owned by
a holding company transported the products of the holding company's subsidiary, even though
the transportation caused all of the harms the statute was enacted to prevent).
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hold, as agencies engage in extensive rulemaking and do most of their
significant work in that way. Is it so clear that judicial "bending" of
ambiguous provisions in the statute to impose greater procedural re79
quirements in rulemaking is unfaithful to the purpose of the law?
Indeed, is it so clear that such an interpretation is bending at all? In
view of the changed context, what would it mean for courts to be
"faithful" to the original purpose?80
The problem in these settings is that mechanical transplantation
of statutory purposes to new settings is unlikely to produce sensible
results even from the standpoint of the enacting legislature. Nor is it
sufficient to say that the legislature rather than the courts should
respond to changed circumstances. Often it is unrealistic to expect a
legislative response. 8 ' More important, the issue for interpretation is
the meaning of the statute in the new circumstances. Meaning does
not remain static across changes in law, policy, and fact. 82 Interpretation that brings the legislature into the present will, however, inevitably involve a large measure of discretion and a corresponding
danger of judicial abuse.
Purposive interpretation, then, is far from a panacea. Although it
is frequently helpful in giving context to statutory terms, the effort to
characterize legislative purpose often produces serious problems,
whether or not circumstances have changed. In some cases, the purpose might be characterized in many ways, all of which are faithful
to the original enactment. The act of characterization is therefore one
of invention rather than discovery.
(ii) Legislative Intent and Legislative History. - It is often suggested that in hard cases, the meaning of the statute should be derived
by ascertaining the intent of those who enacted it.8 3 This approach
79 See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SuP. CT. REv. 345, 381-82 (arguing in favor of such judicial "bending").
80 Or suppose Congress enacted a statute regulating banking with the understanding that
the banking and securities businesses could be quite discrete and that banks would face little
competition - but the rise of the money market fund forced banks to compete in an integrated
and competitive national market. In such circumstances, how should the Court decide whether
a bank holding company can provide securities brokerage services in the face of ambiguous
restrictions on combining securities business with banking? See Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672 (1987).
s1See, e.g., Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1988)
(noting Congress' failure to come to terms with the obsolescence of the Delaney Clause).
82 This point is insufficiently emphasized by Dean Calabresi, who suggests that the remedy
for obsolete statutes is "overruling" them. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES

163-66

(1982).

In fact, "obsolescence" frequently involves just the opposite prob-

lem: discerning the meaning of a statute in light of changed circumstances.
83See, e.g., Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597, z6o5 (1989);
Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. I, 23-25 (8976).
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is similar to purposive interpretation, but here the goal is not to look
at a general legislative aim or purpose, but instead to see more particularly how the enacting legislature would have resolved the question, or how it intended that question to be resolved, if it had been

presented. For those who emphasize legislative intent, the legislative
history is a central object of concern.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has been divided about the
significance of legislative intent and legislative history. The Court has

suggested that the question for interpretation is in fact one of "congres-

sional intent,"8 4 and has generally treated legislative history as a key

to the identification of "intent." Justice Scalia, however, has expressed
considerable doubt about legislative intent in general and legislative

history in particular.8 5 In Justice Scalia's view, the role of the courts
is to ascertain statutory meaning rather than legislative "intent."

Moreover, Justice Scalia suggests that legislative history is frequently
Written by well-organized private groups, and much of it, especially

the floor debates, reflects little, if any, general congressional will.8 6
Judicial reliance on legislative history thus increases the power of
interest groups over the interpretive process at the expense of Congress

84 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 1o8 S. Ct. 513 ('988); cases cited supra note 83.
85 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., iog S. Ct. 198i, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); United States v. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183, 1193-97 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 946-47 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413,
2423-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Thompson, io8 S. Ct. at 522-23 (Scalia, J,
concurring in the judgment). Consider also the critical discussion of legislative intent in
MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966); and Radin, Statutory Interpretation,
43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 866 (193o).

Justice Scalia's hostility to the use of legislative history derives in part from his characteristic
but quite extraordinary antagonism to approaches that increase complexity in the law. A reliance
on the text seems to have the comparative virtue of simplicity. For illustrations of Justice
Scalia's hostility to complexity in a range of areas, see Mistretta v. United States, xog S. Ct.
647, 675 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court in part because of the complex
character of the balancing test it adopts); Morrison v. Olson, 1o8 S. Ct. 2597, 2622-41 (1988)

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); Thompson, io8 S. Ct. at 522-23 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (calling for a bright-line rule against implied causes of action); and Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 170 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(calling for the use of the state statute of limitations or no limitations period at all when the
federal statute lacks an explicit limitations period).
86 As a self-conscious example, consider these words:
Mr. Speaker, having received unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD,
I would like to indicate that I am not really speaking these words. . . . As a matter of
fact, I am back in my office typing this out on my own hot little typewriter.. . . Such
is the pretense of the House that it would have been easy to just quietly include these
remarks in the RECORD, issue a brave press release, and convince thousands of cheering
constituents that I was in there fighting every step of the way, influencing the course of
history in the heat of debate.
117 CONG. REC. 36506 (I97) (statement of Rep. Heckler).
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itself. Above all, Justice Scalia argues,
the legislative history was
87
never enacted and is therefore not law.
Concerns of this sort are both legitimate and well-taken. Although
it is proper to look at a statute's background in the form of actually
enacted and repealed provisions, the legislative history, which was
never enacted, should rarely be permitted to supplant the statutory
words as they are ordinarily understood. 8 8 This is so because attention
to the language promotes the rule of law and because of democratic
and constitutional considerations - the words rather than the intent
survived the procedures of article I. Moreover, such an approach
might both discipline Congress, by forcing it to attend to its words,
and minimize judicial discretion by barring judges from relying on
policies and principles of their own. But Justice Scalia somewhat
overstates the point.8 9 The legislative history will sometimes reveal
what some or many members of the Congress thought about the
meaning of an ambiguous term, and that understanding is relevant.
It is unlikely that the history will only reflect the views of selfinterested private groups. 90 Moreover, legislative history provides a
sense of the context and purpose of a statutory enactment, which, as
we have seen, can provide important interpretive help.
Finally, and most fundamentally, it is not clear where judges are
to look if they refuse to consider the legislative history. Without
reference to the history, interpretation sometimes becomes far less
bounded, 9 1 and it is no surprise that those who reject intent and
history tend to be textualists 92 - a strategy that in hard cases will
87 See, e.g., Bock, o9 S. Ct. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Stuart, log
S. Ct. at 1193-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Blanchard, xo9 S. Ct. at 946-47
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Taylor, xo8 S. Ct. at 2423-24
(Scalia, J., concurring in part).
88 See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 87o F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. i989).
89 Cf. Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 423-25, 437-61 (criticizing Justice Scalia's rejection
of the use of intent and legislative history); The Role of Legislative History in Judicial Interpretation: A Discussion Between Judge Kenneth W. Starr and Judge Abner J. Mikva, 1987
DUKE L.J. 367, 381-86 (judge Mikva) (arguing that the use of legislative history is compelled
by inherent ambiguities in many statutes).
90 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 445-46 (suggesting that legislative history is more
likely to reflect the views of congressional staff members than those of private interest groups).
It is also possible to create a hierarchy within the sources of legislative history. Thus, for
example, floor debates, which are often conducted before few legislators and sometimes are
added after the fact, are entitled to less weight than a committee report. See Eskridge, The
New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REv. (forthcoming iggo).
91 The combination of textualism, disregard of legislative history, and the Chevron principle,
see infra pp. 444-46, would produce a dramatic increase in the executive's power to make law.
When the language is ambiguous, the executive's interpretation will control, even if the legislative
history argues in the other direction. Consider in this regard Justice Scalia's general enthusiasm
for executive power. See Mistretta v. United States, o9 S. Ct. 647, 68o-83 (989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, io8 S. Ct. 2597, 2622-41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92 As Justice Scalia often is. See sources cited supra note 23 (debating the merits of using
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leave large gaps or produce mistakes. One might say all this without
denying that Justice Scalia is saying something correct and important
in cautioning courts not to accord weight to legislative history at the
expense of statutory language, and in recognizing the risk that parts
of the history may have been composed by one side or the other. In
short, courts should approach legislative history cautiously. 93 Except

in rare cases of unintended irrationality or injustice, 94 courts should

not permit history to overcome statutory language; but they should

also not ignore it, especially when the text is unclear.
For present purposes, the more fundamental point is that judicial

reliance on legislative intent, whether or not derived on the basis of
legislative history, suffers from three basic difficulties.

The first is

that Congress enacts statutes rather than its own views about what
those statutes mean; those views, while relevant, are not controlling

unless they are in the statute. The words, not the "intent," represent
the law. The enactment, not the legislature's unenacted views, binds
the public and the judges. 95
To say this is not to deny that the intentions of a group or majority
of lawmakers will be pertinent and helpful. Legislative history has
in fact provided a valuable sense of context in a number of recent

cases.96 If the legislators understood a statutory word as a term of
legislative history); Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 5II (acknowledging his textualism while detailing the necessity of deferring to an
agency's greater expertise and accountability). Justice Scalia has, notably, endorsed some canons
of construction. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 1O9 S. Ct. i98i, 1994 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (advocating an interpretation "most compatible with the
surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated - a compatibility which,
by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind'); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, iog
S. Ct. 1676, 1683-84 & n.5 (1989) (invoking the expressio unius canon); Coit Independence
Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 109 S. Ct. 1361, 1377 (1989) (Scalia, J.,concurring in the judgment)
(advocating a presumption against preemption of state law); Pierce v. Underwood, io8 S. Ct.
2541, 2547-49 (1988) (arguing that lower court interpretations should be presumed valid);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453-54 (1987) (Scalia,
J.,concurring in the judgment) (arguing for deference to agency interpretations of law).
93 For a vivid illustration of why courts ought to do this, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER,
cited above in note 23, at 48-54, io8-1o9 (revealing the power of the eastern coal lobby to
obtain legislative history, but not statutory text, in its favor).
94See, e.g., Bock, iog S. Ct. 1981 (discussed below in note 96); cases cited supra note 44.
95 "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899); see also
Thompson v. Thompson, io8 S. Ct. 513, 522-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
the Court should refuse to infer federal private rights of action in the absence of express
legislation).
96 The Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy vigorously argues in favor of actual
rather than intended meaning, see USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
52, at 21-26. The argument, however, understates the usefulness of intended meaning in clearing
up ambiguities, correcting unintended absurdities, and avoiding irrationality.
In Bock, iog S. Ct. 1981, for example, all the members of the Court refused to read the
relevant text literally, and all agreed that the legislative history helped to reveal that literalism
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art, that understanding should prevail; courts should attend to the
intended meaning rather than the usual meaning of the words if the
former is clear and the latter would produce absurdity. Moreover, an
undisputed congressional intent should ordinarily be followed in the
event of linguistic ambiguity. 97 But the subjective intentions, even if
98
ascertainable, are not controlling unless enacted.

would lead to inadvertent absurdity. The case involved the meaning of rule 6og(a)(x) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows the introduction of prior crimes of a witness, for
purposes of attacking credibility, when "the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the defendant." FED. R. EVID. 6o9(a)(1). All nine members of the Court
agreed that rule 6og could not plausibly mean that evidence would be automatically introduced
against civil plaintiffs, but not against civil defendants. The legislative history revealed that
such an interpretation was unintended - for no one, at any point in the background and
history of the rules, ever proposed or assumed a distinction between the rights of civil plaintiffs
and those of civil defendants. Indeed, even Justice Scalia acknowledged the usefulness of history
here: "I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including ... the legislative
history... to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition... was indeed unthought
of, and thus to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of the word 'defendant' in the
Rule." Bock, io9 S. Ct. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Legislative history can also help the courts to avoid irrationality while vindicating congressional will in the face of ambiguity. In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,
109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989), the Court faced the question whether the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, 5 U.S.C. App. §§ i-IS (1982 & Supp. V), which imposes detailed requirements for openness,
publicity, and balance in membership of federal advisory committees, applied to the consultations
of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary. That committee
consults with the President regarding potential nominees for federal judgeships. The Court
acknowledged that the Act's language, which defined an advisory committee as one "utilized
by" the Executive, appeared to apply to the ABA committee. But use of a dictionary definition
of "utilize" would be absurd because it would make the Act apply even to presidential decisions
to consult with his own political party before selecting his Cabinet. The Court instead examined
the legislative history, which strongly suggested that the ABA committee - a private group not
established by the federal government and not receiving federal funds - did not fall within the
category of advisory entities that Congress wanted to control. See Public Citizen, O9 S. Ct.
at 2567-73. See also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
432-43 (1987) (finding that asylum could be granted to aliens reasonably fearing persecution, in
part because the legislative history demonstrated that Congress did not intend a more demanding
standard).
97 The intent should also control in the event of inadvertent error. For an example, see the
inadvertent insertion of the word "not" in a bill revising the boundaries of the Olympic Park
and the Olympic National Forest. The statute says that the Secretary of Agriculture must
design and construct a forest logging road, but also provides that the Secretary "shall not
construct the road as close as practically possible to the park boundary but not more than five
hundred feet east of the divide." Pub. L. No. 99-635, § 2(a), ioo Stat. 3527, 3528 (1986)
(emphasis added).
98See R. DwoKXIN, supra note ig, at 313-54. Dworkin rejects the use of subjective
intention to resolve ambiguities in favor of a principle that would call on courts to use "the best
principle" that justifies "what the legislature has done." This position is discussed in more detail
at p. 436 below. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that Dworkin almost entirely
ignores the risks of judicial error, venality, or confusion in generating "the best principle"; in
light of those risks, presumptive reliance on subjective intentions in the face of ambiguity or
irrationality seems desirable from the standpoint of democratic theory.
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The second set of problems is that legislative intent, like legislative
purpose, is largely a fiction in hard cases - a problem aggravated by
the extraordinary difficulties of aggregating the "intentions" of a multimember body. With or without these problems, there are risks of
ambiguity, overinclusiveness, and underinclusiveness in relying on
legislative intent, just as there are in relying on text and purpose.
The third problem is that Congress may have enacted a concept
capable of change over time. Those who emphasize legislative intent
sometimes say that interpreters should attempt to "go back" to the
beliefs and hopes of the enacting legislature to see how it would decide
the question had it been presented. 99 It is unclear that this "imaginative reconstruction" approach is either consistent with Congress'
interpretive instructions or a sensible way of ascertaining the meaning
of statutory terms. In the face of changed circumstances, perhaps the
better route would be to imagine that the enacting legislature could
be "brought forward" into the present and then to ask how it would
decide the question in light of new developments of law, fact, and
policy. 100

99 This was Learned Hand's view. See Borrella v. Borden Co., I45 F.2d 63, 64 (2d. Cir.
1944), aff'd, 325 U.S. 679 (I945); L. HAND, How FarIs a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?,

in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY IO6-o9 (I. Dilliard 3 d ed. i96o). Judge Posner recently suggested:
"The judge's job is not to keep a statute up to date in the sense of making it reflect contemporary
values, but to imagine as best he can how the legislators who enacted the statute would have
wanted it applied to situations they did not foresee." R. POSNER, stpra note io, at 287; see
generally id. at 286-93.
This approach suffers from three difficulties in addition to those identified in the text. First,
in hard cases, this advice is open-ended, and perhaps contradictory. The legislature may have
intended that the statute not contradict contemporary values when applied to unforeseen situations. Second, an entirely backward-looking approach of this sort may lead to a less sensible
system of law than would alternative approaches, because it would perpetuate anachronistic
views. Finally, background norms of interpretation play an inevitable part in the process, and
those norms cannot readily be captured in the notion of imaginative reconstruction.
100 As Justice Holmes commented:
[W]hen we are dealing with words- that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution
of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters.... The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience,
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
There is a significant difference between backward-looking and forward-looking interpretation. Consider, for example, Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), in
which the Court was asked to decide whether a public policy exception to the charitable
deduction required the Internal Revenue Service to deny tax deductions to schools that discriminated on the basis of race. There is no doubt that if that question had been put to the Congress
that initially enacted the relevant provision of the Code, it would have answered that there was
no such requirement. But if the enacting Congress were brought forward to the present - to
be sure, a difficult conceptual exercise - it would probably have concluded that the deduction
was impermissible in light of its inconsistency with recent law and policy proscribing and
penalizing private racial discrimination.
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When circumstances have changed, backward-looking interpretation may produce absurd results, and often it is fully plausible to
think that members of the enacting legislature intended the meaning
of the statute not to be controlled by its original understanding. In
such cases - signaled most obviously by open-ended terms capable
of change over time - it should be relatively uncontroversial for
courts to depart from original meaning; here meaning obviously shifts
with circumstances. More generally, the legislature will often have
had no considered view on the question of backward-looking or forward-looking interpretation. In these circumstances, reliance on intent
Something other than intent must
will lead to intractable problems.
1 1
be the basis for decision. '
For all of these reasons, the notion of legislative intent is at best
an incomplete guide to statutory construction. If the legislative intent
is ascertainable, it should be used to resolve otherwise doubtful questions about statutory meaning. Nevertheless, difficult questions will
often remain.

In sum, the traditional contextual approaches can help remedy
some of the problems with reliance on text "alone." But sometimes
structure, purpose, intent, and history will leave gaps or ambiguities,
and reliance on purpose, intent, and history may lead to interpretive
mistakes. Although it would be foolish to dispense with these tools,
they cannot generate a workable approach to interpretation without
considerable supplementation.
3. Legal Process. - Some of those who stress the importance of
background and context acknowledge that in some cases, a reliance
on these sources will be inadequate. Thus the celebrated treatment
by Hart and Sacks in The Legal Process0 2 suggests that to solve hard
cases, the court "should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably
appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."'10 3 In a similar vein, Karl
Llewellyn counseled courts to "strive to make sense as a whole out of
04
our law as a whole.'
Legal process approaches stand poised somewhere between agency
theories of the judicial role and understandings of an altogether dif101See supra note io; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 64 (advocating interpretation that
departs from original meaning in the face of changed circumstances).
102 H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 15.
103 Id. at 1415.
104 Llewellyn, supra note ig, at 399 (emphasis in original). Many of the most astute writers
on statutory interpretation spoke very much in these terms. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 44,
at 231; Radin, supra note 85, at 884.
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ferent sort. On the one hand, some such approaches (particularly that
of Hart and Sacks) are designed to implement legislative commands
by counseling courts to replicate the judgment the legislature would
have made.' 0 5 On the other hand, some such approaches are designed
to produce "reason" or "rationality" in statutes, quite apart from any
actual or hypothetical judgment by the legislature.' 0 6 In either case,
the legal process reference to "reasonableness" or "sense" points to the
context of the statute's application rather than to its background and
development.
For those who endorse the agency model, the first problem with
such approaches is that they appear to be based on poor understandings of the actual nature of the legislative process.' 0 7 Hart and Sacks,
for example, dealt inadequately with the role of interest groups in
determining the content of statutes - an unsurprising omission in
light of the fact that most of the relevant literature has emerged in
the last generation. The view that courts should treat statutes as if
they promoted reasonable purposes in a reasonable way is an attractive one - indeed, it plays a central role in this Article. But this
claim is normative, not descriptive. The task of imposing reason on
regulatory legislation is sometimes inconsistent with the legislation
itself, and it takes courts far from the role of faithful agents of the
legislature.
More fundamentally, the suggestion that courts should attempt to
"make sense" of regulatory statutes or to treat them as would "reasonable people acting reasonably" is a conspicuous outgrowth of 1950's
jurisprudence, when the "end of ideology" thesis played such a large
role in political science and the study of law.' 0 8 Advice of this sort
is useful only when there is a consensus or a defense of particularized
judgments about what approach "makes sense" or is "reasonable." In
many interpretive disputes, however, such guidance is too open-ended
to be helpful. Without much more, a reference to "sense" cannot
determine whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
requires the agency to undertake cost-benefit analyses, or whether the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws race-conscious programs designed to
increase the representation of blacks. A recognition of this point has
lOSSee H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 15, at 1414.
106 This is true of Llewellyn, who calls for an active, synthetic role for the courts; it is also
true of Freund and Radin. See sources cited supra note 104.
107 See sources cited supra note 70 (discussing the public choice analysis of the congressional
process); see also pp. 446-47.
108 See generally D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL

IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (i960) (describing the "end of ideology" in America as a result of political
and social changes); Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761, 765-66 (1987) (associating the decline of the autonomy and authority of
purely legal inquiry with the demise of the political consensus of the i95o's).
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led many to return to the text - an understandable but unsuccessful
strategy.
The same problems underlie Ronald Dworkin's influential treatment of this subject.' 0 9 Dworkin argues that courts should interpret
statutes in accordance with the best principle that can be brought
forward in support of what the legislature "has done." In Dworkin's
view, the judge should see himself as "a partner continuing to develop,
in what he believes is the best way, the statutory scheme Congress
began. " 110 The judge should ask "what coherent system of political
convictions would best justify what [the legislature] has done," 111 and
should find and apply to disputed issues of interpretation "the best
11 2
justification . . . of a past legislative event."
This position is a clear heir to the legal process position - above
all, in its emphasis on the use of judicial interpretation to produce
reasonable results, to guard against arbitrariness, and to produce
coherence in the legal system. As did its legal process predecessors,
Dworkin's approach sees the courts partly as agents (hence the emphasis on "what the legislature has done") and partly as creative actors
relying on normative theories of their own. In a number of respects,
Dworkin's approach fits congenially with what I suggest here: it, too,
insists on judicial efforts to promote a principled rather than ad hoc
set of legal requirements and to foster what Dworkin calls "integrity,"
sometimes in the face of legislative "intent" or the actual character of
113
the legislative process.
Dworkin's approach is marred, however, by the open-ended character of its guiding interpretive principle - a failing that provides
the final link between Dworkin's effort and that of the legal process
school. The dangers of judicial discretion in searching for and giving
content to "the best principle" are largely unaddressed. Dworkin fails
to explore the institutional background, or the substantive functions
and failures of statutory regimes. The characteristics of the modern
regulatory state are entirely invisible in Dworkin's treatment. Dworkin's account draws far too sharp a dichotomy between "the best
principle" - found through tools external (to what extent?) to the
disputed provision or the prevailing legal culture - and "what the
legislature has done," with the latter sometimes treated as if it were
14
a kind of brute fact.

109 See R. DWORKIN, supra note i9, at 313-54.
110 Id. at 313.
11, Id. at 335112 Id. at 338.
113 Indeed, the notion of "integrity" bears some resemblance to the goals of statutory con-

struction described in Part IV.
114 By contrast, the approach of this Article charges the judge neither with invoking an
external "best principle" nor with assessing, as if it were a datum, something the legislature "has
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and this is the central problem -

Dworkin's

effort to find the principle that best justifies what the legislature has
done is largely untethered. An emphasis on text, history, or intention
seems a most appealing refuge from a general inquiry of that sort. In
particular, reliance on the text seems to have a far better democratic
pedigree and to hold far more promise for limiting judicial discretion.
4. The Proper Role of Traditional Sources of Meaning and the
Failureof the Agency View. - The discussion thus far suggests several
conclusions about the use of traditional tools of statutory construction.
The text, understood in its context and in concert with shared background norms, is usually sufficient to resolve interpretive disputes.
Sometimes, however, the text is ambiguous or reveals a delegation or
gap. Moreover, the ordinary meaning of the text should not be decisive when the statutory structure or purpose (if subject to an uncontroversial characterization) suggests an alternative meaning, and when
a literal interpretation would produce a patently unjust or irrational
application that was not clearly sought by the legislature. Similarly,
the legislative "intent" - as reflected in the legislative history - is
admissible to resolve ambiguities, but it usually should not be permitted to overcome the ordinary meaning of the statutory words if
that meaning is otherwise clear. The only exception is when the
history supports the conclusion that literalism would produce unintended irrationality or injustice." 5 In some cases, however, all of
these sources of statutory meaning will leave serious gaps or uncertainties, and sometimes interpretive principles are properly invoked
to press language in particular directions.
As complete theories of statutory construction, then, the most
prominent examples of the agency view of the judicial role appear to
fail; it is time to consider the implications of that failure." 6 The
agency view starts from the important truth that it would be improper
for judges to construe statutes to mean whatever the judges think
best; the lawmaking primacy of the legislature, with its superior democratic pedigree, 1 17 prohibits such a conception of statutory "interpretation." It follows from this understanding that where there is neither
interpretive doubt nor constitutional objection, the judgment of the
electorally accountable branch should prevail.

done." The interpreter's understanding of what the legislature has done and the interpreter's
own principles are a product of background norms; the two cannot be separated.
Is See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., iog S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
116 In fact, it is doubtful that any judge subscribes to the view that the agency theory is a
complete one. The theory operates largely as a rhetorical device or a rallying cry, and as such,
it is useful in disciplining judges but also highly misleading.
117 Both disparities in political influence and the difficulties described by Arrow, see K.
ARRow, supra note i5, make it necessary to be cautious about this point. See generally infra
note X48 (describing difficulties with attributing purpose to multimember legislative bodies).
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The agency theory requires that judges exercise minimal discretion
and avoid inquiries into the constitutional backdrop, appropriate institutional arrangements, statutory function, or larger social goals.
Instead, the judge must be largely a functionary performing a mechanical process. This is, at bottom, a formalist position - formalist
because it sees the process as entirely autonomous and free from valueladen inquiries. Formalism and the agency view are entirely unobjectionable insofar as they recognize an important distinction - itself
value-laden to be sure - between the relatively constrained operation
of adjudicating statutory questions ("interpretation") and the relatively
open-ended process of legislating. But like all formalist positions, the
agency view of statutory interpretation is subject to two sorts of
objections.
First, the agency conception of "meaning" is too crude. As we
have seen, language is not self-interpreting, and sometimes legislators
delegate, self-consciously or otherwise, gap-filling power to the courts.
Moreover, the instructions of the principal are unintelligible without
background norms that interpreters alone can supply. Usually such
norms are uncontested within the legal culture, and therefore it is
sufficient to rely on the generally accepted meanings of words. In
such cases, the incompleteness of formalism is not troublesome for
interpretive practice, and the uncontested meanings should ordinarily
be given their full scope. In other cases, courts must resort to contestable or conspicuous interpretive principles, or gap-filling devices,
in order to decide the question of meaning. It is important to emphasize that this is a conceptual or logical claim, not a proposition
about the appropriate distribution of powers among administrative
agencies, courts, and legislatures. It depends not at all on a belief in
the wisdom and decency of the judges. To recognize the need for
interpretive norms when Congress has not enacted them is not to
confer on courts power that they do not already, and necessarily,
have.
Second, the broad legitimacy claims of the agency theory rely on
question-begging and probably indefensible premises. For such claims
to be persuasive, those who invoke the agency theory n1 8 must claim
that a formalist approach to construction - again, to the (limited)
extent that it is possible - is constitutionally compelled, or (what
may amount to much the same thing) will lead on balance to the best
or most sensible system of law. 119 This latter claim must be under118 See sources cited supra notes 25 & 29.
119For examples of such claims, see Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, io9 S.

Ct. 2558, 2573-74 (I989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., Io9 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (x989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); and Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, ii HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59

(1988).
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stood as a belief that the ordinary or original meaning of statutory
words must control, even if it would lead to absurd or unjust results.
But it is far more likely that the occasional introduction of other
considerations will lead to a superior system.
For example, assume that statutory language, while ambiguous, is
most naturally read to lead in a direction that is, by consensus,
irrational; that a statute might be understood as giving open-ended
authority to a bureaucracy; that the most obvious reading of a statute
provides bizarre or unjust results in light of changes in the fifty years
since its enactment. We will encounter many such cases below. In
all of these settings, courts that act as more than mere agents and
that invoke contestable background norms will produce a more sensible system of law. Indeed, sometimes such a role will be consistent
with the best reading of Congress' interpretive instructions, or will be
the best understanding to attribute to Congress when it has made no
considered judgment on the point. For this reason, courts should be
authorized to depart from the ordinary or original meaning and to
press ambiguous words in particular directions if the context suggests
that this would lead to superior outcomes.120
Of course, there are risks in admitting power of this sort, largely
in the form of increased judicial discretion. For this reason, invocation of controversial background norms should be modest. Although
no decisive argument is available to demonstrate why and to what
extent the recognition of such authority will make matters better rather
than worse, it is possible to point to institutional characteristics of the
judiciary that occasionally justify what might seem an aggressive role
in interpretation.
First, the focus on the particular circumstances enables judges to
deal with applications that no legislature, no matter how farsighted,
could conceivably have foreseen. Under changed or unforeseen circumstances, mechanical application of statutory terms is unlikely to
produce sound results, even from the standpoint of the enacting legislature. By contrast, judicial resolution of individual cases, allowing
not
an emphasis on particular settings with which a lawmaker could
12 1
interpretation.
for
advantages
significant
be familiar, contains

120 In civil law systems, this point is conventional, and a judicial role of this sort is fully
consistent with legal practice throughout this country's history, even before nationhood. See
Zweigart & Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation- Civilian Style, 44 TUL. L. REV. 704, 70708 (197o); infra note 124. Something like it was suggested by Alexander Hamilton himself. See
infra note 123. It is one thing to say that courts must defer to the lawmaking primacy of the
legislature; it is quite another thing to say that this principle implies a theory barring courts
from interpreting statutes with the aid of sometimes controversial background norms. In light
of the relevant history, the view that the Constitution carries with it this quite novel theory of
interpretation is hard to sustain.
121Consider Wittgenstein's game with dice, discussed above at p. 419; consider also the cases
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Second, because of their independence and their deliberative capacities, courts have significant advantages over a legislature that may
be influenced by parochial interests and is frequently responsive to
momentary demands.1 22 Considerations of this sort were emphasized
in The Federalist, quite outside of the context of constitutional review. 123 Those considerations support a relatively aggressive role for
the courts in statutory interpretation, one that sees judges as someThat position is consistent as well with
thing other than agents.
124
historical practice.
It would of course be possible to use contestable principles modestly or quite aggressively, and courts have occasionally used interpretive norms to construe statutes in ways that are plainly inconsistent
with the outcome that would be reached through reliance on text,
structure, purpose, and ordinary understandings of linguistic commands. 125 As a general rule, however, courts should use controversial
background norms sparingly, in deference to the basic principle of
democratic primacy. But in some situations - for example, when
conventional interpretation would produce absurdity or gross injustice,
when changed circumstances call for creativity, when constitutional
considerations counsel courts to interpret statutes in one direction involving interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Delaney Clause.
See infra pp. 489-93, 496-97.
122 Public choice theory shows that legislation imperfectly reflects the desires of the "public"
and indeed that the concept of a public will is a confused one. See, e.g., K. ARROW, supra
note 15; see also sources cited infra note 148 (discussing the economic theory of legislation).
123 In The FederalistNo. 78, Hamilton wrote:
But it is not with a view to infractions of the constitution only that the independence of
the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in
the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights
of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of
the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity, and confining the
operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those
which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in
passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are
to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very
motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 528 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 196i); cf. R. POSNER, SOME
PROBLEMS IN JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming 199o) (discussing how interpretation "civilizes" statutes).
124 Consider, for example, the central role that canons of construction have played in statutory interpretation throughout the history of Anglo-American law. See i W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *87-*92 (discussing statutory interpretation in a
nonformalist way, with principles of construction); E. BEAL, CARDINAL RULES OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION (A. Randall ed. 1924) (same); T. McLEOD, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1984) (same); Eskridge, supra note 21, at ioo-i1 (same); Landis, supra note
12, at 222-23 (same); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra note 4, at 385-86 (same); see
also T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE

FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1922) (discussing various interpretive principles of the fourteenth century).
125 See infra p. 465.
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courts should be more aggressive in statutory interpretation. In the
abstract, these observations make it difficult to decide to what extent
departures from the agency model are appropriate. The discussion in
Part IV is designed to provide a more concrete understanding of the
problem.
B. Indeterminacy? Conventionalism?
The problems with textualism and with the agency view lead some
to conclude that statutory interpretation produces unpredictability and
indeterminacy in most or all cases. 12 6 Noting that interpretation is
possible only within the context of interpretive conventions, 12 7 others
argue that it is not possible to change, debate, or even theorize about
interpretation. One just does it.
Those who accept conventionalism differ from those who believe
that statutory meaning produces indeterminacy. For conventionalists,
meaning is hardly open-ended. But the two camps have much in
common. Both reject the possibility of criteria with which to distinguish between good and bad interpretations, or to mediate disputes
over meaning. In both accounts, words have the meanings that they
do simply because people in positions of authority so interpret them.
On this point, both accounts are inadequate.
i. Indeterminacy. - It is not always clear whether the claims of
indeterminacy are meant to be normative or positive. According to
the normative version, there are no correct answers to questions of
statutory interpretation, but instead merely subjective (and perhaps
arbitrary) opinions. 128 In contrast, the positive version has it that
judicial decisions cannot be predicted in advance, even if there are
criteria by which reasonable people might mediate among interpretive
disputes.
Whether normative or positive, the claim that statutory meaning
is "indeterminate" is wildly overstated. Claims about the inevitable
indeterminacy of interpretation usually suffer from a failure to take
account of the contextual character of linguistic commands. Communication is possible only because of agreement over the governing
126 See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 190-92 (1930); see also R. UNGER, Supra
note 17, at 94-98 (arguing that a coherent theory of legal adjudication is not possible on the
premises of liberal thought).
127 See S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, sup-a note 18, at 357-58; S. FIsH, Is
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?, sup a note 18, at i3-15, 331-32. Compare the conventionalist
position with Holmes' claim that law consists of "what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more," Holmes, The Path of the Law, io HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) - a claim that is
unhelpful for a judge trying to decide what to "do in fact."
128But cf. S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?, sup a note IS, at 268 (arguing that,
in interpretation, there are obvious and inescapable meanings resulting from shared interpretive
assumptions).
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rules; these rules enable people to understand each other, and they
sharply limit the number of possible interpretations. 129 When taken
in their setting - in their context and culture - statutes are usually
susceptible to only one plausible meaning. Judicial interpretation of
statutes is therefore quite predictable, largely because background
norms are uncontested among the judges. Even where background
norms are in conflict, it is often possible to know how the case will
come out, or at least to limit the number of possible outcomes, because
one can predict which norms will govern in the circumstances. For
this reason, the claim of indeterminacy, if taken as a positive one, is
implausible.
It is possible to show as well that some interpretations are correct. 130 This is most obviously true in easy cases, in which there is
no controversy over the meaning of text in light of background norms;
but it is true in hard cases as well - a point to which I return below.
To make the unsurprising point that the choice among interpretive
strategies or background norms implicates a value judgment is hardly
to say that the choice is arbitrary. The existence of judgments of
value leads to a conclusion of arbitrariness only for the most incorrigible of positivists. Moreover, the fact that someone might argue that
a statute does not mean what it appears to say, or might characterize
the legislative purpose in a counterintuitive way, does not mean that
such arguments are convincing or even plausible. Nor does the existence of some hard cases mean that all cases are hard. The ultimate
task is to develop criteria by which to mediate among conflicting value
judgments in concrete cases, including hard ones - a task taken up
in Part IV.
2. Conventionalism. These points help to identify the flaws in
conventionalist accounts of legal interpretation. It is correct and salutary to emphasize, as conventionalists do, that interpretive assumptions are always in force, and that texts do not have "inherent" or
"necessary" meanings in the strong sense that those meanings remain
constant across different contexts and cultures. Moreover, some words
simply mean what they mean; they are not a subject of reflection and
criticism to someone who speaks the language. 13 1 But these claims
- attacks on implausible versions of textualism or formalism provide little help in the descriptive or normative tasks of interpre129 See Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 533 n.2 (discussing Wittgenstein's contention that
"meaning" is supplied by the community).
130 The criteria for correctness here are intended to be pragmatic in character. See R.

POSNER, supra note 123; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554s5 (i988). In so saying, I do not mean to take a side in the debate between realists and skeptics
about foundations for right answers in the law or speculate on the possibility that a resort to
interpretation will make that debate unnecessary. See generally Moore, The Interpretive Turn
in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 872 (x989).
13, Compare S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note I8, at 358-59 with note
24, supra.
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tation. They do not explain how conflicts within a group of interpreters should be, or in fact are, resolved. Above all, they do not
suggest that participants in the legal culture should rest content with
existing interpretive strategies, or that it is impossible to evaluate those
strategies or proposed alternatives. Interpreters in fact choose among
strategies on the basis of the reasons offered on their behalf. To claim
that meaning is only a function of culture is to give up on the important questions altogether.
Moreover, the conventionalist suggestion that interpretive norms
themselves need interpretation 3 2 hardly suggests that there are no
criteria for assessing particular norms, or that people are unable to
explain why some such norms would make things worse rather than
better. 133 In short, the conventionalist account is both too crude and
too flat. It treats interpreters as always the objects or recipients, and
never the subjects or creators, of interpretive practice. It fails to
account for the related phenomena of choice among interpretive strategies and of change over time.
C. Extratextual Norms
In recent years, courts and commentators have proposed three
theories of statutory construction that rely on extratextual norms. The
first involves a background rule in favor of private ordering; the
second calls for a rule of deference to regulatory agencies; the third
refers to the difficulties in aggregating diverse legislative views and
the notion that statutes represent "deals" among self-interested actors.
Each of these approaches suffers from significant flaws.
i. Private Ordering. - On one view, the constitutional system
leaves citizens free to conduct their affairs without governmental interference, and that basic principle requires courts to interpret statutes
to extend only as far as their explicit language and history require. 13 4
For example, courts should not recognize implied causes of action,
since statutes ought not be taken to intrude on private autonomy
except to the extent that they do so unambiguously. 13 5 An interpretive
principle of this sort would have enormous consequences for statutory
interpretation; it would limit statutes in all areas of social and economic regulation, from discrimination law to pollution control to securities fraud. In short, the private ordering norm requires that statutes with gaps or ambiguities be interpreted unfavorably towards their
intended beneficiaries.
132 See S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 18, at 120-21.

133 See, e.g., West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation:Some Reservations About the LawAs-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 253-57 (1987).
134 See Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 549-50.
135 See sources cited supra note 38.
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The presumption in favor of private ordering is merely the most
recent incarnation of the view, set out in the early twentieth century
and before, that statutes in derogation of the common law should be
read against a laissez-faire baseline and narrowly construed. 13 6 In
some legal systems, and in some contexts, such a presumption would
be desirable; and the presumption is always sound insofar as it recognizes that where Congress has neither legislated nor left a gap for
interpreters to fill, no law constrains private behavior. In the wake
of the New Deal, however, a broad interpretive norm in favor of
private ordering can no longer be sustained. This is so partly because
the post-New Deal system is generally superior to its common law
predecessor insofar as it recognizes that private autonomy is a product
of legal controls and that modern regulation often promotes both
economic welfare and distributive justice. 13 7 The more fundamental
problem with the broad presumption in favor of private autonomy is
its inconsistency with the values that underlie modern government.
Such a presumption would invoke understandings repudiated by the
democratic branches of government in order, ironically, to discern the
reach of statutes enacted and administered by those very branches.
It would be highly undemocratic, and indeed presumptuous, for courts
to invoke laissez-faire principles in support of such a judicial role.
Gaps should not be filled in, and ambiguities should not be resolved,
by reference to norms that run counter to those of the enacting Congress in particular and the modern regulatory state in general.
2. Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Law. 138 - Another view,
finding considerable support in recent cases, maintains that courts
should defer to agency interpretations of law whenever the statute is
ambiguous. Because of their superior accountability, expertise, and
ability to coordinate complex enactments, agencies should be given
the benefit of every doubt. Unlike the private ordering principle, this
view has roots in the New Deal period, with that era's endorsement
of administrative autonomy; and it places a strong emphasis on the

136 See supra pp. 407-08. This basic approach to regulatory statutes operated as the statutory
analogue to the constitutional principle in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (19o5), in which
the Court treated certain statutory measures as impermissible deviations from the "neutral"
principles reflected in the common law. Both principles were properly rejected. They used a
highly controversial set of regulatory ideas, embodied in nineteenth-century common law, as the
baseline against which to decide the scope of innovations developed by the democratic branches
in a conscious rejection of the common law. The legal realists - important forces behind the
New Deal reformation - argued that governmental power lay behind common law rules, which
could not, therefore, be treated as merely facilitative of private desires; they played a constitutive
role as well. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Hale, Coercion
and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
137See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note *, chs. 1-2.

138 The discussion in the following paragraphs draws from Sunstein, supra note 9, at 437-
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displacement of judicial lawmaking represented by the creation of
regulatory schemes. Thus, in the exceptionally important Chevron
case, 139 the Supreme Court said that courts should defer to agency
interpretations of law unless "Congress has directly spoken to the
1 40
precise question at issue.
Even if read for all that it is worth, the Chevron position would
not resolve every disputed statutory question. Threshold interpretive
questions must be asked and answered even under Chevron. For
example, courts have to rely on some methodology that is independent
of the rule of deference to decide when statutes are ambiguous. The
rule of deference would, however, have significant consequences, because it would remit all uncertain cases to regulatory agencies for
administrative resolution. Moreover, such a rule is quite appealing, 141
especially when Congress has delegated law-interpreting power to the
agency or when the question involves the agency's specialized factfinding and policymaking competence, as do "mixed" issues of law
and fact.
For several reasons, however, a general rule of judicial deference
to all agency interpretations of law would be unsound. The case for
deference depends in the first instance on congressional instructions. 142
If Congress has told courts to defer to agency interpretations, courts
must do so. But many regulatory statutes were born out of legislative
distrust for agency discretion; they represent an effort to limit administrative authority through clear legislative specifications. 143 A rule of
deference in the face of ambiguity would be inconsistent with understandings, endorsed by Congress, of the considerable risks posed by
administrative discretion.1 4 4 An ambiguity is simply not a delegation
of law-interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two.
139Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
see also NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 1o8 S. Ct. 413, 421
(1987) (advocating deference to administrative interpretation in the absence of an unambiguous
statutory command).
140 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. But see Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987) (arguing that courts should not defer to agency interpretations on pure questions of law but only on mixed questions of law and fact).
141 See, e.g., Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549 (1985); Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, supra note
92; Strauss, One Hundred and Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1117-29
(1987). The Chevron approach might enable agencies to apply rigid measures in a way that
takes account of difficulties in applications to concrete settings; facilitate coordination and
consistency in the regulatory process; counteract the effects of obsolete statutes; and promote
accountability by considering the different views of different administrations.
142 See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. I, 25-28
(1983).
143See Vogel, supra note 8, at 172.
144 On those risks, see J. FREEDMAN,

CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
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Second, the notion that administrators may interpret statutes that
they administer is inconsistent with separation of powers principles
that date back to the early days of the American republic 45 and that
retain considerable vitality today. 146 The basic case for judicial review
depends on the proposition that foxes should not guard henhouses. It
would be most peculiar, for example, to argue that courts should defer
to congressional or state interpretations of constitutional provisions
whenever there is ambiguity in the constitutional text. Those who
are limited by a legal restriction should not be permitted to determine
the nature of the limitation, or to decide its scope. The relationship
of the Constitution to Congress parallels the relationship of governing
statutes to agencies. In both contexts, an independent arbiter should
determine the nature of the limitation.
This basic principle assumes special importance in light of the
awkward constitutional position of the administrative agency. Broad
delegations of power to regulatory agencies have been allowed largely
on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency
fidelity to whatever statutory directives have been issued. 147 If agencies are able to decide on the meaning of ambiguities in these directives, the nondelegation problem grows dramatically. A firm judicial
hand in the interpretation of statutes is thus desirable.
The point can be made more vivid by imagining cases involving
such questions as whether agency action is reviewable; whether agencies may issue fines; whether agency jurisdiction extends to new or
unforeseen areas. In all of these cases, it would be peculiar to say
that the agency is permitted to decide the meaning of a law whose
scope is so directly relevant to agency self-interest. In short, a general
rule of deference to agency interpretations of law would be inconsistent
with the best reading of Congress' interpretive instructions, with the
constitutional backdrop, and with the goal of promoting sound regulatory policy.
3. Public Choice Theory and "Deals." - A number of commentators have recently attempted to find guidance for statutory interpretation in welfare economics and public choice theory. Two claims are
crucial here - the first descriptive, the second normative. The first
claim is that the concept of legislative purpose is incoherent. 148 Seeing
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); Stewart, The Reformation of American Admnin-

istrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1676-88 (1975).
145 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("'There
is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers."'
(quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. xi, ch. 6, para. 4, at 151-52 (T. Nugent
trans. rev. ed. 1949))).
146 See Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 488-99 (1989).
147 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 42-46 (1932); Farina, supra note 146, at 487.
148Public choice theorists have outlined a number of problems with attributing purpose to
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politics not as an effort to carry out coherent or public-regarding
purposes but as a battle for scarce resources among self-interested

private groups, these commentators maintain that the legislative process is a series of interest-group struggles. They also emphasize the

difficulties in aggregating the preferences and beliefs of numerous
legislators. From this they conclude that statutes reflect unprincipled

"deals" and not intelligible collective "purposes." Some of those who
urge this view claim that it has foundations in the thought of the

framers of the Constitution. 149
The second claim is that courts charged with interpreting statutes

should not rely on unitary or public-regarding purposes, but instead
should enforce the statute according to its terms, which reveal the

relevant "deal." Courts should not see legislators as "reasonable people
acting reasonably." Instead, statutes are often unprincipled outcomes

with
of multiple pressures imposed on multiple actors. The contrast
50
the legal process school in particular could not be sharper.1

Consider, for example, how an advocate of the deals approach
would analyze the question whether a federal statute regulating pol-

lution implicitly authorizes victims of pollution to bring suits against
polluters.

If the statute does not expressly provide for such suits, the

victims have not obtained that right as part of the statutory "deal,"
and the right should be denied. By contrast, a court that saw the
legislature as "reasonable people acting reasonably," or that treated

a multimember body. First, efforts to aggregate multiple points of view through legislation will
not yield an intelligible preference of the collectivity. Even if legislators vote according to their
actual preferences, the outcome may not reflect a coherent aggregation of preferences because
the outcome eventually chosen depends on the order in which different proposals were considered
rather than on a collective preference for that outcome. See K. ARRow, supra note i5, at 466o (describing the Impossibility Theorem).
Second, legislators may engage in strategic behavior, especially if there are three or more
alternatives up for a vote. For example, a legislator might decide to misrepresent her preferences
by voting for proposition x instead of proposition y because the defeat of y will increase the
likelihood that proposition z, which our sample legislator prefers, will pass. See Gibbard,
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?, supra note 15, at 358. Legislators also trade votes or "logroll." See B. BARRY & R.
HARDIN, Introduction to Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules, in RATIONAL
MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?, supra note 1S, at 341-42. These difficulties make it hard to
discern a unitary purpose behind legislative enactments, other than the purpose to do what the
legislature has done.
Third, the legislative outcome may reflect organizational difficulties faced by diffuse, poorly
organized groups, and it is unclear how the complex interactions between the well-organized
and the poorly organized should enter into the depiction of "purpose." See, e.g., R. HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
149 See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TuLLOCK, supra note i5, at 24-25; Macey, Competing
Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50 (1987) (arguing that the framers
of the Constitution sought to prevent, rather than promote, wealth transfers by interest groups).
150 For a discussion comparing approaches toward public-interest statutes and "deals" statutes, see Easterbrook, cited above in note 14, at 42-51.
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legislation as public-spirited, might well recognize private suits as a
way of enforcing the statutory mandate.
Advocates of the "deals" approach correctly emphasize legislative
compromise, and they have also performed a valuable role in suggesting that legislative purposes are often multiple and even conflicting. As a theory of statutory interpretation, however, the "deals"
approach suffers from many of the failings of textualism. The first
problem is indeterminacy. In many cases, the terms of any deal will
be hopelessly unclear in the absence of background norms that a
system of interpretation - one that has nothing to do with deals alone can supply. For example, an approach that sees statutes as
deals is in fact unhelpful in cases involving implied causes of action.
Ifa statute is treated as a deal between industries seeking protection
against too much regulation on the one hand, and environmental
groups attempting to prevent pollution on the other, what result is
appropriate? The answer would be obvious if there were a background norm to the effect that regulatory statutes generally create
private rights of action. In that case, the failure of industry to obtain
a prohibition on such rights would suggest that the deal authorized
them. The result would also be clear if the background norm forbade
private rights without explicit legislative authorization: the deal did
not include them. The central question is what the relevant norm
should be. The claim that statutes should be understood as deals
provides no help in deciding on the background against which deals
must be read. In the end, advocates of the "deals" approach - like
most formalists - rely in fact on a substantive background norm;15 '
it is that norm, on which the "deals" approach is utterly unhelpful
and indeed silent, that is the true basis for decision.
Even if the problem of indeterminacy could be overcome, the
question would remain whether courts should treat statutes as unprincipled deals. The argument in favor of that system would have
to claim that it is constitutionally required, or that the legal system
that would emerge would be preferable to the alternatives. Some
have stressed the dangers of judicial discretion, the fact that statutes
are in fact deals, the likelihood that a system of deals will be responsive to constituents' demands for law, and the value of obtaining deals
152
in the first place.
151 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 549-50 (relying on the background norm of

private autonomy). Consider also Justice Scalia's enthusiastic resort to the principle in favor of
judicial deference to agency interpretations of law. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
152 Compare Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,
r8 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1075) (arguing that an independent judiciary is essential to enforce the
"deals" struck in a pluralist system) with Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of
Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 537, 1547-56 (1983) (criticizing the interest-group model).
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Often, however, efforts to understand statutes as deals depend on
highly artificial premises. The empirical work points in both directions. There is evidence that public officials often respond to their
own conception of the public interest.' 5 3 Numerous people, moreover,
help to produce statutes, and it is not easy to see how the multiple
forces can meaningfully be thought to produce a deal. The problems
of aggregating multiple desires do not always prevent the ascription
of "purpose" to legislation. The claim of realism is therefore overstated.
Even if statutes were deals, the argument that courts should always treat them as such is hardly self-evident. Indeed, the "deals"
approach tends to break down if conceptions of politics rooted in
interest-group pluralism cannot be defended on normative grounds.
Far from having a good constitutional pedigree, the pluralist understanding runs afoul of the fundamental constitutional norm against
naked interest-group transfers. 15 4 That norm proscribes legislative
efforts to transfer resources from one group to another simply because
of the political power of the latter. The norm has firm roots in both
Madisonian republicanism - designed to ensure a measure of deliberation in government - and in current law under a number of
constitutional provisions, including the equal protection, due process,
eminent domain, and contract clauses.' 55 An effort to treat statutes
as mere deals is thus inconsistent with the basic constitutional background.
Moreover, interest-group pluralism cannot be defended as a
method for ensuring accurate aggregation of citizen preferences. Public choice theory itself reveals that pluralist systems reflect collective

153 See, e.g., M. DERTHICK & P. QuIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985); Kalt &
Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279
(1984).
IS4 See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984).
SSOn Madisonian republicanism, see Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-48 (1985). On the norm against naked interest-group transfers, see
id.; Sunstein, cited above in note 154; and sources cited in note 245 below.
To be sure, courts usually find a public-regarding justification for legislation, and therefore
invalidate statutes as naked interest-group transfers only infrequently. See, e.g., United States
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (i98o) (finding that distinctions among railroad
employee retirement benefits plausibly protect employees with greater equitable claims); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding that requiring an ophthalmologist prescription to allow an optician to fit eye glasses is rational due to occasional necessity of medical
prescriptions). But judicial deference here is a product of the institutional position of the
judiciary, which leads courts to give legislatures the benefit of every doubt. Cf. Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1213-20 (1978) (positing that many constitutional norms are underenforced due to institutional
concerns rather than conceptual limits). The fact of infrequent enforcement should not be taken
to deny the constitutional status of the norm, which can be vindicated by courts much less
intrusively, and to that extent more justifiably, through statutory construction.
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action problems, strategic behavior, cycling problems, the power of
1 56
various groups over the agenda, and a host of other difficulties.
Here descriptive work in the public choice, tradition 5 7 helps to supply
a strong normative argument against a theory of statutory construction
that is inspired by public choice theory. Courts that treat statutes as
deals will tend to produce incoherence and irrationality in the law.
Even if accurate preference-aggregation could be achieved through
politics, it is far from clear that the system would warrant support.
Politics performs a number of functions that cannot be captured in
the notion of aggregation of private preferences. Collective aspirations
about social justice; democratic preferences for others, including future
generations; and social subordination, which has consequences for the
preferences of both the advantaged and the disadvantaged - all these
have called forth statutory regimes promoting a range of values that
58
a pluralist system cannot sufficiently protect.'
A system of interpretation that treats statutes as interest-group
deals or as incoherent compromises therefore would suffer from a
wide range of problems. By contrast, a regime in which courts treat
statutes as purposive, rational, and public-regarding would be more
likely to push statutes in purposive, rational, and public-regarding
directions. Of course, a court should respect a deal if it is unambiguously reflected in law. But an interpretive approach that is alert to
the risks of deals and that attempts to make sense of statutory enact59
ments will produce a superior system of law.1
4. Criteria.- It will be useful to conclude this section by seeing
whether the discussion of extratextual norms suggests some general
criteria by which to evaluate such norms. We have seen that a broad
private autonomy principle may well be objectionable as a theory of
the appropriate role of the state' 60 and that it lacks fit with the modern
regulatory structure and its underlying values. Unlike the autonomy
principle, the principle of agency deference has the advantage of
attempting to respond to the real-world operation of the regulatory
state. It is, however, inconsistent with likely congressional desires and
with the constitutional backdrop, and if adopted, it would impair the
performance of regulatory institutions. The "deals" approach properly
brings to bear a realistic understanding of legislative processes. The

156 See K. ARRow, supra note 15; J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 15; see also
supra note 148 (discussing the problems faced by multimember representative bodies).
157 See sources cited supra notes 148 & 156.
158 See Stewart, supra note 152, at i566-8I; Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private

Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1152-58 (1986).
'59 See Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
160 See supra pp. 443-44; see also C. SUNSTEIN, supra note *, chs. 1-2 (discussing rationales
for regulation).
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understanding is, however, only a partial one. The "deals" approach
would ultimately engraft onto interpretation a conception of politics
that would increase regulatory irrationality and injustice and that
would in any case be in severe tension with the constitutional framework.
If these points provide persuasive grounds for rejecting these interpretive norms, they suggest that in order to be acceptable, interpretive norms must be consistent with the constitutional structure and
the fabric of modern public law; must improve rather than impair the
performance of governmental institutions; and must reflect a conception of politics that is likely, if adopted, to help combat defects in
regulatory practice. Criteria of this sort are highly value-laden; but
they suggest that it is possible both to criticize conventions and to
mediate among different interpretive norms. 161

III. THE ROLE OF INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES
A. Karl Llewellyn and the Canons of Construction
The discussion thus far has suggested that the agency view is
inadequate and that interpretive norms play an indispensable role in
statutory construction. The relative silence about the role of such
norms therefore presents something of a puzzle.
Some help in this regard might be found in the fate in academic
circles of the "canons" of construction. Although courts have always
used something like "canons" as background principles for interpretation, the canons were criticized and indeed virtually discredited by
the legal realist movement. The most conspicuous example is Karl
Llewellyn's celebrated effort to demonstrate that for each canon there
is an equal canon pointing in the opposite direction.1 62 An inspection
of the decisions revealed that the canons of construction did not help
to decide cases; instead they operated as mechanical, after-the-fact
recitations disguising the reasons for decision.
161 To say this is not to suggest that criteria can ever be entirely external to "conventions,"
at least if these are defined broadly enough. The inquiry here is pragmatic in character, see
supra note i3o; it is sufficient to suggest that some norms can be shown, for good reasons, to
be preferable to others. See also infra pp. 460-62 (discussing freedom and constraint in developing interpretive norms).
162 See Llewellyn, supra note ig, at 40o-o6. For example, the canon calling for adherence
to the "plain meaning" of the text is countered by the principle that courts should vindicate the
spirit of the law; the notion that statutes in derogation of the common law should be narrowly
construed meets the principle that remedial statutes should be broadly construed; and the idea
that every word and clause should be given effect is countered by the principle that words and
clauses may be rejected as surplusage when they were inadvertently inserted or repugnant to
the rest of the statute. See id. at 404.
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The realists argued that the canons substituted unhelpful, misleading, and mechanical rules for a more pragmatic and functional inquiry
into statutory purposes and structure. 163 'This view has deeply penetrated modern legal culture. Almost no one has had a favorable
word to say about the canons in many years. 164 For the most part,
the canons are treated as anachronisms.
Llewellyn's demonstration was persuasive insofar as it characterized the use of canons as a crude version of formalism. In fact,
however, his claim of indeterminacy and mutual contradiction was
greatly overstated; some of the canons actually influenced judicial
behavior insofar as they reflected background norms that helped to
give meaning to statutory words or to resolve hard cases. The notion
that courts should narrowly construe statutes in derogation of the
common law is the most prominent example. As we have seen,
Llewellyn's abandonment of the canons left him with the hopelessly
banal claim that decisions depended on "the sense of the situation as
seen by the court"165 and that "a court must strive to make sense as
a whole out of our law as a whole.' 6 6 Llewellyn did not unpack the
notion of "sense" and its possible relationship to canons of construction. Indeed, he did not recognize that quite particular - and defensible - conceptions of "sense," often forming the judge's initial, intuitive, or even considered response to a statutory dispute, might
themselves be reflected in canons of construction. Llewellyn, like
many of the realists, attempted to liberate legal thought from flawed
structures by denying the need for structures altogether, but structures
are inevitably present.
The canons of construction continue to be a prominent feature in
the federal and state courts. The use of general guides to construction
163

See Posner, Statutory Interpretation -

CHI. L.

REV. 800, 8O

In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 5o U.

(1983).

164 See id. There are notable exceptions, including H. HART & A. SACKS, cited above in
note i5, at 1221-41; Eskridge, cited above in note 21, at iozz; Macey, cited above in note i59,

at 264-66. An especially useful treatment can be found in W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 639-95

(198s).
Consider also the suggestion in Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947):
[C]anons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact a delicate
judgment, concluding a complicated process of balancing subtle and elusive
elements. . . . So far as valid, they are what Mr. Justice Holmes called them, axioms
of experience. . . . Insofar as canons of construction are generalizations of experience,
they all have worth.
Id. at 544.
165 Llewellyn, supra note i9,at 397 (emphasis in original).
166 Id. at 399 (emphasis in original). See also Radin, supra note 85, at 884 (advising judges
to ask: "Will the inclusion of this particular determinate in the statutory determinable lead to a
desirable result? What is desirable will be what is just, what is proper, what satisfies the social
emotions of the judge, what fits into the ideal scheme of society which he entertains.").
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in the form of "clear-statement" principles and background understandings - can be found in every area of modern law.
An analogy may be helpful here. The law of contracts is pervaded
by - indeed, it consists largely of - a set of principles filling contractual gaps when the parties have been silent, or when the meaning
of their words is unclear. 16 7 Imagine, for example, that the parties
have been silent on the time of performance, damages in the event of
breach, or the consequences of dramatically changed circumstances
and partial default. The use of implied terms, or "off-the-rack" provisions, is a familiar part of the law of contract; and it would be most
peculiar to say that they are an illegitimate incursion into the usual
process of "interpreting" the parties' intent. Without implied terms of
some sort, contracts simply would not be susceptible to construction.
Implied terms also provide the background against which people enter
into agreements.
To a large degree, interpretive principles - including the traditional "canons" 168 - serve the same function in public law. They too
help judges to construe both statements and silences; they too should
not be seen as the intrusion of controversial judgments into "ordinary"
interpretation. There are, however, differences as well as similarities.
In the law of contracts, it is often said that implied terms should
attempt to "mimic the market" by doing what the parties would do if
they had made provision on the subject. 169 In this respect, contract
law is pervaded by a background norm in favor of party autonomy
and the market. In statutory construction, by contrast, the notion of
"mimicking the market" is unavailable, and the idea that one should
do what Congress would have done is far from a complete guide. As
we have seen, how Congress would have resolved the question is
sometimes unclear; sometimes the resolution of the enacting Congress
170
would produce difficulties as a result of changed circumstances;
sometimes courts properly call into play principles - many of them
-

167 See generally Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 261, 264-89 (1985)
(discussing the courts' role in creating implied contract terms).
168 1 use the term "interpretive principles" to encompass both the "canons" and the full range
of norms that are used in statutory construction. The notion of "canons" has an unduly
mechanistic connotation, and it is a misleading description of the norms I am proposing insofar
as it suggests that those norms operate as rules.
169 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 167, at 266. There is not universal agreement on this
point. First, it is sometimes impossible to "mimic the market" because the market is itself the
function of the governing legal rule. See Sunstein, supra note 158, at 1145-52. Second, even
when possible to do so, one might prefer terms that serve redistributive functions, see Kennedy,
Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargainingPower,41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982), or that transform
preferences, see Sunstein, supra note 158, at 1158-66.
170 See infra PP. 493-97.
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constitutionally inspired - that push statutes in directions that diverge
from the conclusion that Congress would have reached if it had resolved the matter. Despite these differences, the critical point is that,
as in contract law, the interpretation of a text requires courts to refer
to background norms in interpreting terms.
B. The Functions of Interpretive Principles:
A Catalogue
Part of the problem in coming to terms with the canons is that
they have served different functions, as do the interpretive principles
courts generally employ. Some of these functions are nearly invisible:
the norms are so widely shared, and so central to the very process of
communicating in English, that they seem to be part of the words
rather than part of the interpreter's tools. Some such "norms" are
simply part of meaning and not open to discussion; others are also
invisible but value-laden and potentially subject to evaluation. 17 1 Still
other norms look to values that more visibly serve substantive or
institutional goals and are applicable principally in the context of
interpreting statutes: these norms - here referred to as background
norms - often seem extratextual. It is useful to distinguish between
the invisible norms and background norms because usually only the
latter are controversial and constitute the subject of interpretive disputes. The distinction, however, is imprecise, for interpretive norms
often serve multiple functions simultaneously, and substantive and
institutional functions are served by invisible norms as well.
x. Orientation to Meaning. - Interpretive principles may be designed to orient judicial readers to the text in order to help them to
ascertain its meaning in the particular case. This is the most uncontroversial function of interpretive principles. Most of these "principles"
are so internalized that they are invisible and serve as an ordinary
part of communication itself. They operate as rules of syntax or
grammar.
Some of these syntactic norms have been explicitly identified as
guides to interpretation. Consider, for example, the idea that the
language of a particular provision will be taken in the context of the
statute as a whole and will not be interpreted so as to do violence to
the statutory structure. 1 72 As we have seen with structural approaches
to interpretation, this idea is helpful in ascertaining the meaning of a
term that, if understood in a different context, would be ambiguous
or indeed would have a "literal" meaning contrary to that indicated
by the particular setting. Even apparently unambiguous statutory
terms might have a counterintuitive meaning if other provisions of
171

See supra note

24.

172 See, e.g., O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 32 (x986).
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the statute so indicate. 173 The same considerations support the principle that statutory provisions should be read so as not to create
internal inconsistency or conflict with other enactments, 174 and the
idea that, where there is a potential conflict, specific provisions should
1 75
prevail over general terms in the same statute.
Many of the infamous Latin-phrased canons serve similarly mundane functions. For example, the principle of ejusdem generis where general words follow a specific enumeration, the general words
should be limited to persons or things similar to those enumerated 176
- derives from an understanding that the general words are probably
not meant to include matters entirely far afield from the specific
enumeration. If understood to be truly general, the general words
would make the specific enumeration redundant.
A more controversial example is the principle expressio unius est
exclusio alterius: to include one thing is to exclude another. Courts
sometimes use this principle when Congress has specified a list of
actors entitled to something - say, the people authorized to obtain
review of federal administrative action, or to obtain welfare benefits
- in order to support the conclusion that those not specified are not
entitled to the good in question. 177 The assumption is that by expressly singling out those people to whom it wanted to grant the good,
Congress implicitly decided to deny all others the good. The expressio
unius canon should not be used mechanically. The failure to refer
explicitly to the group in question may reflect inadvertence, inability
to reach consensus, or a decision to delegate the decision to the courts,
rather than an implicit negative legislative decision on the subject.
Moreover, Congress could have explicitly solved the problem by specifying that the group in question may not receive the benefit, and the
availability of that option weakens the inference that silence resolves
173 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, io9 S. Ct. 278, 282 (1988). Suppose,
for example, that the question is whether the term "feasible" requires an agency to weigh costs
and benefits, or instead tells the agency to act unless the industry would be seriously jeopardized
by the regulation. If the word "feasible" is used in the same sentence or provision as the term
"cost-benefit analysis," then it is reasonable to assume that the word "feasible" itself does not
call for cost-benefit balancing - otherwise the statute would be redundant or incoherent.
174 See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986); Washington
Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, ioi U.S. 112, 1I6 (I879).
175See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 1o9 S. Ct. 2702, 2722 (1989);'id. at 2724
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Northern Border Pipeline Co.
v. Jackson County, 512 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (D. Minn. ig8i).
176 See 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17,
at 166 (N. Singer rev. 4 th ed. 1984) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION].
177 See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984); National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974); see also United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205-06 (I979) (suggesting that title VII's

express disclaimer of a requirement of affirmative action supports the view that it does not
prohibit voluntary plans).
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the issue against the group. Sometimes, however, the principle is a
helpful way of discovering statutory meaning in a particular case. 178
When it is plausible to assume that Congress has considered all the
alternatives, the legislative failure to grant authority to one person
suggests that it intended to deny the relevant authority to that person.
Although particular interpretive principles of this type will be
controversial, many of them serve the time-honored function of helping to discern the meaning of the statute in the particular case.
2. Interpretive Instructions. - Interpretive principles may also
serve as guides to what might be called the interpretive instructions
of the legislature. The goal is to capture an actual or hypothetical
legislative judgment about how statutes should be construed. 179 The
easiest cases involve explicit legislative instructions about interpretation. The first sections of the United States Code thus set out such
instructions, 18 0 as do the codes of other countries. 18 1 Such statutes
may attempt to provide substantive guidance. 182
Some interpretive principles, however, are a product of an understanding of implicit rather than explicit legislative interpretive instructions. For example, a familiar and often quite important principle is
that appropriations measures should not lightly be taken to amend
substantive statutes. 183 That principle does not of course indicate
Congress' specific instructions on every bill. Appropriations measures
are often designed to amend substantive statutes. As a general matter,
however, this norm tracks an understanding about how Congress

would want courts to interpret appropriations measures: the rules of

178 Consider, for example, United Steelworkers v. Weber, in which the Court was asked to
decide whether Congress had outlawed voluntary affirmative action by prohibiting racial discrimination. See 443 U.S. at 197. In concluding that Congress had not done so, the Court
relied on the fact that Congress enacted a provision saying that it did not intend to "require"
race-conscious decisions, an enactment that would be most puzzling if the basic antidiscrimination principle already invalidated affirmative action. See id. at 205-06.
179
As noted, Congress may intend that the courts fill gaps or that general terms be construed
in accordance with contemporary understandings. See supra pp. 421-22.
180 See I U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1988); see also R. DICKERSON, supra note 33, at 262-81 (discussing
the Uniform Statutory Construction Act); 1A SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176,
§ 27.03, at 463-64 (discussing state interpretation acts).
181 See, e.g., DAs ALLGEMEINE BORGERLICHE GESETZBUCH § 7 (Aus.) (instructing judges

that when interpreting an ambiguous code provision, they should look to the purpose of the
statute, to analogous cases, and finally to general legal principles); C.C.D.F. art. 9 (Mex.)
(presuming that previous laws are not repealed unless a statute expressly does so or its provisions
are incompatible with the previous laws); ZGB, Cc, Cc art. 1(2) (Switz.) (instructing a judge
when faced with a gap in the code to apply the customary law and, if that does not resolve the
case, to place himself in the role of a legislator and decide accordingly).
182 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1866 (West 1983) (instructing judges in cases of

ambiguity to interpret provisions in favor of "natural right").
183See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 221-22 (xg8o); Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-9, (1978).
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the House and Senate prohibit substantive lawmaking through appro84
priations. 1
Consider, as another example, the idea that statutes should be
construed to avoid constitutional invalidity. 185 Although this principle
does not attempt to discern statutory meaning in the particular case,
it might be justified as an accurate reflection of Congress' likely pref86
erence for validation rather than invalidation.1
3. Improving Lawmaking: Institutional Considerations.- A third
function of interpretive principles is to promote better lawmaking.
Some principles, for example, minimize judicial or administrative discretion, or push legislative processes in desirable directions. The effort
is to improve lawmaking processes and the deliberation and accountability that are supposed to accompany them. In this respect, some
interpretive principles fulfill goals associated with the separation of
powers and with plausible assessments of comparative institutional
competence.
The "plain meaning" principle, for example, might be an effort
not to discover what Congress meant in the particular case, but
instead to tell Congress to be careful with statutory language. The
principle warns Congress that courts will not guess about the meaning
of statutes or supply remedies for language that leads to absurd results. 187 The hope - probably a false one - is that the principle
will lead Congress to express itself clearly in the future. The principle
also helps to discipline the judiciary by warning courts not to implement policies of their own choosing.
Some principles designed to fulfill institutional goals require a
"clear statement" before courts will interpret a statute to disrupt timehonored or constitutionally grounded understandings about proper

184 See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

H.R.

Doc. No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 573-74 (1987) (rule XXI(2)) (prohibiting provisions or
amendments in general appropriations bills that change existing law); COMMITTEE ON RULES
& ADMIN., UNITED STATES SENATE, STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 18

(Comm. Print 1972) (rule 16.4) (same); see also Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies
Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 458 (favoring these limitations).
185 See, e.g., Communications Workers of America v. Beck, io8 S. Ct. 2641, 2657 (1988);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986); NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979); American Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865,
867 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
186 This norm also serves other purposes. See infra p. 459.
187 See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546-48 (1987) (refusing
to find that the outer continental shelf is in Alaska for purposes of the Alaskan National Interest
Lands Conservation Act); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74 (1984) (relying on plain
language and arguing that it would be absurd to give a statute a construction that would result
in "a federal robbery statute without jurisdiction"); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308
(198o) (holding that genetically engineered bacteria can be patented because of plain meaning
of statutory language); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (refusing to
exempt federal projects from the Endangered Species Act).
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Clear-statement principles force Con-

gress expressly to deliberate on an issue and unambiguously to set

forth its will; they commonly appear in statutory interpretation as a
subset of the category of interpretive norms. Presumptions in favor

of state autonomy, 18 8 of noninterference with executive power in for-

eign affairs,' 8 9 and of continued judicial power to balance the equities, 190 all preserve traditional institutional roles. All of these principles are designed to require a clear statement before courts will find
congressional displacement of the usual allocation of institutional authority.

The principle that appropriations measures should not be construed to amend substantive statutes also has an institutional function.
This principle is designed in part to promote responsible lawmaking
by ensuring that casual, ill-considered, or interest-driven measures do
not overcome ordinary statutes. 19 1 The narrow construction of appropriations measures promotes the primacy of ordinary lawmaking,
in which the constellation of interests is quite different and the likelihood of, deliberation higher.
Similar goals are served by the idea that when there is doubt,

statutes should be construed to limit the discretion of regulatory agencies. 192 The principle in favor of narrowing discretion works against
regulatory pathologies produced by factional power or self-interested
behavior of bureaucrats.1 93 Also in this category are the notions that

statutes

regulating

the

same

subject

should

be

construed

harmoniously1 94 and that courts should defer to interpretations of the
law by regulatory agencies. 195 As noted above, this latter idea, prominent in recent cases, 19 6 is often defended by reference to a judicial

belief that when statutes have ambiguities or leave gaps, discretionary
188 See sources cited supra note 36.

189 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (ig8i); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 301 & n.o (ig8i); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965).
190 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 319 (1982).
191 See Devins, supra note 184, at 481-99; cf. R. KATZMAN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY
(1986) (criticizing special interest groups' role in halting the federal government's effort to ensure
handicapped access to public transportation); Macey, supra note 159 (advocating the use of
traditional statutory interpretation to regulate interest groups' effect on lawmaking).
192 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
640 n.45 (i98o) (plurality opinion); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. I6, 128 (1958).
193 To say this is not to deny that congressional specificity has risks of its own. See Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, i J.L., ECON. & ORGANIZATION 8I, 83 (1985).
194 See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 209 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (x989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
195 See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 413 (1942).
196 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 23, 108 S.
Ct. 423, 421 (2987); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (2984).
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judgments should be made by the relatively more accountable agency

rather than by courts. That substantive value judgment cannot be
traced to Congress. It is a judicial construction designed to promote
electoral accountability and to reduce the policymaking discretion of

judges. 197
4. Substantive Purposes. - Finally, interpretive principles may
serve substantive purposes wholly apart from statutory meaning, interpretive instructions, or the lawmaking process. These functions are
usually the most visible and the most controversial. Substantive principles may reflect an objectionable judicial value judgment; but they
might result instead from policies that derive from the Constitution
or are otherwise easy to defend.
Interpretive principles are often a product of constitutional
norms. 198 The idea that when a statute might be interpreted to be
constitutionally valid or invalid, courts should construe it so that it
survives challenge, vindicates constitutionally grounded substantive
values; it also reflects probable interpretive instructions and promotes
superior lawmaking.199 A somewhat broader version of this idea

would suggest that where statutes might be thought to raise a constitutional question, they should be construed so as to steer clear of
constitutional doubt. 20 0 The Constitution provides the background
20 1
against which statutory terms are read.

197 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Monaghan, supra note 142 (discussing administrative accountability).
198 Some of the substantive interpretive principles may be treated as a form of "constitutional
common law," in which courts, responding to policies having a kind of constitutional status,
press statutes in particular directions. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. i (1975).
199 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. ii6, 129 (1958); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46
(1932).
200 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (I979); Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461, 472 (1892).
201 Interpretive principles rooted in constitutional provisions help account for a large number
of other decisions. Consider, for example, the rule of lenity in criminal law, which counsels
courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly. See, e.g., United States v. CamposSerrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971) (requiring clear and definite language before choosing the
harsher of alternative readings). The principle is rooted in due process notions, which require
clear notice before the imposition of criminal liability. Another example is the principle that
congressional statutes should not lightly be taken to preempt state law. See, e.g., Puerto Rico
Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., io8 S. Ct. 1350, 1355 (1988); Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); see also Frankfurter, supra note 164, at 539-40
(defending the anti-preemption canon). Also rooted in due process is the principle that disfavors
the retroactive application of statutes. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 109 S. Ct. 468,
471 (1988).
The frequently invoked idea that "remedial statutes should be broadly construed," see, e.g.,
3 SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176, § 6O.Ol, at 55-56, however, is largely
useless. All statutes are in a sense remedial, and it would be odd to suggest that all statutes
should be broadly construed. The principle is best defended as a necessary corrective to the
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Another substantive principle, one without constitutional foundations but easily defended, holds that statutes and treaties should, 20in2
the face of ambiguity, be construed favorably to Indian tribes.
There is no reason to think that this notion will tend accurately to
describe congressional intent in particular cases. It is instead a judgemade rule responding to obvious disparities in bargaining power and
to inequitable treatment of Native Americans by the nation in the
past. Other substantive norms counsel courts not to infer private
causes of action from regulatory statutes, 20 3 to assume that legislation
of Congress applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, 20 4 not to imply exemptions from taxation, 20 5 to assume
that criminal statutes require mens rea, 20 6 to avoid irrationality, 20 7 to
law rights in the
counteract obsolescence, 20 8 and to protect common
20 9
absence of a clear statement from Congress.
C. An Alternative Method:
The Agency Theory of the JudicialRole Reconsidered
The functions played by background norms suggest an alternative
to the conventional understandings of statutory interpretation, an alternative that explains both the substantial areas of agreement and
the nature of interpretive disputes. On this account, the statutory
text is the starting point, but it becomes intelligible only because
interpretive norms give it content. In most cases, the text, together
with widely shared background norms, will be unambiguous. In other
cases, the text alone will produce doubt, but a careful consideration
of the context, structure, purpose, and legislative history of a statute
will lead to a single conclusion. In the remaining cases, the history
will itself be ambiguous or will reflect the work of an unrepresentative,
self-interested group; the "purpose" of a multimember body will be
impossible to characterize; and other contextual considerations will be
unhelpful. In these hard cases, faced with the familiar problems of
ambiguity, overinclusiveness, underinclusiveness, and gaps, courts
must resort to more conspicuous background norms.
canon calling for narrow construction of statutes in derogation of the common law. The legal
system would be better off without either canon.
202 See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 472 U.S. 759, 764-66 (1985); Three
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 149 (1984); cf. California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (invoking the federal interest in Native American
sovereignty to preempt a contrary state law).
203 See sources cited supra note 38.
204 See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (2949).
205 See, e.g., United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, io8 S. Ct. 1179 (1988).
206 See 3 SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 276, § 59.04, at 26 nn.8 & 9.
207 See infra pp. 482-83.
208 See infra pp. 493-97.
209 See 3 SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176, § 61.02, at 87.
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Many of these cases will involve norms that are visible but not
controversial; others will involve the application of norms that are
both. Such norms serve the full range of interpretive functions. In
the most controversial cases, they are intended to improve lawmaking
or to further substantive policies. Sometimes the goals motivating
these norms are disputable - consider the protection of federalism,
the rule of lenity, the protection of Native Americans - and sometimes it is unclear how well the particular principle serves those goals.
In hard cases, however, the dispute is over the background principles,
not the dictionary meaning of the words. Although it is tempting to
see the use of such principles as a controversial intrusion of "value
judgments" or "policy concerns" into the process of legal interpretation,
this view misconceives the nature of statutory construction. As we
have seen, norms of this sort are an indispensable part of the process
of deriving meaning from text.
The challenge is, first, to identify norms on which participants in
the legal culture do or might agree and, second, to generate principles
under which conflicting norms can be reconciled. Inevitably that task
will be highly value-laden. It is impossible to select interpretive norms
without assessing their role in improving or impairing the operation
of statutory law. 2 10 The choice of norms will call for judgments of
value and policy precisely to the considerable extent that formalist
approaches to statutory construction are incomplete or unacceptable.
It follows that the interpretive norms will be defensible only to the
extent that good substantive and institutional arguments can be advanced on their behalf.
Undertaken properly, however, the task-of developing interpretive
norms will not amount to an unanchored or entirely open-ended inquiry into the best outcomes in particular cases. Even when the
traditional sources of interpretation leave gaps, courts should not
resolve cases merely by deciding what result would in their view be
best, all things considered. Instead, the legal culture should be taken
to impose a degree of constraint on the selection of the governing
principles. For example, we have seen that a broad private autonomy
norm is unacceptable largely because of its inconsistency with the
fabric of the modern regulatory state; the same would be true for a
norm in favor of, say, communism or fascism. Moreover, some interpretive principles - for example, the idea that statutes should be
interpreted favorably to the Indian tribes or so as not to override state
law - are so well-established that they have the status of precedent.
Of course, the decision to follow such constraints must itself be justified on normative grounds. But there are good institutional reasons

210 As we have seen, even the most formalist approaches must resort to such norms, but
often at a high level of abstraction and without acknowledgment. See supra pp. 416-24.
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to require courts to use principles that are consistent both with the
modern regulatory state and with existing interpretive norms

-

at

least if the existing norms are not anachronistic 2 11 and if the state and
the norms are not themselves conspicuously irrational or unjust.

We are left, then, with the task of generating interpretive principles
a task that does not amount to an open-ended search for the right

results in particular cases, that faces some serious constraints, but
that has a significant normative or evaluative dimension. If properly
executed, that task will significantly increase the candor and clarity
of interpretation, by making the relevant norms explicit and well-

ordered rather than invisible and ad hoc. The resulting system will
also make it easier to understand the actual dynamics of the interpretive process; provide a clear and structured background against which
Congress, administrators, and courts can do their work; and increase

the likelihood of legislative or public correction of outmoded or unjustified norms. Finally, in hard cases, such an approach will give
rationality and justice the benefit of the doubt, while furnishing relatively concrete guidance for unpacking those concepts.

IV. INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES FOR THE REGULATORY STATE
Background norms vary from one country to another; they also
vary from one period to another within any particular country. In
the United States, for example, the principles of the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries reflected a belief in common law ordering
that was largely repudiated in the

1930S.212

In the Warren Court

period, the background norms differed from those that prevailed in
2 13
the Burger Court era and those that operate today.

211 See infra p. 480 (calling for judicial consideration of systemic effects to promote rationality
in regulation); infra pp. 48o-8i (calling for abandonment of private law principles when they
are inconsistent with public law goals).
212 See supra p. 408.
213 See generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892 (1982). Consider, for example, the
dramatically shifting reaction to implied causes of action. Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (willingly creating such actions) with Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560 (r979) (requiring affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to create implied causes
of action). Consider also the Court's increasing reluctance to find federal preemption of state
law, see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975), and the increasingly narrow interpretation of statutes
protecting disadvantaged groups, compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 410 U.S. 424 (1971)
(interpreting title VII to require only proof of disparate impact) with Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (limiting use of statistical evidence and placing the burden of
proof on plaintiff at all times). In all of these areas, the source of the disagreement is not the
"text" - although that is frequently the articulated basis of argument - but instead a dispute
over which interpretive norms should be applied when the traditional sources of statutory
construction leave gaps or ambiguities.
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Despite the shift in the New Deal period, courts have continued
to use institutional and substantive norms that are a legacy of common
law understandings. Those norms seem to have taken on a life of
their own; indeed they appear invisible to those who rely on them.
Sometimes, however, these norms conflict with the values that underlie the modern regulatory state, or they otherwise impair governmental
performance. 2 14 A task for the future is to design background norms
that are well-adapted to contemporary conceptions of the relationship
between the citizen and the state and that are rooted in a solid
understanding of the purposes and pathologies of regulation.
Outside of law, and to some extent within the legal academy, it
has become fashionable to suggest that interpretive disputes are resolved on the basis of agreements within a community of interpreters. 2 15 It should be clear by now that the central tasks here description and prescription - require far more, especially in light of
the fact that the community will frequently be divided. In these
circumstances, the task is to locate the sources of interpretive princi2 16
ples and to identify those that deserve general respect.
In this Part, I attempt to carry out that task by outlining a series
of institutional and substantive principles designed to promote constitutional purposes and to improve the operation of deliberative government in the post-New Deal period. All of the principles have at
least some basis in current law, with some more firmly rooted than
others. My goal, however, is not solely descriptive. All of the principles described here have justifications deriving from the constitutional backdrop, the promotion of sound institutional arrangements,

214 See infra pp. 480-81. A similar problem arises from the use of principles that reflect a
poor understanding of the operation of regulatory law, including above all misconceptions of
the probabilistic character of regulatory injuries and of the complex systemic effects of regulation.
See infra p. 480.
215 See S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 18; S. FISH, Is THERE A
TEXT IN THIS CLASS?, supra note 18; Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985);

Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 745 (I982). The disagreement
between Fish and Fiss - involving the degree of "constraint" imposed by rules of interpretation
- should not disguise the substantial overlap in their positions; both advert to convention as
the basic source of interpretation and argue that those who undertake or evaluate interpretive
practices must be content with invoking agreed-upon background principles.
216 The development of defensible background norms, and of criteria of this sort, would
furnish a decisive response to those who view legal texts as inevitably indeterminate or who
refuse to engage in the process of evaluating competing conceptions of meaning. See supra pp.
441-42.

"Deconstruction" within the law - which attempts to draw on the work of Derrida, see,
e.g., J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (G. Spivak trans. 1976), but usually amounts in practice
to quite ordinary efforts at undermining a particular line of reasoning - is inadequate in large
part because it fails to account for interpretive norms and criteria. In law and elsewhere, texts
have relatively fixed meanings because of shared interpretive principles. Even where meaning
is contested, standards for mediating among conflicting views can be discussed and evaluated.
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and the prevention of statutory irrationality and injustice. I outline
the relevant justifications while discussing the norms.
In general, these principles are not designed to allow courts to
depart from the approach prescribed by the agency conception of the
judicial role where that approach leaves no ambiguity. In easy cases,
the agency conception leads - with the inevitable aid of generally
shared interpretive principles - to a clear result. The principles
discussed in this Part are intended both as guides to statutory meaning
and to fill gaps. Politically contestable background principles do not
provide a license for courts to ignore the otherwise clear meaning of
the statute. Sometimes, however, these principles will call for a more
aggressive judicial role - requiring a clear legislative statement, for
example, before interpreting congressional action to have violated
2 17
constitutional norms or to have produced irrationality.
A. Sources and Scope of Interpretive Principles
z. The Domain of Institutionaland Substantive Norms. - Because
this Part considers cases in which the traditional sources of meaning
do not yield a single answer, I focus on norms that read legislative
instructions in light of institutional or substantive concerns. Norms
that perform the other two functions - orientation to meaning or
capturing interpretive instructions - are not considered, except to the
extent that norms serving institutional or substantive functions also
serve those functions. In focusing on institutional and substantive
norms, an initial question arises: when should they be applied?
In easy cases, substantive and institutional norms often seem unnecessary, and norms serving syntactic functions - mostly those so
widely shared that they need not be identified - appear sufficient to
resolve the case. But substantive and institutional norms are ubiquitous. Consider a federal environmental statute that allegedly
preempts all of state tort law. The reason that it does not do so is
not syntax alone, but syntax along with, and indeed inseparable from,
a wide range of agreed-upon substantive and institutional understandings about, among other things, the limited preemptive effect of federal enactments and the appropriate role of the judiciary.
217 My discussion of background norms is directed in particular to courts seeking to discern
statutory meaning. Its implications do, however, extend to other institutions, including regulatory agencies and Congress itself. In the first instance, agencies are charged with interpreting
and enforcing their statutory mandates, and administrative, practice inevitably involves interpretation, with all the necessary reliance upon background norms. Moreover, ideas about the
constitutional backdrop, the institutional practice, and statutory function and failure influence
legislative drafting. Ultimately, a system of interpretive norms aims to describe the nature of
modern social and economic regulation, and to suggest the ways in which national institutions
might improve its performance - a goal that reaches far beyond the topic of statutory interpretation.
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For these reasons, no cases can be resolved without reference to
norms having substantive and institutional functions. But sometimes
syntax or interpretive instructions, accompanied by other norms on
which there is a wide consensus, are so clear that it would be wrong
or unnecessary to introduce controversial substantive or institutional
norms. This is a more precise formulation of the usually correct claim
that substantive norms should not be permitted to override "the text."
Young v. Community Nutrition Institute2 18 provides an instructive
example. Congress has instructed the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) that when dangerous substances are required in the preparation
of food, "the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the
protection of public health, and any quantity exceeding the limits so
fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe." 2 19 In Young, the FDA was
asked to regulate the quantity of aflatoxin, a carcinogenic substance.
Because "to such extent as he finds necessary" follows "thereon" rather
than "regulations," the syntax of the provision suggests that when
dangerous substances are required in the production of food, the
Secretary must promulgate regulations setting a tolerance level. Under
this reading, the words "to such extent as he finds necessary" allow
the Secretary discretion to decide on the tolerance level but do not
confer on him discretion not to promulgate regulations at all. 220 Al-

though perhaps not compelled by the text, this reading is strongly
supported by the fact that an interpretation conferring on the Secretary
discretion not to issue regulations would make the entire provision
unnecessary. The discretion to promulgate or not already belonged to
him.
The Supreme Court, however, invoked the principle of deference
to agency interpretations of law in order to uphold the FDA's view
that the statute allows the Secretary not to promulgate regulations. 22 1
This decision may be taken as an example of a case wrongly invoking
a contestable institutional norm - deference to agency interpretations
- in a context in which syntax and structure alone, accompanied by
agreed-upon background norms, led to a single answer.
In other settings, however, norms that go to syntax or to interpretive instructions, even accompanied by generally held institutional and
substantive understandings, will lead to uncertainty, to irrationality,
or to an intrusion on constitutionally grounded arrangements. Conspicuous or contestable norms should be invoked only in narrowly
defined settings: to "break ties"; to require a clear statement before
218 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
219 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982) (emphasis added).

220 See Young, 476 U.S. at 984-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221See Young, 476 U.S. at 98o (following Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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reaching an outcome that would be absurd or would intrude upon
constitutionally grounded arrangements; to fill a gap or respond to a
delegation of lawmaking power; or to help decide what to do in the
face of changed circumstances or the apparently irrational results of
2 22
literaism.
2. Sources: In General. - Institutional and substantive norms are
of course value-laden, and the choice among them is a subject of
disagreement. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify sources of values,
and values themselves, that are or deserve to be widely shared. The
first and most straightforward source is the Constitution. Understandings about constitutional arrangements provide a significant amount
of the background against which statutory construction occurs. To
be sure, constitutional meaning is frequently uncertain, and statutory
disputes are sometimes, in part, a function of a broader dispute about
the best way to characterize the constitutional backdrop. Often, however, there is sufficient consensus about the meaning of the Constitution to ground a large part of interpretation. When no such consensus exists, the position one takes will be a function of a more
narrowly held account of what the Constitution requires. Whether
the position is persuasive depends on the reasons that can be marshaled on behalf of that account.
The second source of interpretive norms - also straightforward
- consists of understandings about how statutory interpretation will
improve or impair the performance of governmental institutions.
Some such understandings are a firmly rooted and probably unavoidable part of interpretation. One might, for example, conclude that
legislative history, produced by private groups and never enacted, is
entitled to little weight; or that appropriations statutes, written hastily
and without deliberation, should be narrowly construed. If one were
simply describing statutory construction as it is currently practiced,
one would find a number of background norms traceable to understandings of precisely this sort.
The third and final source of background norms is more complex;
it emerges from the intended functions of regulatory statutes and the
ways in which such statutes fail in practice. An understanding of
statutory function and failure -

curiously neglected topics -

is in-

dispensable not only to an appreciation of modern law, but also to an
understanding of statutory construction. In hard cases, the familiar
notion that statutes should be construed so as not to produce absurd
222 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2573-74 (1989)
(refusing to attribute to Congress the intent to dictate absurd results); Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 198r, 1984 (i989) (same). See generally T. McLEOD, supra note 124,
1-14 to -17 (describing the idea that statutes should be construed to avoid absurdity as "the
Golden Rule").

HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 466 1989-1990

19891

INTERPRETING STATUTES

or irrational results is too abstract to be helpful; one needs a particularized understanding of regulatory statutes. A detailed discussion
of these points would be well beyond the scope of this Article, 223 but
a brief outline will be useful.
The goals of statutory regimes span a wide range. Some statutes
are designed to promote economic efficiency, others to redistribute
resources in public-regarding ways, to protect future generations from
irreversible losses, to reflect nonmarket values or aspirations, to counteract the social subordination of disadvantaged groups, or to enforce
the terms of pure interest-group deals. Moreover, statutes fail for a
number of different reasons. 224 Some are flawed in conception as a
result of interest-group power, collective action problems, 225 the absence of political accountability or political deliberation, changed circumstances or obsolescence, or lack of coordination with other statutes. Other statutes fail because of implementation problems. For
example, a regulation may be based on a poor understanding of the
way that the market can nullify its intended effects. 2 26 Legislation
apparently intended to protect consumers, workers, or tenants may
have undesirable and unintended consequences. 22 7 Finally, statutes
designed to reduce or eliminate the social subordination of disadvantaged groups, or to promote public values like environmental quality
and the protection of endangered species, frequently encounter in the
implementation process the same obstacles - collective action prob223 For a more complete discussion, see C. SUNSTEIN, cited above in note *, chs. 1-3.

224 If it were possible, it would be extremely valuable to establish a tight connection between
identifiable statutory functions and particular forms of statutory failure. Any such enterprise
faces serious obstacles. The empirical work on the consequences of social and economic regulation remains primitive.

For a review, see C. SUNSTEIN, cited above in note *, ch. 3.

For

helpful work in this area, see SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION (Comm. Print
198o); R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (1983); R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENSPECHT, I. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE (1986); K. MEIER, REGULATION: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND ECONOMICS (1985); J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF
Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION (1988); W. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POL-

Icy (1985); D. VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION (1986); and Graham & Vaupel, Value
of a Life: What Difference Does It Make?, I RISK ANALYSIS 89 (i98I). In any case, an
assessment of those consequences cannot depend on empirical work alone; it must also rest on
some ideas, normative in character, about what a well-functioning regulatory system would look
like.
225 See supra note 148.
226 Thus, for example, the minimum wage has increased unemployment. See F. WELCH,
MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE (1978).

227 Rent control legislation and implied warranties of habitability have not merely protected
tenants, but have also decreased the supply of housing and had at least some harmful effects
on poor people. See, e.g., Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of
Habitability Laws upon Rent, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1O98, 1130-31 (1975) (discussing warranties
of habitability).
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lems, the unrepresented character of future generations, and other
disparities in political influence - that make such statutes necessary
in the first place. 2 28 Government failure rfiimics market failure.
Although conclusions of this sort are principally of interest to
officials in the legislative and executive branches, they are relevant to
the judiciary as well. Judicial conceptions of the likely function and
potential failure of regulatory statutes inevitably shape legal interpretation. Moreover, such understandings will likely improve interpretation, for a sensitivity to regulatory failure can aid courts in promoting legislative goals in the face of textual ambiguities. Recognizing
that conflicts among the principles will exist in some settings, I discuss
rules of priority and harmonization below.
B. The Principles
i. ConstitutionalNorms. - Many constitutional norms deserve a
prominent place in statutory interpretation. Some of them have been
mentioned in Part I. The central point is that the Constitution
provides the backdrop against which statutes are written and interpreted, and it furnishes the basic assumptions of interpretation.
Federal courts underenforce many constitutional norms, and for
good reasons. Institutional constraints - most notably, limited factfinding capability and attenuated electoral accountability - make
courts reluctant to vindicate constitutional principles with the vigor
appropriate to governmental bodies with a better democratic and
policymaking pedigree. As a result, there is a gap between what the
Constitution actually requires and what constitutional courts are willing to require the political branches of government to do. In this
context, courts should recognize that some statutes respond to Congress' constitutional responsibilities even if courts would not, for institutional reasons, require Congress to carry out those responsibilities
in the first instance. Relatively aggressive statutory construction pushing statutes away from constitutionally troublesome ground provides a way for courts to vindicate constitutionally based norms
and does so in a way that is less intrusive than constitutional adju2 29
dication.
(a) Avoiding ConstitutionalInvalidity and Constitutional Doubts.
The principle that statutes should be construed so as to survive
228 See, e.g., K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SocIETY (I988) (discussing barriers to
enforcement of civil rights laws); Wood, Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?, 34
Am. J. POL. Sci. (forthcoming i9go) (arguing that politics does make a difference in the
enforcement of civil rights).
229 Cf. Sager, supra note 155 (arguing that Congress and state courts should be allowed to
enforce constitutional norms to their fullest extent). One might accept this general point while
acknowledging the highly controversial nature of particular views about which constitutional
norms are underenforced.
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constitutional challenge serves a number of functions: it is a natural
outgrowth of the system of separation of powers; it minimizes interbranch conflict; it responds to Congress' probable preference for validation over invalidation ("implicit interpretive instructions"); and it
strengthens judicially underenforced constitutional norms. The mild
statutory "bending" that sometimes occurs is legitimate, for courts are
not mere agents of the enacting legislature but have an obligation to
the citizenry and the legal system as a whole.
This basic idea supports the broader principle, reflected in many
cases, that courts should construe statutes to avoid not only constitutional invalidity but also constitutional doubts. 230 This latter principle calls for a far more aggressive judicial posture in statutory
construction, one that allows judicial "bending" of a greater range of
statutes. Judge Posner criticizes this principle on the ground that it
furnishes a kind of "judge-made 'penumbra"' around the Constitution, 23 1 by allowing courts to press statutes in particular directions
even though they would ultimately be found not to offend the Constitution.
Judge Posner's objection becomes less forceful, however, in light
of the fact that constitutional norms are often underenforced. As we
have seen, there is a difference between what the Constitution requires
and what the Supreme Court, interpreting the Constitution, is willing
to compel. The aggressive construction of questionable but not invalid
statutes - removing them from the terrain of constitutional uncertainty - is a less intrusive way of vindicating norms that do in fact
have constitutional status.
(b) Federalism. - In the system of American public law, the basic
assumption is that states have authority to regulate their own citizens
and territory. This assumption justifies an interpretive principle requiring a clear statement before judges will find federal preemption
of state law. 23 2 Although no substitute for an inquiry into the rela-

tionship between state and federal law in the particular context, this
principle will frequently aid interpretation in disputed cases.
(c) Political Accountability; Checks and Balances; the Nondelegation Principle.- Some interpretive norms represent constitutionally
inspired efforts to promote a sound allocation of institutional responsibility. Courts hesitate to interpret statutes as intruding on the President's power in foreign affairs, 233 or as interfering with judicial power
to "balance the equities" in cases involving possible injunctive relief. 234

230 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
231 See R. POSNER, supra note io, at 285.
232 See, e.g., Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., iOS S. Ct.
1350, 1355 (x988); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
233 See cases cited supra note i89.
234 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 319 (1982). This idea, however, is

vulnerable in the post-New Deal era. See infra pp. 480-81.
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Other interpretive strategies can be similarly understood. For example, courts have, since the New Deal, permitted Congress to delegate exceptionally broad policymaking authority to regulatory agencies. Such broad delegations were at one time thought to offend article
235
I of the Constitution, which vests legislative power in Congress.
In recent years, courts have been reluctant to enforce the nondelegation doctrine. This reluctance is partly attributable to the difficulty
of developing standards for distinguishing between prohibited and
permissible delegations, partly a product of the intrusiveness of any
such judicial role, and partly a result of the frequent existence of good
reasons for the delegation of discretionary power to regulatory agencies. 23 6 Through statutory construction, however, courts are sometimes able to vindicate the constitutional principle against delegation
of legislative authority. They can do so, for example, by narrowly
23 7
construing grants of policymaking power.
Various doctrines dealing with the degree of judicial deference to
agency interpretations promote principles of nondelegation, accountability, and checks and balances. For example, the controversial
proposition that courts should interpret congressional enactments on
their own, without deferring to agency constructions, is intended to
avoid the delegation problem that would arise if administrators could
interpret the scope of their own authority. It is bad enough for
administrators to have broad lawmaking power; the problem is aggravated if administrators can judge the scope of whatever constraints
Congress has imposed on them. As we have seen, courts should not
permit foxes to guard henhouses. 238 The exceptionally important idea
that a delegation of power to an administrator implicitly permits
presidential supervision and control similarly tries to promote political
accountability. 2 39 This idea promotes the constitutionally grounded
235 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
236 See Mistretta v. United States, iog S. Ct. 647, 654-58 (1989). See generally Stewart,
supra note 144, at 1693-97 (criticizing attempts to revive the nondelegation doctrine).
237 Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding as a matter of constitutional
law that aliens could only be prevented from serving as federal employees by a decision of the
President or the Congress but not the Civil Service Commission). In other cases, the Court has
suggested that the Constitution permits certain disabilities to be imposed on groups only when
an accountable actor has so decided. The most celebrated example is Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
ii6 (1958), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the Secretary of State may not deny a
passport to a member of the Communist Party unless Congress clearly authorized him to do so.
Decisions of this sort impose a "clear-statement" principle to the effect that important decisions
are to be made by accountable actors and that only a clear statement to the contrary will rebut
this presumption.
238 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 48o U.S. 422, 445-48
(1987); see also Farina, supra note 146, at 502-1I (discussing how Congress and the President
control agency discretion, and criticizing Chevron).
239 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 63 (1926); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. ig81), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 68o (1983).
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goals of a unitary executive branch:
centralization, expedition, and
240
accountability in law enforcement.
(d) The Rule of Law. - In interpreting statutes, courts employ a
clear-statement principle in favor of the "rule of law": a system in
which legal rules exist, are clear rather than vague, do not apply
retroactively, operate in the world as they do in the books, and do
not contradict each other. 24 1 The due process clause provides a constitutional basis for the rule of law ideal. 2 42 The most celebrated
aspect of this general idea is the rule of lenity, which leads courts to
resolve ambiguities favorably to the criminal defendant.243 Courts
also interpret statutes to minimize administrative discretion, to apply
prospectively, and to require or permit rules. "[T]he law in general
...does not interpret a grant of discretion to eliminate all 'categorical
24 4
rules."'
(e) Political Deliberation; the Constitutional Antipathy to Naked
Interest-Group Transfers. - Designed to ensure a kind of deliberative
democracy, the constitutional system is hostile to measures that impose
burdens or grant benefits merely because of the political power of
246
private groups. 245 Governmental actions require some public value.
This norm, firmly rooted in current law, has a number of implications
for statutory interpretation. It suggests, for example, that courts
should develop interpretive strategies that promote deliberation in
government - by, for example, remanding issues involving constitutionally sensitive interests or groups for reconsideration by the legislature or by regulatory agencies when deliberation appears to have
been absent. It also suggests that courts should narrowly construe
statutes that embody mere interest-group deals. 24 7 This principle does
not authorize elaborate judicial review of legislative and administrative processes, but it does require a clear statement before courts will
construe statutes as amounting to naked wealth transfers or as intruding into constitutionally sensitive areas.
240 See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking,
38 ADMIN. L. REv. 18i, i89-9o (i986).
241 For a discussion of these values and how they fail, see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAw (rev. ed. 1969).

242 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. i56 (1972).
243 See, e.g., United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
244 Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2746 (1989) (emphasis

in original) (applying "traditional" balancing as a background rule).
24S See D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (x984); M. MEYERS,

Reflection and Choice: Beyond the Sum of the Differences, an Introduction, in THE MIND OF
THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON at xi (rev. ed. 1981);

Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in How
DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. i98o).
246 See supra note 154.
247 On narrow construction, see pp. 486-87 below. Much of American administrative law
is founded on these ideas. See Sunstein, supra note 155, at 59-64.
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(f) HearingRights. - One of the most important functions of the
Constitution is to provide procedural safeguards by affording rights
to a hearing and to judicial review in cases involving important
interests. 248 The precise extent of these safeguards is sharply disputed.
It is unclear, for example, whether Congress has the constitutional
power to eliminate hearing rights for those seeking regulatory benefits,
or to provide that federal courts may not review certain claims.

249

In this area, courts often interpret statutes in the shadow of constitutional hearing rights. For this reason, courts narrowly interpret
statutory provisions purporting to eliminate rights to a hearing and to
judicial review. 25 0 The ordinary presumption is that such rights are
available, and that the constitutional issue therefore need not be resolved.
(g) DisadvantagedGroups. - Some of the most difficult questions
in contemporary constitutional law involve the degree of protection
afforded to disadvantaged groups by the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In many of the cases, courts have afforded
less protection than they otherwise might have because of a desire to
minimize interferences with the democratic branches of government.
For example, in one of its most important and controversial decisions since World War II, the Supreme Court held that to establish
a violation of the equal protection clause, blacks, women, and others
must show "discriminatory intent" on the part of the enacting legislature. 25 l This requirement has furnished a significant barrier to constitutional complainants. 25 2 It is best understood at least partly as an
outgrowth of institutional concerns. If courts held that a disproportionate effect sufficed to raise constitutional doubts, a wide variety of
governmental policies would be seriously questioned - an extremely
intrusive outcome that might be inappropriate in light of the properly
limited role of the judiciary in American government.
Courts have also invoked institutional considerations to justify an
interpretation of the Constitution that affords little protection to certain groups, including most notably the handicapped and gays and
248 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (affording hearing rights); Fallon, Of
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, xox HARv. L. REV. 915, 974-89
(1988) (discussing when judicial review is necessary); Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (x953)
(suggesting that the due process clause generally requires judicial review).
249 See Fallon, supra note 248, at 974-91.
250 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 1o8 S. Ct. 2047, 2053 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 41S U.S.
361, 367 (1974).
251 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
252 See, e.g., Personnel Adn'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).

See generally Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 54 U. Cmi. L. REv. 935, 000-03 (1989)
(criticizing Feeney).
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lesbians.253 In this light, statutes that provide protection for these
groups, or against discriminatory effects, might well represent the
legislature's response to its judicially underenforced constitutional responsibilities. Through statutory construction, courts can ensure that
the relevant norms are vindicated. Aggressive construction of ambiguous statutes designed to protect disadvantaged groups provides a
constitutional norm of equal protection
way for courts to protect the
25 4
in a less intrusive manner.
(h) Property and Contract Rights. - In the aftermath of the New
Deal reformation, courts have been reluctant to use the Constitution's
explicit protection of property and contracts in a way that would
seriously interfere with social and economic regulation. 25 5 To a large
degree, the reluctance is a product of the Court's substantive belief
that redistributive goals fall within the state's police power under these
clauses - a large shift from the understanding of the founding generation. Part of the Court's reluctance, however, derives from its
belief that in the post-New Deal period, regulatory interferences with
private contract and private property have considerable democratic
support, and the judiciary ought to intervene only in egregious cases.
Whether or not the Court's unwillingness to provide more protection to rights of contract and property is justified, 25 6 courts can vindicate those rights less intrusively by narrowly construing regulatory
statutes that raise serious constitutional doubts under the contracts
and takings clauses.
(i) Welfare Rights. -

In the I96O's and i97o's, a number of

commentators urged the Supreme Court to give constitutional protection to the right to minimum levels of subsistence. 25 7 These claims
253 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia sodomy statute over
objections based on the right of privacy); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 439-47 (1985) (holding that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification,
but that requiring a special-use permit for group homes for the mentally retarded nevertheless
violated the equal protection clause).
254 The much-maligned decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197I), raises
related issues. Under Griggs, a showing of disparate impact shifts to the defendant the burden
of demonstrating business necessity. See id. at 432. In light of the fact that proof of "discriminatory purpose" is exceptionally difficult even when purpose exists, the Griggs framework seems
appropriately to further the congressional command. See Strauss, supra note 252, at 1012-14;
see also infra pp. 484-85 (discussing Griggs in light of other substantive norms).
25SSee, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (finding no violation of
the public use requirement); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400 (1983) (contracts clause); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978) (takings clause); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (contracts
clause).

256 For an emphatic negative answer, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).

2S7For the most prominent defense of welfare rights, see Michelman, The Supreme Court,
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have plausible if not firm substantive roots in some of the most
prominent theories of judicial review2 5 8 and in the New Deal reformation of the constitutional structure. 25 9 There are, however, formidable institutional objections to such a judicial role, 2 60 which would
involve careful monitoring of a massive national bureaucracy. For
the Supreme Court to undertake to protect welfare rights entirely on
its own would raise serious questions of democratic legitimacy and
remedial competence. Perhaps a Court that saw substantive force in
the claim for constitutional welfare rights would attempt to vindicate
that claim, not through the Constitution itself, but through aggressive
statutory construction to ensure against irrational or arbitrary deprivations of benefits. Such an approach would tend to produce evenhandedness in the distribution of funds to the poor in a democracy
that has committed itself to a "social safety net." Statutory construction, requiring a clear statement before allowing selective exclusions,
might produce many of the advantages of recognition of welfare rights
without imposing nearly so severe a strain on the judiciary.
2. Institutional Concerns. A number of interpretive principles
respond directly to institutional concerns and are designed to improve
the performance of governmental entities. Most of these principles
are straightforward and can be discussed quite briefly.
(a) AppropriationsStatutes. - Courts construe appropriations provisions quite narrowly in light of judicial understandings about the
character of the appropriations process, in which careful legislative
deliberation is highly unlikely. 26 1 Interest-group power is particularly
likely to influence results in this context.
(b) A Cautious Approach to Legislative History. - As Justice
Scalia has emphasized, 262 legislative history is sometimes written by
one side or another in a dispute over the content of the law, and the
history will sometimes reflect a view that could not prevail in the
processes of congressional deliberation. 2 63 In any case, the history is
not law. Courts should therefore adopt a firm principle of the priority

1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the PoorThrough the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 7 (1969); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 659 [hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights].
258 See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 257, at 684 (arguing that Dean Ely's theory
of judicial review based on representation reinforcement makes a case for minimum welfare
rights).
2S9 See Ackerman, Constitutional PoliticslConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
199o) (discussing the transformation of American law brought about by the New Deal's recognition of affirmative duties on the part of national government).
260 See, e.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
SUP. CT. REV. 41 (challenging the proposed constitutional right to various goods).
261 See supra pp. 456-57.
262 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., B. AcxRmANr
& W. HASSLER, supra note 23, at 44-54.
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of statutory text to statutory history - a principle that does not call
on courts entirely to disregard the history, but that gives the history
limited weight in cases of conflict.
(c) The Presumption Against Implied Repeals. - Courts do not
lightly assume that one statute has implicitly repealed another. 264 This
principle is a product of a set of beliefs about the legislative process
- in particular, a belief that Congress, focused as it usually is on a
particular problem, should not be understood to have eliminated without specific consideration another program that was likely the product
of sustained attention.
(d) Implied Exemptions from Taxation. - Courts do not infer
exemptions from taxation. 2 65 This principle derives partly from a
desire to protect the Treasury; it also responds to the perception that
Congress is highly attentive to tax matters; and it rests partly on a
view that selective exemptions from taxation might represent a departure from ordinary principles of equality and should therefore be
disfavored.
(e) The Question of Administrative Discretion. - Courts defer to
agency understandings of policy and fact in cases in which discretion
has lawfully been conferred. 266 This idea is based on a recognition
of the superior democratic accountability and fact-finding capacity of
the agency and the corresponding belief that courts ought to treat
agency decisions with a fair degree of respect. Similarly, the rare
judicial decisions finding agency action not subject to judicial review
are based on perceptions that judicial intervention would likely be
267
counterproductive in the circumstances.
(f) The Presumption in Favor of Judicial Review. - By contrast,
courts presume that the legislature has not precluded judicial review
of agency decisions. This presumption is partly attributable to a belief
- vindicated by recent experience 268 - that regulatory agencies are
susceptible to factionalism and self-interested representation. Judicial
review operates as both an ex ante deterrent against dangers of this
sort and an ex post corrective. If Congress is to eliminate judicial
review, it must do so unambiguously.
There is a tension between the goal of limiting administrative
discretion and the desire to ensure that courts defer to the agency's

264 See iA SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176,

§

23.io, at 346.

265 See, e.g., United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, io8 S. Ct. 1179, 1183 (i988).
266 See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983).

267 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243,
1249-5I (1st Cir. i97o).
268 See, e.g., B. ACKEILM4N & W. HASSLER, supra note 23, at 79-io3; K. SCHLOZMAN &
J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 63-87 (1986); Stewart, supra
note 144, at 1795-96.
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specialized fact-finding and policymaking competence. The best reconciliation of these competing concerns would call for a principle
requiring a clear legislative displacement of judicial review; for judicial deference to agency decisions on facts, policy, and "mixed" questions having legal components; and for independent judicial review of
pure questions of law except where Congress has delegated interpretive power to the agency.
(g) Ratification, Acquiescence, Stare Decisis, and Post-Enactment
History. - Although Congress' post-enactment views do not have the
authority of law, stare decisis and post-enactment history should play
a limited role in interpretation. 2 69 Post-enactment history deserves
the least deference. Like other legislative history, it can provide a
sense of context, but it has the normal difficulties of unenacted views;
indeed, it is even worse than pre-enactment history in the sense that
it is uninformative about the desires of the enacting Congress. On
the other hand, evidence that part or all of Congress has endorsed a
judicial construction or interpreted a statute in a particular way is
important in furthering the goals of rationality, consistency, and coordination in interpretation. Stare decisis principles have traditionally
served the same function of ensuring rationality and consistency, even
though the previous decision may not have accurately understood the
270
original meaning of the statute.
3. Counteracting Statutory Failure. - I have suggested that a
number of interpretive principles in current law are intended to counteract failures in social and economic regulation. 2 71 The general idea
that statutory construction should combat characteristic pathologies in
regulatory legislation is well-grounded in existing doctrine. In this
section, I outline and defend a series of interpretive norms designed
to promote this goal. Some of the particular norms have solid roots
in current case law; others are implicit; still others find at best ambiguous support and are proposed here for the first time. I indicate
the relationship between the suggested norms and current law in the
particular discussions.
Courts should, I argue, try to avoid characteristic failures in regulation - caused, for example, by a failure to understand the systemic
effects of regulation or to coordinate statutes regulating the same area.
Courts should also be aware of the risks of overenforcement and
underenforcement and therefore permit de minimis exceptions, assume
proportionality in regulation, and generously construe statutes de269 See, e.g., Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 21, at 1042-44. See generally Eskridge,
InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 9o-Io8 (1988).
270 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989); R. DwoRKIN,
supra note ig, at 348-50; Eskridge, InterpretingLegislative Inaction, supra note 269, at xo822.

271 See sura pp. 457-59.
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signed to protect traditionally disadvantaged groups and nonmarket
values.
Some of these ideas, depending for their support on views about
regulatory failure, are of course products of contestable substantive
claims. Notwithstanding their number and variety, moreover, the
principles are united by certain general goals, which include, above
all, the effort to promote accountability and deliberation in government, to furnish surrogates when both are absent, to limit factionalism
and self-interested representation, and to further political equality.
All of the principles respond to an understanding of the various reasons for statutes and of the various ways that statutes fail.
(a) Promoting Political Accountability. - Courts should construe
statutes so that those who are politically accountable and highly visible
will make regulatory decisions. This norm finds its justification in
constitutional and institutional considerations deriving from the basic
premise of electoral accountability and also in a perception that regulatory failure is sometimes a product of factional power.2 72 As we
have seen, a number of cases growing out of constitutional concerns
recognize this basic principle. 2 73 Reflecting judicial reluctance to allow
agencies to exercise discretionary power that has not been clearly
delegated, these cases often require accountable actors to make decisions involving important rights and politically weak groups. Such
decisions can also be understood as an effort to counteract regulatory
failure that occurs from a lack of accountability.
Other doctrines also draw from the goal of promoting political
accountability. The principle that courts should defer to administrative interpretations of statutes is an example. 274 Indeed, in the most
important recent case invoking that principle, the Supreme Court
referred expressly to the greater accountability of the President in
comparison to the judiciary. 275 Because the President, unlike a judge,
is elected, interpretation of statutes raising controversial questions of
public policy should be made by the executive branch, at least where
the legislature has granted the executive the power to construe ambiguous statutes. As lawmaker, however, Congress is in a superior
position to the President or the regulatory agency. In order to ensure
compliance with legislative instructions, courts, not potentially selfinterested regulators, should resolve statutory ambiguities involving
pure questions of law. 276 But the principle of leaving decisions to
electorally accountable officials is sound insofar as it recognizes that
272 See supra pp. 467-68.
273 See sources cited supra notes 234-40.
274 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865-66 (1984).
275

See id.

276

See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 444-52.
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Congress may and often does delegate to regulatory
agencies and the
2 77
President the power to fill in statutory gaps.

(b) Taking Account of Collective Action Problems.2 78 - Regulatory
statutes are sometimes subverted in the implementation process, often
as a result of the diffuse character of the class of regulatory beneficiaries. 2 79 In one common scenario, the beneficiaries of regulatory programs, though numerous and ordinarily disorganized, are able to
mobilize to obtain protective legislation. -As the statute is implemented, however, the group tends to dissipate, and well-organized
members of the regulated class are able to exert continuing pressure
on the agency. The regulatory program is skewed against effective
implementation. 280 Congress' words become purely symbolic, and
inadequate implementation prevents the statute from accomplishing
legislative goals. judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutes that
takes account of this phenomenon will promote fidelity to these goals.
Many decisions appear to have reacted to the possibility that collective action problems will undermine regulatory programs. The
most conspicuous examples are decisions aggressively construing regulatory statutes in order to protect the environment. 28 1 The context
presents a classic setting for regulatory "failure" resulting from collective action problems (not to mention unrepresented future generations,
which cannot wield political power). Other illustrations include judicial decisions taking a careful look at administrative decisions that
jeopardize the interests of regulatory beneficiaries. 282 These decisions
also respond to a perception that poorly organized beneficiaries are at
risk during implementation, and that as a result, legislative goals will
not be carried out in the real world.
Cases responding to overzealous regulation may be motivated by
a similar concern.2 8 3 In this context, a collective action problem or
structural infirmity may incline the agency toward excessive intrusion

277 See Monaghan, supra note 142, at 25-28.
278 See supra note 148.
279 See Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 369-72
(J. Wilson ed. 198o).
280 This phenomenon has at times impaired national environmental policy in the United
States. See, e.g., R. MELNICK, supra note 65, at 195-238; D. VOGEL, supra note 224, at x4652.
281 See cases cited infra note 334.
282 See Sunstein, Deregulationand the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 177, 189-

97 (discussing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983));
see also Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 330-34 (1988) (challenging the Court's conclusion because
of a collective action problem in Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)).
283 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
639-52 (i98o) (plurality opinion).
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into the marketplace. Cases involving OSHA regulation 284 and banking controls 285 provide examples.
(c) Promoting Consistency and Coherence Among Regulatory Pro-

grams. -

The post-New Deal proliferation of regulatory programs

has sometimes led to inconsistency and incoherence in the law. For

example, the standards for regulating carcinogens are notoriously variable; they call for excessive controls in some areas and unduly weak
regulation in others. 286 Some carcinogens are thus regulated at a cost
28 7
of $40 million per life saved, whereas others cost $400,000 or less.
The absence of centralization has led to regulatory failures - in the
form of incoherent and even chaotic regulation in numerous
2 88
areas.
As a partial solution, courts should require a clear statement by
Congress before allowing a statute to create significant inconsistency
in the law. A judicial role of this sort has clear precedent in contemporary administrative law and in the old canon that statutes governing
the same subject matter should be construed together. 28 9 In light of
the potentially chaotic pattern of social and economic regulation, judicial decisions limiting agency authority to impose huge costs for
uncertain or speculative gains might be seen as part of an integration

of statutory systems into a coherent whole. 290 Similar considerations

284 See id.; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1152-54 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en banc); Asbestos Information Ass'n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 727
F.2d 415, 424-27 (5th Cir. 1984); Aqua Slide 'n' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
569 F.2d 831, 839-43 (Sth Cir. 1978).

28SSee Langevoort, supra note 80, at 729-33 (concluding that, when changing financial
markets undermined the premises of the McFadden and Glass-Steagall Acts, courts began to
construe regulations to accommodate this change).
286 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 274-75 (1985); R. LITAN

& W.

NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 48, 77 n.26 (1983). See generally Graham &
Vaupel, supra note 224, at 94 (pointing out large cost differences between types of life-saving
programs; in particular, noting that the OSHA regulations are normally hundreds of times more
expensive per life saved than highway regulations).
287 See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 224, at 22.
288 See, e.g., E. BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POLICY I-I1 (1987); R. KATzMAN, supra note 191,

at 144-51, 188 (chronicling "uncertainty and vacillation"); Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, ioo HARv. L. REv. 1002,

1002 (1987) ("Current

regulation of [the electric power industry] now promises both less electricity and more damage
to health and the environment.").
289 See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 787-88 (1976); Estate of
Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Daigneault v. Public Fin. Corp., 562 F. Supp.
194, 197 n.2 (D.R.I. 1983); Preston State Bank v. Ainsworth, 552 F. Supp. 578, 58o (N.D.
Tex. 1982); Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs., 504 F. Supp. 1244, 1254 (N.D. Ill.
2982), aff'd, 682 F.2d 724 ( 7th Cir. i982).

290 See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (OSHA); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 2246
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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help explain Bob Jones University v. United States.29 1 This decision
might be understood as an effort to ensure that the IRS takes account
of the widespread social antagonism toward racial discrimination, as
part of the general thrust of contemporary "public policy."
(d) Considering Systemic Effects. - Regulation is frequently unsuccessful because of a failure to understand the complex systemic
effects of governmental controls. 292 Courts dealing with regulatory
issues often act as if the decision will create only ex post winners and
losers in the particular case. This misunderstanding leads to statutory
construction that is uninformed by the real-world impact of regulation.
Examples include the Supreme Court's OSHA decisions, 293 in which
several members of the Court appeared to assume that greater protection for workers would automatically follow from more stringent
statutory requirements.2 94 This assumption is false. By requiring
government to regulate to the point of "feasibility" and forbidding
balancing of benefits and costs, stringent statutory requirements have
at times harmed workers themselves. Faced with such onerous requirements, 295 regulators have often underenforced the statute by failing to enforce the rules on the books or by refusing to issue rules at
all.296 Interpreting an environmental or occupational health law as
especially protective may ultimately decrease regulatory protection.
The problem of unintended or perverse side-effects is pervasive.
Courts should understand the sometimes counterintuitive systemic
consequences of different interpretations of regulatory statutes.
(e) Avoiding PrivateLaw Principles. - As suggested above, courts
cannot properly invoke common law principles of private autonomy
as the backdrop for interpreting public law.297 Suppose, for example,
that a statute allows employees to file workers' compensation claims,
and that an employer attempts to discharge an employee for filing
such a claim. In this setting, courts should not invoke the background
rule of at-will employment in order to uphold the discharge, even if
the legislature has not explicitly displaced that rule in this context.2 98
291 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

292 See Rose-Ackerman, Comment: ProgressiveLaw and Economics - and the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 364-67 (1988); see also Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985) (advocating decentralized, cost-effective
environmental regulation).
293 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (g8i) (refusing to
apply cost-benefit analysis to OSHA's cotton dust standard); American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607
(plurality opinion).
294 See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs., 452 U.S. at 499.
295 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 292, at 1335-4o; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 292,
at 355-58.
296 See, e.g., J. MENDELOFF, supra note 224, at 22; IV. VIscUsI, RISK BY CHOICE 25-36
(1983); D. VOGEL, supra note 224, at x64-69, 192.
297 See supra pp. 443-44.
298 See, e.g., Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 15i (1976).
HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 480 1989-1990

INTERPRETING STATUTES

1989]

The at-will rule would undermine the purpose of the workers' compensation statute. When the legislature intends to transform the relationships created by the common law, principles rooted in the common law do not provide an appropriate background rule.
Private law principles are wrongly applied in several areas of
modern law. In interpreting the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 2 99 the Supreme Court has held that agency
action is presumptively reviewable, but that agency inaction is presumptively unreviewable, in part because agency inaction is not "coercive." 300 This understanding depends on an outmoded conception that
finds coercion only in cases in which government intrudes on common
law rights. Under this view, for example, the failure to protect against
environmental harms or discrimination is not coercive at all. But the
New Deal reformation, and the existence of social and economic
regulation in general, are largely based on an understanding that the
market creates a kind of coercion against which government must
guard. For this reason, it is quite troublesome to use common law
principles of coercion as the basis for creating a presumption against
30 1
review of inadequate regulatory protection.
On occasion, the Court's treatment of the standing provisions of
the APA30 2 has likewise disserved the goals of the legislature in enacting regulatory statutes. In some cases construing the APA, the
Court has barred regulatory beneficiaries from seeking relief because
they lacked a common law injury.30 3 In others, the Court has used
a clear-statement principle in favor of continued judicial power to
"balance the equities" in environmental cases and has thus decreased
the likelihood of injunctive relief in such cases. 30 4 In both of these
contexts, the Court has used traditional private law principles in order
to give content to modern public law; in both settings, the resulting
doctrine disserves the goals of the legislature. 30 5
299

5

U.S.C. § 702 (i988).

300 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
301 See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv.

653, 666-69 (1985).
302 See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
303 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-61 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 4o-46 (1976). For a discussion of the dependence of these holdings
on private law principles, see Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 1461-69 (1988).
304 See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541-46 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (2982).
305 A similar error can be found in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,
109 S. Ct. 2732 (2989), in which the Court was asked to decide whether a successful plaintiff
in a civil rights case could obtain attorneys' fees against an intervening party. The relevant
provision states that a "court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5(k) (1982).
The Court held that intervenors would be liable to a prevailing plaintiff only if the intervention
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(f) Avoiding Irrationalityand Injustice. - A time-honored principle in Anglo-American law is that statutes should be construed to
avoid irrationality and injustice, even whell the language of the statute
seems to lead in that direction. 30 6 The principle is controversial because there is no obvious basis for deciding whether an outcome is
irrational, and because it is plausible to suggest that the correction
for any such defect should come from the legislature rather than the
courts. Because courts are able to focus upon the concrete and often
unforeseeable effects of general statutory provisions, however, they
are in a much better position to judge whether a particular provision
produces peculiar consequences in a particular setting. The judgment
that the consequence is peculiar - and could not plausibly have been
intended - is sometimes irresistible. On occasion the text, read literally, will appear to compel results that the legislature could not have
anticipated and resolved in enacting a broad standard. It would be
unrealistic to think that any legislature could or should correct every
such problem.
In such circumstances, what might appear to be aggressive construction is entirely legitimate 30 7 - at least if the injustice or irrationality is palpable and there is no affirmative evidence that the
legislature intended the result. Usually the interpretive issue in such
cases resembles Wittgenstein's game of dice. 30 8 Here it is fully plau-

were wholly frivolous, even if the intervenor had acted only after the defendant had agreed to
settle. See Zipes, IO9 S. Ct. at 2736-39. The Court reasoned that the fee-award provision is
subject to "the competing equities that Congress normally takes into account," and those equities
called for a rule that would permit an intervenor - who was not a wrongdoer - to participate
free from liability for fees. See id. at 2736.
The dissent argued that in light of the congressional effort to encourage civil rights plaintiffs
to bring suit and to settle as well, intervenors should be liable for fees. See id. at 2741-46
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court responded that "the essential difference" between the two
sides had to do with whether title VII should be interpreted as reconciling "competing rights"
in the traditional way, or instead as placing plaintiffs at the highest point of a hierarchy. See
IO9 S. Ct. at 2738 n.4. On this score, the Court's resolution depended on its assumption that
the fee-shifting provisions of title VII should be interpreted against the backdrop of the rights
possessed before the statute was enacted. But the enactment of title VII in general and of the
fee-shifting provision in particular probably should have been considered a repudiation of the
more open-ended equitable balancing that preceded it. See id. at 2742-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
306 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566-67 (1989);
O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 31 (x986); Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 25859 (1986); cases cited supra note 44.
307 See, e.g., Public Citizen, io9 S. Ct. at 2566 (rejecting the literal meaning of a statute
when it would "'compel an odd result'" (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., o9 S.
Ct. I981, 2984 (1989)); see also id. (citing cases). The emphasis of the legal process school on

the need to construe statutes so that they are "reasonable" has continuing relevance, and provides
a degree of interpretive guidance. See R. DWORKIN, supra note I9, at 148-6o; H. HART & A.
SACKS, supra note 15, at I410-I7.
308 See supra p. 419.
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sible to interpret a statute so as not to apply notwithstanding its literal
meaning.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,30 9 for example, the Court confronted the issue of the notice requirements for class members in a
class action in which the individual claims were extremely small.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires "the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all class members who can be identified through reasonable effort." 3 10 Interpreting
the language literally, a unanimous Supreme Court held that identi31
fiable class members had to be notified of the suit. '
The result of Eisen - which effectively bars small claim class
actions in most settings - is exceedingly peculiar. The purpose of
notice is to protect those who are to be notified; in a case in which
those notified do not have individually viable claims, it seems odd to
suggest that notice is required in deference to their interests. Moreover, it is utterly irrational on the one hand to allow balancing with
respect to the costs of identifying class members, but on the other to
impose a per se rule in favor of notice when the costs of identification
are low and the costs of providing notice are extremely high. The
drafters of the notice provision of rule 23 probably were not thinking
about the problem of individually small but collectively large claims
when they drafted the notice provision. As in Wittgenstein's game of
dice, the literal language, read acontextually, leads to an absurd result.
(g) Protecting Disadvantaged Groups; Civil Rights Questions. Disadvantaged groups are especially at risk in the process of implementation. The same stereotypes and prejudices that afflict disadvantaged groups in the marketplace can also affect those responsible for
implementing statutory protections. Those in a position to enforce the
law thus tend to do so inadequately. Difficulties of organization and
mobilization - including the costs, stigma, threat to future employment, and other burdens of bringing an enforcement action - undermine implementation as well. 3 1 2 In the face of ambiguity, courts
should resolve interpretive doubts in favor of disadvantaged groups
so as to ensure that regulatory statutes are not defeated in the implementation process.
This idea has roots in existing law, though the basic principle has
rarely been explicitly recognized. 3 13 The well-established idea that
statutes should be interpreted in favor of Indian tribes is the most
conspicuous example of this general idea. 3 14 Likewise, the Supreme
309 417 U.S. 156 (i974).
310 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
311 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-77.

312 See supra pp. 467-68.
313 For an exception, see Eskridge, Public Values, cited above in note 21, at 1032-34.
314 See id. at 1047-48.
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Court's general hostility to the creation of implied rights of action
finds an exception in the civil rights laws. In a number of cases,
courts have created implied rights to protect disadvantaged groups in
the face of an ambiguous text. 315 A number of decisions reflect generous interpretations of statutes protecting the disabled. 3 16 Responding to this rationale, courts have often aggressively construed statutes
forbidding discrimination on the basis of race and sex 3 17 - although
recent cases suggest a movement in the opposite direction, perhaps
3 18
rooted in a competing norm of private autonomy.

An example here is Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 3 19 which
involved the standards governing disparate-impact cases brought under title VII. 320 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,321 the Court held that
once a plaintiff showed that an employment practice had a discriminatory impact on members of a minority group, the burden shifted to
the defendant to show that the practice was justified by "business
necessity." 322 In Wards Cove, the Court altered Griggs in two major
ways. First, it held that the defendant's burden is one of production,
not of persuasion, and the plaintiff must carry the burden of persuasion on the issue of business justification. 323 Second, and more fundamentally, the Court held that the defendant need not show that a
challenged practice is "'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's
business." 32 4 Instead, the question is "whether a challenged practice
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the
employer. "325
The textual proscription of "discrimination" does not resolve the
questions in Wards Cove. The text does not indicate whether discrim-

315 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687-717 (,979) (title IX); Allen
v. State Bd.of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-57 (1969) (voting Rights Act).
316 See R. KATZMAN, supra note i9i, at 152-87; see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S.

273, 28o-86 (z987) (interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to protect individuals with
contagious diseases).
317 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (,979) (holding that title VII allows
voluntary affirmative action plans); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (X971) (holding
that title VII prohibits facially neutral practices with disparate impact on minorities).
318 This tendency was especially pronounced in I989. See, e.g., Independent Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989); Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702
(1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
319 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
32042 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a) (2982).
321 401 U.S. 424 (I97i).
322 Id. at 429-32.
323 See Wards Cove, iog S. Ct. at 2126.
324 Id. at 2125-26.
32SId. at 2125. The burden of production seems, however, to have unusual substantive
weight. Although the defendant need not show a practice is "indispensable," it must serve
legitimate goals "in a significant way." Id.
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inatory effects are in themselves troublesome or impermissible, or
whether such effects might shift all the relevant burdens to the defendant - not because they are objectionable in themselves, but in order
to flush out a discriminatory purpose. Although the legislative history
reveals that the legislators were thinking largely of obvious cases of
racial nonneutrality, it does not indicate whether the statutory proscription applies when the defendant adopts a practice, not justified
by business necessity, that "'freeze[s]' the status quo of prior discriminatory practices, '3 26 or when the practice has a disproportionate effect
on blacks that the employer would not be willing to tolerate if the
burdened group consisted of whites. 3 27 Wards Cove thus raises questions about gaps and implementing devices, questions that the text
328
and history of the statute inform but do not answer.
To resolve the disagreement between the majority and the dissent,
one must ask a value-laden question: what sorts of devices best implement the nondiscrimination guarantee if it is properly characterized? The Wards Cove Court did not discuss this question at all;
instead it acted as if the statute and relevant precedents largely disposed of the question. Although the issue is complex, one might start
by observing that discriminatory purpose is exceptionally difficult to
show even when it exists. A test that makes discriminatory effects
probative of discriminatory purpose might invalidate some practices
that should, given perfect implementing devices, be upheld. Wards
Cove, however, will validate many practices that should, given such
devices, be struck down. Moreover, discrimination exists when an
employer has been nonneutral in the sense that it has adopted a
practice having a discriminatory effect on blacks that it would not
have adopted if the burden had been imposed on whites; Wards Cove
will not reach this form of discrimination. For these reasons, Wards
Cove will produce substantial underenforcement of the law. By contrast, systemic barriers to the implementation of antidiscrimination
statutes3 29 make any concern about overenforcement highly speculative. No approach is perfect in this situation, but Griggs was probably
a better method of implementing the statutory proscription.
(h) Protecting Nonmarket Values. - Statutes are frequently designed to protect aspirations or other values that the market under-

326 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.

327 This conception of neutrality might well satisfy an intent requirement. On this view, if
the employer would not be willing to use the same test if the burdened and benefited groups
were switched, he has discriminated. This understanding of neutrality includes racially selective
concern and indifference as well as conscious racial animus. See Strauss, supra note 252, at
956-59.
328 For this reason, the decision must be regarded as a form of federal common law, akin
to the implementation of the Sherman Act and § 1983. See supra pp. 421-22.
329 See supra pp. 467-68.
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values. 3 30 Those "nonmarket" values - reflected in laws regulating
broadcasting and protecting the environment and endangered species
are often jeopardized in the post-enactment political "market," for
the same reasons that nonmarket values are threatened by the willingness-to-pay criterion of the economic marketplace. If this characterization is accurate, an aggressive judicial role, combating a characteristic form of regulatory failure, is an appropriate way to achieve
legislative- goals. In many decisions interpreting the "public interest"
standard of the Federal Communications Act, 33 1 courts have prodded
the FCC to promote diversity, local control, local participation, and
high-quality programming, and to work against racism and sexism in
broadcasting 332 - all notwithstanding the fact that the market for
broadcasting may fail to respect such norms. A similar solicitude for
nonmarket values helps account for decisions taking a skeptical look
at efforts to deregulate broadcasting 333 and perhaps most notably for
334
the aggressive judicial protection of the environment.
(i) Minimizing Interest-Group Transfers. - Courts should narrowly construe statutes that serve no plausible public purpose, and
amount merely to interest-group transfers. This idea is traceable to a
basic constitutional norm 335 and follows from the proportionality principle considered below. The idea helps explain a number of decisions
330

See Stewart, supra note

152,

at 1566-87; Sunstein, supra note 158, at 1133-38.

331 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-6io (1982).
332 See Stewart, supra note 152, at 1582-87 (discussing the treatment of noncommodity

values in the courts).
333 See, e.g., Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 779 F.2d
702 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (broadcast deregulation); Office of Communications of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); see also Central Florida Enters., Inc.
v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (public interest standard), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957
(979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 26-43 (D.C. Cir.) (invalidating FCC
regulations limiting "siphoning" of programming from broadcast to pay television as beyond the
Commission's authority), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (i977); Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
555 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Citizens Comm. To Save WEFM v. FCC, 5o6 F.2d 246 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (en banc); Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), opinion clarified per curiam,
463 F.2d 822 (1972). But see Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d
5o (D.C. Cir. 1986) (concluding that the fairness doctrine had not been codified), cert. denied,
482 U.S. 919 (1987). See generally Stewart, supra note 152 (using broadcast rights to exemplify
noncommunity values).
.334 See, e.g., California Coastal Comm. v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987); Citizens
To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 402 U.S. 402 (1971); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647
F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (i98o); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v.
Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 197); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 6o8 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Sierra Club v.
Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972) (mem. opinion). See generally R. MELNICK,
supra note 65 (discussing the Clean Air Act).
331 See supra pp. 471-72; Macey, supra note 159, at 261-66.
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3 36
in areas of economic regulation, such as banking and agriculture. 337
It also informs the courts' approach to the Robinson-Patman Act
and their effort to understand the Sherman Act as an attempt to
promote consumer welfare rather than as protection of small business
as such. 33 8 When a public purpose is palpably absent, this principle
should be unexceptionable. 3 39
(j) Requiring Proportionality. - Another interpretive principle
would understand statutes to impose benefits roughly commensurate
with their costs, unless there is a clear legislative statement to the
contrary. This proportionality norm, implicit in several recent
cases, 340 draws on an understanding of likely legislative purpose and
on perceptions about regulatory failure. Statutes often fail because of
excessive controls or inadequate implementation, 3 41 and courts should
generally assume that Congress wants to avoid those problems and
therefore intends agencies to impose regulations after a balancing

process. 34 2 As we have seen, the absence of a proportionality principle

336 See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821
F.2d 81o (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. loo5 (1988); Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC,
815 F.2d 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1988); Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. OO5 (1987); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); Langevoort, supra note 8o, at 701, 725-33.
337 See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 409-10 (1978).
338 See id. at 72-89; Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 1O8 S. Ct. 1515, 151924 (1988); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. i, 19-22 (1979); Continental TV, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-59 (1977).
339 This principle must not, however, be confused with the unjustifiable idea that statutes
in derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed; it is not a license for grudging
interpretation of statutes that promote noncommodity values or that embody public-spirited
redistribution, as suggested in Easterbrook, cited above in note 13, at 539-43. This is also a
problem with the otherwise excellent treatment in Macey, cited above in note i59. As the
experience of the early part of this century reveals, it is not for courts - in the process of
statutory construction - to take a side in the regulatory debate that runs in the face of a
legislative judgment. Courts should therefore attempt to discern a public-regarding purpose and
give the benefit of every doubt to the legislature. But sometimes such purposes are not even
plausibly at work. Of course, some difficult line-drawing problems will exist.
340 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
652 (198o) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe mere possibility that some employee somewhere in the
country may confront some risk of cancer is [not] a sufficient basis for the exercise of the
Secretary's power to require the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars to minimize that
risk.'); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (calling for consideration of feasibility).
341 See J. MENDELOFF, Supra note 224, at 1-12.
342 Consider, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146
(D.C. Cir. 1987). In that case, the court concluded that § 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (1982), which requires emissions standards that provide "an ample margin of safety,"
permits the Administrator to consider cost and technology despite the statute's failure to refer
expressly to those factors. The decision is best understood as founded on a background principle
of proportionality, one that Congress may eliminate only through a clear statement.
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may produce harmful systemic consequences as well as overregulation.
Ironically, it will also produce severe underregulation. Moreover,
bureaucratic self-interest or factional pressures sometimes incline agencies toward overzealous enforcement, which Congress is unable routinely to monitor or remedy. The proportionality norm is reinforced
as well by interpretive norms calling for legislative deliberation. It
leads to narrow construction of statutes enacted as a result of interestgroup pressure or as myopic or impulsive reactions to short-term
problems.
The difficulty with this principle is that there is no uncontroversial
metric with which to measure social costs and social benefits. If courts
understand benefits and costs technically - as in the economic formulation - and make the assessment turn on private willingness to
pay, they will undervalue aspirations and nonmarket values and ultimately undermine statutory goals. 34 3 The very decision to create a
regulatory system often reflects a rejection of private willingness to
pay as the criterion of social choice. Many statutes are designed to
transform rather than to implement preferences, to redistribute resources, or to reflect the outcome of a deliberative process about
relevant public values. 3 44 Moreover, a statute that protects (for example) endangered species may have symbolic or aspirational benefits.
The various values that are served by regulatory programs should be
treated hospitably.
For these reasons, the proportionality principle is most useful for
cases of economic regulation. It becomes most workable when it is
clear, by reference to a widely held social consensus, that the social
benefits are small in comparison to the social costs. Even in cases of
public aspirations or nonmarket values, the proportionality idea
should be invoked when the disadvantages of regulation seem
to dwarf
345
the advantages, at least when the statute is ambiguous.
(k) Allowing de Minimis Exceptions. - It follows from the proportionality principle that regulatory statutes should ordinarily be
understood to contain de minimis exceptions. In such cases, the costs
of regulation outweigh the benefits, which are by hypothesis insubstantial. Moreover, the failure to allow de minimis exceptions will

343 See, e.g., Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 54 (1988);
see also Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 2o6-2 (198O) (arguing that
wealth maximization in itself is not a value).
344 Thus, title VII is partly an effort to transform preferences; the minimum wage has
redistributive purposes; the Clean Air Act is partly an outcome of a deliberative process. On
these and other regulatory functions, see C. SUNSTEIN, cited above note *, chs. 1-2.
345 This principle casts in doubt the outcome in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978), which held that the Endangered Species Act blocked construction of a dam that
would destroy the habitat of the snail darter. See also R. DWORKIN, supra note x9, at 347
(concluding that Tennessee Valley Authority was wrongly decided).
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probably decrease rather than increase health and safety. 3 4 6 Administrators should be allowed to refuse to impose costly regulations for
highly speculative or minimal gains. 34 7 Many courts have reached
precisely this conclusion. Indeed, courts should probably require such
exceptions in the absence of an explicit statutory text or plausible
substantive justifications 348 to the contrary.
4. Examples. - Two important cases involving the meaning of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act illustrate the basic framework. The pertinent language of the statute34 9 directs OSHA to
promulgate the standard that "most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard . . . for the period of his working life."'35 0 The

statute also contains a general definition of "occupational safety and
health standard," which says that the term refers to measures that
require "conditions ...

reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide

'35
safe or healthful employment and places of employment." '
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute,352 the Supreme Court invalidated an OSHA regulation of
benzene. Although the precise consequences of the regulation were
sharply contested, there was evidence that the regulation would impose enormous costs in exchange for small or speculative gains.
OSHA itself concluded that its regulation would require capital investments of $266 million, first-year operating costs of $187 to $205

346 See supra p. 423.
347 Courts have reached somewhat conflicting conclusions on this point. The background
rule, however, seems to be in favor of de minimis exceptions. See Public Citizen v. Young,
831 F.2d iio8, 1118-22 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting "literalism" and endorsing the de minimis
exception, but refusing to imply such an exception to the Delaney Clause); Gilhooley, Plain
Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative Purpose: The Interpretationof the Delaney Clause,
40 ADMIN. L. REv. 267 (1988) (advocating an "absurdity exception" that would be applied to
the Delaney Clause); see also Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 356-61 (D.C. Cir.
1979) ("[T]he ability ...
to exempt de minimis situations from a statutory command is not an
ability to depart from the statute, but rather a tool to be used in implementing the legislative
design."); Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. I979) (inferring a de
minimis exception from the Food and Drug Act's definition of "food additive"); cf. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding denial of a benefit based on an interpretation of
"disability" to mean "severe impairment"); Mumpower, An Analysis of the de Minimis Strategy
for Risk Management, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 437 (1982) (emphasizing the complexity of risk management). See generally Fiksel, Toward a de Minimis Policy in Risk Regulation, 5 RISK
ANALYSIS 257 (1985).
348 These might include the high aggregate costs of making such exceptions. See Latin,
Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "FineTuning" Regulation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1314-32 (1985).
349 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982).

350 Id.
351 Id. § 652(8).
352 448 U.S. 607 (198o) (plurality opinion).

HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 489 1989-1990

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 103:405

million, and recurring annual costs of $34 million. 35 3 Contemporary
scientific knowledge appeared to preclude a clear prediction of signif'35 4
icant benefits, which in the Court's view "may be relatively small.
A plurality of the Court concluded that the definitional clause
required OSHA to establish a "significant risk" before regulating a
toxic substance. The plurality justified its conclusion by referring to
the Act's definition of occupational safety and health standards as
those "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment. 3 55 In the Court's view, a standard was not "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" if OSHA was unable to demonstrate a significant risk.
There was, however, little direct basis in the text or history of the
Act for the plurality's conclusion. Congress did not explicitly require
OSHA to show a "significant risk." The plurality found that such a
requirement was implicit in the definitional clause, but it is very
unusual to read a definitional clause, ordinarily carrying no weight,
as creating a substantive limitation on administrative power. The
clause is more plausibly treated as having no substantive content, or
as having substantive content defined by other provisions of the Act.
It is even more unusual for the Court to look to a definitional clause
when the definition, so interpreted, contradicts a far more specific
substantive provision, which in this case says that toxic substance
standards must ensure "to the extent feasible . . . that no employee
'35 6
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.
The reference to "no employee" seems to suggest that the statute
forbids OSHA from permitting risks from toxic substances even if
only one or a few workers would suffer "material impairment of
health." The judicially created "significant risk" requirement, by contrast, forbids regulation unless enough workers will be affected to
make the benefits of regulation significant. Nothing in the legislative
history supports the Court's interpretation of the definitional clause,
35 7
and indeed the history argues against that interpretation.
Unable to point to a solid textual basis for its "significant risk"
requirement, the plurality invoked a clear-statement principle:
In the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to
assume that Congress intended to give the Secretary the unprecedented
power over American industry that would result from the Government's view . . . . Expert testimony that a substance is probably a
human carcinogen ... would justify the conclusion that the substance
poses some risk of serious harm no matter how minute the exposure
353 See id. at 628-29.
354 Id. at 630.

355 Id. at 638 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 652(8)).
356 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
3S7 See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 708-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and no matter how many experts testified that they regarded the risk
as insignificant. That conclusion would in turn justify pervasive regulation limited only by the constraint of feasibility. ...
[T]he Government's theory would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs
that might produce little, if any, discernable benefit. 35 8
The plurality further suggested that the government's interpretation would give the Secretary of Labor "open-ended" policymaking
authority that might amount to an unconstitutional delegation of leg3 59
islative power.
The plurality's conclusion in American Petroleum is difficult to
defend in either formalist or textualist terms. The "significant risk"
requirement has no textual basis, at least not in any ordinary sense;
it was a judicial creation. It would therefore be possible to caricature
the result in the case as an impermissible judicial rewriting of the
statute. 360 But the conclusion in the case was nonetheless sound. A
realistic interpretation of the statutory language would recognize that
it was not addressed to the problem at hand. It is simply a myth to
suggest that the Congress that enacted OSHA focused on the question
of imposing enormous expenditures to redress trivial risks - recall
Wittgenstein's game of dice. Despite the broad-language of the toxic
substances provision, Congress simply did not deal with the problem.
In these circumstances, the plurality's opinion can be seen as invoking several of the substantive norms defended above. The case
provided an excellent setting for the application of the principle calling
for de minimis exceptions to social and economic regulation. An
exclusive focus on the one or two employees who suffer "material
health impairment" as a result of a lifetime of exposure would in the
long run produce less, not more, protection of workers. 3 61 If OSHA
must regulate to the point of feasibility in the face of trivial risk, the
Department of Labor will be reluctant to embark on any regulation
at all.
Moreover, the proportionality principle and the background norm
counseling avoidance of irrationality both argue in favor of the plurality's reading. The beneficiaries of OSHA regulation are well-organized and able to protect themselves in the implementation process.
American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 645 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 651-52. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell, advocating an interpretation
of the Act that would call for cost-benefit balancing, suggested that "a standard-setting process
that ignored economic considerations would result in a serious misallocation of resources and a
lower effective level of safety than could be achieved under standards set with reference to the
comparative benefits available at a lower cost." Id. at 670 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
360 Similarly, a background principle in favor of interpreting words in accordance with their
plain meaning would point toward acceptance of the government's position. See id. at 688
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
361 See supra p. 480.
358
359
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There was therefore a ready political corrective both to the plurality's
conclusion, if it was contrary to public consensus, and to inadequate
implementation in general. For all these reasons, the plurality correctly interpreted OSHA to require a showing of a significant risk as
362
a predicate for regulation.
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan,3 63 the
Supreme Court decided a question left open in American Petroleum:
whether the OSHA statute required cost-benefit analysis. In arguing
that it did, the industry contended that the word "feasible" required
OSHA not only to show a significant risk, but also to demonstrate
that the benefits of regulation justified the costs. "Feasibility," in the
industry's view, contemplated a balancing of costs and benefits. The
government contended that once OSHA had shown a significant risk,
it could regulate to the point where the survival of the regulated
industry would be endangered by additional controls. For the government, the term "feasibility" did not connote cost-benefit balancing,
3 64
but instead meant "possible."

In accepting the government's argument, the Court relied on the
dictionary definition of "feasible" to conclude that the term meant
"'capable of being done, executed, or effected,"' rather than justified
by a balancing of costs and benefits. 3 65 This literal approach to the
statute was not entirely unreasonable. The structure of the toxic
substances provision - consider the "no employee shall suffer" language - is in considerable tension with the industry's construction.
Moreover, Congress has sometimes used the term "feasible" as a selfconscious alternative to "cost-benefit" balancing, 366 and that fact argues against the view that the two terms have the same meaning.
But the same principles that support the decision in American Petroleum cast serious doubt on American Textile Manufacturers.
Notwithstanding the statute's language, it is probably unrealistic
to believe that Congress actually focused on, and resolved, the ques-

362 A different result might be appropriate if the scientific evidence were uncertain. If a
significant risk were impossible to show because the data were unclear, perhaps employers,
rather than workers, should bear the burden of medical uncertainty. The plurality did not make
clear how such considerations would bear on the problem of carcinogen regulation if they had
been squarely confronted by OSHA.
363 452 U.S. 490 (i981).
364 See id. at 494-95.
365See id. at 508-09 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 831 (1976)).

366 In construing feasibility, courts have not weighed the benefits of the practice against its
costs but inquired instead whether the regulation would prevent the industry from functioning.
See National Cottonseed Prod. Ass'n v. Brock, 825 F.2d 482, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[A] standard
is economically feasible if the cost of compliance does not threaten the 'competitive structure or
posture' of the industry." (quoting Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
478 (D.C. Cir. 1974))).
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tion whether to favor the government's approach over some kind of
balancing of costs and benefits. The question never arose during the
debates. The general and more fundamental problem is the basic
irrationality of a system in which OSHA is required to find a significant risk, but is prohibited from undertaking cost-benefit analysis.
Whether a risk is "significant" depends in large part on the costs of
eliminating it. A relatively small risk might justify regulation if the
costs are also small, but a larger risk might best be left unregulated
if the costs are enormous. A rational system of regulation looks not
at the magnitude of the risk alone, but assesses the risk in comparison
to the costs.
These considerations would deserve little weight if the statute
unambiguously dictated a contrary result, but the word "feasible" is
flexible enough to accommodate a proportionality requirement. By
refusing to read the statute in this way, the Supreme Court has
contributed to the irrationality of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act - an irrationality that has harmed workers, employers, consum3 67
ers, and the public at large.

C. Changed Circumstances or Obsolescence
When circumstances change, statutory interpretation becomes especially difficult. Older statutes may depend on factual assumptions
that no longer hold, or may conflict with more recent statutes, thus
producing inconsistency and incoherence in regulation. This problem
is complicated by the fact that the statutory term may have been clear
when enacted, and at that time it may have been inappropriate to
invoke controversial substantive norms to interpret, it; but changed
conditions can render a term ambiguous and thus make it appropriate
to apply conspicuous or controversial norms. Because it represents a
recurring hard case for statutory interpretation, the confrontation between statutory terms and new or unforeseen contexts deserves separate treatment.
In cases of changed circumstances, statutory construction appears
informed by an effort to ensure integrity and coherence in the law by
"updating" obsolete statutes or, to put it less contentiously and
probably more accurately, by interpreting them in a way that takes
account of changing conditions. 36 Here courts reject the idea that
the original understanding of its audience or authors exhausts the
meaning of a statute. There are good reasons to permit courts to go
beyond the original understanding in the face of dramatically changed

367 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 292, at 360-66.
368 See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (198 7).
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circumstances, at least when the statutory text is ambiguous. 36 9 Such
an approach is likely to produce greater coherence in the law; to
reduce the problem, pervasive in modern government, of regulation
by measures that are badly out of date; and to lead to a legal system
that is both more rational and more consistent with democratic
norms. 370 It is tempting but inadequate to say that the legislature
should respond to the problem of changed circumstances. The question is what the statute means in those circumstances, and that question must be answered by those who interpret it, including the courts.
This claim does not, of course, mean that changed circumstances
should be understood to authorize courts to amend or rewrite statutes,
but it does mean that "meaning" is itself a function of those circum3
stances. 71
The problem of changed circumstances presents questions not only
of statutory meaning in new settings, but also of implicit interpretive
instructions: how would Congress have wanted courts to approach its
enactments in the face of obsolescence or changed circumstances?
There will rarely be a direct answer to this question. As in constitutional law, the problem of changed circumstances requires courts to
decide whether the content of legal rules should change when there
have been changes in law, policy, and fact. At the very least, courts
should answer in the affirmative 3 72 when a statute contains an openended term like "public policy" or "psychopathic '3 73 that invites interpretations that change over time; when statutory language already
contains an ambiguous term ("feasible") whose meaning depends on
current conditions; 374 or when the statute contains a phrase ("induce
cancer") that has been rendered ambiguous because of changed cir3 75
cumstances.
Even when no clear interpretive instructions allow a judge to adapt
statutory terms to new conditions, courts may do so when those
conditions have rendered a statute ambiguous. This problem typically
occurs in three ways. First, the factual assumptions underlying the

369 See Aleinikoff, supra note 64, at 56-61; Eskridge, supra note 368, at 1497-539; see also
Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, z963 Sup. CT. REV. 211, 219-23 (noting
that changed circumstances have traditionally provided a rationale for departing from stare
decisis).
370 See sources cited supra notes 224-28.
371 Dean Calabresi has argued that courts should have the power to invalidate obsolete
statutes and to return them to the legislature for reconsideration. See G. CALABRESI, supra
note 82, at 163-66. A judicial role of this sort would be extremely controversial, and properly
so. The principal problem posed by obsolescence or changed circumstances is that it complicates
ordinary interpretation.
372 See R. DWORKIN, supra note ig; Eskridge, supra note 368, at 1538-44.
373See Aleinikoff, supra note 64, at 47-54.
314 See sura PP. 492-93.
371See infra PP. 496-97.
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original statute may no longer be valid. For example, statutes regulating broadcasting were enacted with the understanding that because
of the limitations of the spectrum, few broadcasting licenses would be
available. In the face of new technology and the rise of cable television, that assumption has become hopelessly unrealistic.
Second, a statutory provision may no longer be consistent with
widely held social norms. In such cases a court must ask whether
this change so alters the landscape that a reading of the statute that
does not accord with the original understanding of its authors is
justified - a question the enacting legislature may well have intended
courts to answer in the affirmative.
Third, the legal background may have changed dramatically as a
result of legislative and administrative innovations. A statute enacted
in 1935 may have ignored environmental considerations widely recognized in statutes enacted after I96O. The question is whether the
change in the legal background has consequences for interpreting the
1935 statute.

Judicial responses to all three kinds of obsolescence are not difficult
to find. The first kind has resulted in aggressive construction, particularly in banking and broadcasting. 3 76 In light of the changed nature
of the relevant markets, it is implausible to resolve ambiguities by
examining Congress' intent at the time of enactment. Such an approach would be a recipe for absurdity, and absurdity would hardly
promote legislative purposes.
The second form of obsolescence is reflected in judicial construction
of statutes of the 192o's and 1930's so as to require old-line agencies

to take account of environmental concerns. In this context, the legal
backdrop has changed so dramatically that seemingly straightforward
interpretation of the old statutes would be undesirable. 3 77 The same
point helps to explain the courts' narrow construction of provisions of
the UCC not anticipating the revolution in the law of products liability. 3 78 The Court's decision in Bob Jones can be understood in

similar terms. Changing legislative and judicial developments had
made racial discrimination inconsistent with "public policy" in the
r98o's, even if no such inconsistency existed when the charitable
deduction was first enacted.
Decisions reading ambiguous statutes to require regulatory agencies
to consider costs and benefits illustrate the third form of judicial
response to obsolescence. 3 79 The Court may also have been reflecting
376 See Langevoort, supra note 80.
377 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Conm'n, 354 F.2d
6o8 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
378 See Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address, 43 U. PTT. L.
REV. 995, ioio (1982).
379 See supra note 340.
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contemporary values in reading the Sherman Act as an effort to
promote consumer welfare. 38 0 The underlying argument would be
that a welfare-based interpretive principle is the only basis for a
judicially administrable standard, and that such a principle conforms
best to current understandings about a well-functioning antitrust
38
law. 1

Several substantive norms apply to cases of obsolescence. Obsolete
statutes are by hypothesis inconsistent with other regulation or with
the current legal framework. They may also have pernicious, if unintended, systemic effects. If the text allows, courts should attempt
to harmonize such statutes with current circumstances.
We might explore the problem of obsolescence in more detail by
examining the Delaney Clause. As noted above, the clause prohibits
the sale of food additives that "induce cancer when ingested by man
or animal" or are found "after tests which are appropriate for the
evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man
and animal." 382 As we have seen, the drafters of the clause believed
that few additives caused cancer, and that those that did so were
extremely dangerous. By the I98o's, however, it was clear that many
substances were carcinogenic, but that a number of them created
38 3
exceptionally minor risks.
These developments severely undermined the assumptions of the

Congress that enacted the Delaney Clause. Indeed the clause, read
literally, appeared quite perverse in many of its applications because

it banned substances that posed no real risk to health. Having been
forbidden to use food additives posing a de minimis risk of cancer,
380 See, e.g., R. BoRm, supra note 337, at 72-89. A similar method was at work in King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a state rule depriving
women of welfare benefits whenever they lived with a man - even if cohabitation occurred as
rarely as once a month. Although there had been a steady trend in the direction of eliminating
moral requirements for welfare recipients, and although the "man-in-the-house" rule had been
widely condemned as irrational, punitive, and probably both sexist and racist in operation, the
Court was unable to point to any statutory provision that unambiguously invalidated the state
rule. The decision in King v. Smith amounted to an aggressive reading of the statute to conform
to what the Court understood to be the current (and well-founded) national consensus.
381 See R. BORK, supra note 337, at 72-1,5; R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 26597 (3d ed. 1986).
382 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982).
383 Albert Kolbye argues:
[A]nalytical chemists can now detect a whole new galaxy of low levels of substances in
food. Previously the limits of qualitative identification and quantitative measurement
were in the parts per thousand range: today parts per trillion are not uncommon and in
some instances routine. This represents a millionfold increase in our ability to detect
'chemicals' in food.
Kolbye, Decision-MakingIssues Relevant to Cancer-Inducing Substances, in REGULATORY AsPECTS OF CARCINOGENESIS AND FOOD ADDITIVES: THE DELANEY CLAUSE 93, 94 (F. Coulston
ed. 1979); see also Merrill, supra note 81, at 15-16 (discussing these technological advances).
HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 496 1989-1990

1989]

INTERPRETING STATUTES

manufacturers instead used additives that caused more serious risks
of other diseases - thus creating what was quite possibly a significant
increase in illnesses and deaths from food additives. In response, the
FDA - invoking background principles against obsolescence and in
favor of rationality and de minimis exception - interpreted the clause
to permit the exemption of trivial risks. The claim, in short, was that
changed circumstances made the word "induce" ambiguous. The FDA
said that it would approve food additives that posed a de minimis
risk of cancer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the FDA's position was unlawful. 3 84 In that court's view,
the Delaney Clause was unambiguous on the point. Read in context,
however, the statute's meaning was far from clear. Because Congress
did not focus on the question of de minimis risks in its original
enactment, a de minimis exception would not have defeated Congress'
will. The factual background against which the Delaney Clause was
written was so different from the present circumstances that the statutory terms "induce cancer" must be treated as ambiguous. The word
"induce" should be read in its setting: whether a substance "induces"
cancer within the meaning of the clause might well be a function of
the degree of risk that it poses. We have seen that where there has
been no clear legislative statement, agencies should be free to create
de minimis exceptions to regulation. In these circumstances, interpretation of the clause to permit such exceptions seems consistent with
permissible understandings of statutory construction, and quite sensible to boot. The D.C. Circuit's decision to the contrary was therefore misguided.
D. Priority and Harmonization
It will not have escaped notice that the interpretive principles I
have proposed will sometimes conflict with one another. For example,
the principle favoring state authority might collide with the principle
favoring disadvantaged groups, and the presumption against amendment through the appropriations process might contradict the principle
in favor of generous construction of statutes protecting nonmarket
values. The examples could easily be multiplied. The possibility of
conflict renders the basic approach vulnerable to a neo-realist objection that, in practice, the interpretive norms will provide contradictory
guidance for the judiciary.
Principles of harmonization and priority can in fact be developed
to resolve cases of conflict. To make this claim is not, however, to
say that the application of interpretive norms can be purely mechan384 See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d ixo8 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 1o8 S. Ct.
1470 (i988).
HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev. 497 1989-1990

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:405

ical. Inevitably, statutory construction is an exercise of practical reason, in which text, history, and purpose interact with background
understandings in the legal culture. 3 85 In light of the dependence of
outcomes on particular contexts, a fully systematized approach to
statutory construction would be unmanageable. But short of a complete system, it is possible to develop some guidelines.
i. Priority. - The first task is to develop principles by which to
rank interpretive norms. Although different judges and administrators
will rank such norms in different ways, it should be possible to achieve
a more precise understanding of statutory construction - both as a
descriptive and as a normative matter - by generating a hierarchy
of interpretive principles.
In that hierarchy, the presumptions in favor of decisions by politically accountable actors and in favor of political deliberation should
occupy the very highest place. The principle of political accountability
has a clear foundation in article I of the Constitution, is an overriding
structural commitment of the document, has roots in assessments of
institutional performance, 3 86 and is also designed to counteract characteristic failures in the regulatory process. 3 87 In this sense, the norm
of political accountability draws on all three basic sources of interpretive principles.
The commitment to political deliberation belongs on the same
plane. The belief in deliberative democracy is also a basic constitutional commitment. 388 Implicit in the systems of checks and balances
and federalism, it draws on Madison's conception of political representation. The absence of deliberation has also contributed to regulatory failure. 38 9 In these ways, the belief in political deliberation and
the belief in political accountability are closely allied.
Other interpretive principles traceable to constitutional norms deserve great respect. They should occupy the next highest position in
the hierarchy. This category would include the norms in favor of
broad interpretation of statutes protecting disadvantaged groups,
against delegations of legislative authority, in favor of state autonomy,
and in favor of narrow construction of interest-group transfers. As
we have seen, all of these principles have constitutional status but are
underenforced as a result of the institutional position of the judiciary.3 90 Moreover, it is possible to create a kind of hierarchy within
constitutionally based interpretive principles. Thus, for example, the
385 See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory InterpretationAs PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 321 (I990).
386 See supra p. 475.
387 For a discussion of these failures, see pp. 467-68 above.
388 See sura pP. 471-72.
389 See, e.g., J. MENDELOFF, supra note 224; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 292, at 352-54.
390 See supra p. 466.
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principle in favor of state autonomy should occupy a lower place than
the principle in favor of protection of disadvantaged groups, which is
the product of the fourteenth amendment, a self-conscious attempt to
limit the scope of state power. The case law in fact reflects this
hierarchy.391

Finally, interpretive principles without constitutional status should
occupy the lowest rung, precisely because the judgments they represent are not so closely connected with the foundational commitments
of American constitutionalism. This category includes norms in favor
of coordination and of proportionality, norms requiring consideration
of systemic effects, norms against implied repeals, and norms against
obsolescence. All these norms should play a less significant role in
cases of conflict. Moreover, these principles might themselves be
placed in lexical order. For example, the principles calling for de
minimis exceptions and for proportionality, and for taking account of
systemic effects, should occupy the highest position among nonconstitutional principles. To use (for example) the principle calling for broad
construction of statutes favoring nonmarket values as a reason to
abandon proportionality would sacrifice those very values - because
of the likelihood that stringent regulation that bars balancing will
produce regulatory irrationality and, ultimately, underregulation. The
background principles calling for proportionality and de minimis exceptions, and requiring consideration of systemic effects, should ordinarily apply unless a constitutional principle trumps them.
2. Harmonization.- Principles of harmonization are designed not
to rank interpretive norms but to minimize the number of conflicts
among norms. For example, courts should apply the proportionality
principle differently when nonmarket values are at stake. In cases of
economic regulation, translating costs and benefits into dollars, measured in terms of private willingness to pay, is entirely sensible. In
cases implicating nonmonetary values, the fact that monetized costs
and benefits are disproportionate is not controlling. Reflecting a similar understanding, the courts have interpreted statutes quite generously, and in a way that conspicuously departs from private willingness to pay, when aspirations and noncommodity values are
39 2
involved.
Another principle of harmonization would recognize that cases turn
not simply on the applicability of interpretive norms, but also on the
degree of their infringement. Thus, for example, an enormous grant
of discretionary lawmaking power to a regulatory agency would argue
more strongly in favor of an aggressive narrowing construction than
a minor grant of such power. Moreover, if the norm in favor of

391See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976).
392See cases cited supra notes 333-34.
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limited delegations conflicts with the norm in favor of coordination of
regulatory policy, the degree of the infringement on both norms would
be highly relevant to the decision.
3. An Illustration - Pennhurst. - Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman3 93 illustrates the operation of principles of
priority and harmonization. In Pennhurst, a group of mentally retarded people brought suit against a mental health facility that was
found to contain dangerous conditions. Many of the residents had
been physically abused, brutally mistreated, or drugged; the facility
was utterly inadequate for the treatment of the retarded. As the basis
of their legal claim, the plaintiffs invoked the "bill of rights" in the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 3 94 The

bill of rights contained a set of legislative findings, including the
following:
(i) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate
treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and should be provided in a setting
that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation
to assure that public funds are not provided to any institution]...
that] does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is
appropriate to the needs of such persons .... 395
The question in Pennhurst was whether the bill of rights created
legally enforceable rights, or whether it instead enacted a set of goals
or aspirations that could not be vindicated in court. The history of
the Act supported an argument that Congress intended to create legally cognizable rights. 39 6 On the other hand, it was not unreasonable
to suggest that the bill of rights should be taken, like some other
prefaces to legislation, as a statement of goals and purposes that
amounted to an essentially precatory statement of congressional aspirations - a statement that would not permit the developmentally
disabled to bring suit against a facility that failed to respect the bill
of rights. There was no affirmative indication that the "findings" were
intended to give rise to legally enforceable rights, costing the state
enormous sums. Without a background interpretive principle, the
case was probably impossible to resolve.
393 451 U.S. i (1981).
39442 U.S.C. §§ 6ooo-6o8i (1982 & Supp. 1989).

395 Id. § 6009.
396 See, e.g., 451 U.S. at 42-47 (White, J., dissenting).
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In holding for the governmental defendant, the Supreme Court
did not deny that the conventional sources of interpretation left the
case in equipoise. Instead it invoked a background principle: "[I]f
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys,
it must do so unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with
a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation. '3 97 The Court
decided Pennhurst on the basis of an interpretive norm derived from
the constitutional background, not from the statute at issue.
For reasons explored above, federalism principles are properly
invoked, at least in ordinary settings, to require a clear statement
from Congress for the imposition of significant duties on the states.
If the Court had held the bill of rights legally enforceable, the states
would have faced an enormous financial burden - one that they had
not, in view of the statute's ambiguity, necessarily expected to incur.
It is for this reason that the outcome in Pennhurst is a plausible one.
But two considerations suggest that Pennhurst was incorrectly decided.
First, a constitutional norm calls for aggressive construction of
statutes involving the developmentally disabled. The Court has been
extremely cautious in using the Constitution to protect the disabled,
largely for institutional reasons. 398 In holding that the equal protection clause does not entitle the mentally retarded to special judicial
protection, for example, the Court stressed that federal and state
legislatures have responded to the pervasive mistreatment of the retarded, and that unelected judges should be reluctant to intrude so
dramatically into democratic processes. 3 99 In these circumstances, the
best substantive theory of the equal protection clause accords special
protection to the disabled, and when other branches give such protection, they are fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities.
Second, federalism principles have much less force in cases in
which Congress attempts to protect a traditionally disadvantaged
group from state political processes. The ordinary presumption in
favor of state autonomy is countered by the fourteenth amendment
- a self-conscious limitation on state power. Invocation of principles
of state autonomy in the context of a socially subordinated group to justify a narrow reading of a statute enacted on its behalf - is
40 0
positively perverse in light of constitutional structure and history.

397451 U.S. at 17 (footnote and citations omitted).
398 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
399See id. at 442-47.

400 To be sure, this conclusion depends on the (controversial) view that the developmentally
disabled should for these purposes be treated the same as blacks, the unquestionable principal
beneficiaries of the fourteenth amendment. But that view should not be difficult to defend in
light of the past and present treatment of the developmentally disabled, treatment that led to
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It follows that when Congress has taken steps to provide safeguards for that group, the Court should take into account the fourteenth amendment and the underenforced character of the equality
norm in order to give statutes involving the disabled a hospitable
rather than a grudging interpretation. 40 1 The PennhurstCourt should
not have relied on a background norm in favor of federalism in order
to render meaningless a statutory provision involving a group and a
40 2
right safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment.
E. A Concluding Note: The Post-CanonicalUniverse
What would the universe of statutory interpretation be like if all
of these proposals were accepted? In one sense, it would not be
dramatically different from the one we inhabit. All of the principles
suggested here have some foundations in current law. A system of
interpretation without interpretive norms, even substantive and institutional ones, would be inconceivable. On the other hand, a legal
system that adopted such principles self-consciously would have a far
greater degree of uniformity and coherence. It would be especially
responsive to constitutional norms, to institutional considerations, and
to an informed understanding of the functions and failures of the
modern regulatory state. Above all, the system would rely on norms
that promote the goals and that improve the performance of statutory
regimes, and it would use the process of statutory construction as a
corrective against some of the pervasive weaknesses, injustices, and
irrationalities of modern regulation.
In all likelihood, a set of explicitly articulated interpretive norms
would elicit administrative and legislative responses. In time, members of Congress, and others involved in the lawmaking process,
would become aware of those norms and would enact statutes in the
shadow of such norms. Some statutes would look quite different, for
Congress would know that courts would, in the face of statutory
silence or ambiguity, press legislation in one direction rather than
another.403 Judicial adoption of interpretive norms of this sort would
and made necessary the very statute at issue in Pennhurst. See Minow, When Difference Has
Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of
Difference, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. III, 144-52 (1987).
401 But cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (upholding tribal sovereign
immunity against equal protection claim under the Indian Civil Rights Act).
402 Principles of priority and harmonization were also at work in Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See supra note ioo. That decision reflects an implicit
understanding that the nonsubordination principle trumps the interest in the autonomy of
religious organizations, at least in the context of tax policy.
403 In light of the absence of solid evidence that legislative activity is materially affected by
interpretive norms in general, this effect would, however, probably not be as great as one might
expect.
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ultimately shift the burden of legislative inertia - giving rationality
of various sorts the benefit of the doubt, and raising the costs of
absurdity or injustice - and at the same time would offer legislators
and others a clear rather than murky background against which to
do their work.
The interpretive norms suggested here would convert some hard
cases into easy ones, by providing principles with which to decide
cases that might otherwise be in equipoise. Examples include cases
like American Petroleum, which involved the operation of the proportionality principle, and cases involving allegations of preemption,
which implicate the principle in favor of state autonomy. But the
norms would also make some easy cases into hard ones, by shifting
the legal backdrop and requiring clear legislative instructions before
certain results could be reached. For this reason, a legal framework
pervaded by explicit background norms of the sort outlined here would
in some settings create rather than diminish legal uncertainty. 40 4 This
cost, however, is a small price to pay for increased clarity in a variety
of contexts, and, much more fundamentally, an improvement in the
performance of regulatory law, an increase in rationality, and a greater
sensitivity to the constitutional backdrop, statutory function, and regulatory failure.
V. CONCLUSION

The traditional understandings of statutory construction are inadequate. They fail to describe existing practice or to set out an approach that deserves support. Under the approach suggested here,
the statutory text is the foundation for interpretation, but structure,
purpose, intent, history, and "reasonableness" all play legitimate roles.
It is possible, moreover, to distinguish among those roles, and thus to
produce a system in which dictionary definitions of statutory terms
ordinarily suffice, but are subject to various forms of contextual qualification.
As complete theories of interpretation, however, all of the traditional sources depend on fictions or leave large interpretive gaps.
Efforts to approach statutes as "deals," or to justify a general background rule in favor of either administrative interpretation or "private
ordering, '40 5 cannot be defended, for they produce indeterminacy, lead
404 The Delaney Clause might be an example. On one understanding of a textualist approach, the case is an easy one, and the FDA loses; it is the norm against de minimis exceptions
that introduces uncertainty into a case that might be otherwise resolved on the basis of the
"text."
40S The quotation marks are necessary because of the dependence of private ordering on
legal decisions - a prominent New Deal theme. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 437-38, 451-
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to an inferior system of law, or depend on values that were repudiated
by the decision to create the regulatory regime in the first instance.
Because language "by itself" lacks meaning, and in light of the
existence of gaps or ambiguities in hard cases, interpretive principles
of various sorts are desirable and in any case inevitable. Interpretation cannot occur without background principles that fill gaps in the
face of legislative silence and provide the backdrop against which to
read linguistic commands. In easy cases, the text, in conjunction with
generally held interpretive principles, is enough to solve interpretive
disputes; in other cases, also relatively easy, a resort to purpose,
context - including legislative history - or reasonableness will be
proper, necessary, and sufficient. In many cases, however, courts
must invoke interpretive principles that appear controversial.
Some such principles aid courts in discerning the meaning of particular statutes, or help to implement Congress' actual or likely interpretive instructions. Others are rooted in constitutional concerns;
others derive from assessments of institutional performance; still others
attempt to respond to characteristic failings of regulatory legislation.
Because statutory meaning is a function of interpretive principles and
cannot exist without them, something like "canons" of construction,
far from being obsolete, must occupy a prominent place in the theory
and practice of statutory interpretation.
In these circumstances, it is especially important to avoid thiee
common errors. The first is to treat interpretive principles as the
illegitimate intrusion of discretionary policy judgments into "ordinary"
interpretation; as we have seen, there is no such thing. The second
is to think that the existence of competing, and value-laden, principles
is a reason to give up on the enterprise of statutory construction
altogether, and in hard cases to resort to a sometimes fictional "plain
language," to treat interpretation as inevitably indeterminate, or to
rest content with the conclusion that statutes turn out to mean what
people in authority say that they mean. Even in hard cases, it is
possible to mediate among competing principles and to assess them in
terms of their sensitivity to constitutional structure, to institutional
arrangements, and to regulatory function and failure. The third error
is to use traditional principles of private law - carried over from
anachronistic conceptions of the relationship between the citizen and
the state - to resolve disputes about the meaning of modern enactments.
The interpretive principles suggested here are intended for the
President, regulatory agencies, and Congress, as well as for the courts.
Even more fundamentally, they provide a basis for understanding the
ideas that underlie the fabric of the modern regulatory state. Indeed,
it is in disputes over background norms of interpretation that one
finds principles that organize and divide understandings not only of
the New Deal reformation, but of American constitutionalism and
democracy as a whole.
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The ultimate task is to develop a set of interpretive norms sensitive to constitutional structure, institutional design, the New Deal
reformation, and the diverse functions and failings of governmental
actors and statutory regimes 40 6 - with which to approach social and
economic regulation in a system that has largely abandoned common
law categories. It is possible to generate a series of interpretive principles, all with support in current law, that can promote the goals of
deliberative government in the post-New Deal period. In this way,
statutory construction can serve as an ally of other, more ambitious
strategies designed to promote some of the original constitutional goals
in a dramatically changed legal environment. It is far too much to
expect statutory construction to respond to all of the failings of the
modern regulatory state. But it is not too much to expect that the
process of interpretation can make the situation better rather than
worse.
406 See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra note 4, at 386 (deploring the courts'
failure to conceive of statutes "as entering into the legal system as an organic whole" and the
judicial treatment of statutes "as introducing a sort of temporary innovation which is not at all
to be thought of as on the same footing with common law doctrines"); see also Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 5o HARv. L. REv. 4, i5 (1936) ("[A] statute is not an alien
intruder in the house of the common law, but a guest to be welcomed and made at home there
as a new and powerful aid in the accomplishment of its appointed task of accommodating the
law to social needs.").
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APPENDIX: INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES, OLD AND NEW

I. EXISTING OR DEFUNCT PRINCIPLES: A TYPOLOGY
A. PrinciplesDesigned To Reveal Statutory Meaning in Particular
Cases
i. Plain meaning (questionable).
2. Understanding words in context of statutory structure.
3. Understanding specific provisions to overcome general provisions.
4. Expressio unius (questionable).
5. Construing statutes in context of and harmoniously with
other statutes.
6. Ejusdem generis.
B. Principles Designed To Reflect Congress' Actual or Likely Interpretive Instructions
I. I U.S.C. §§ 1-6.
2. Narrow construction of appropriations statutes.
3. Construing statutes so as to avoid constitutional invalidity.
4. Presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative
decisions.
5. Accounting for changed circumstances.

C. Principles Designed To Promote Institutional Goals or To Improve Lawmaking
I. Plain meaning (questionable).
2. Narrow construction of appropriations statutes.
3. Narrow construction of exemptions from taxation.
4. Deferring to agency interpretations of law, or to agency
decisions where discretion has been conferred.
5. Construing statutes so as to limit administrative discretion
and force decision by politically accountable persons.
6. Presumption in favor of judicial review of agency decisions.
7. Interpreting congressional refusal to disrupt longstanding
judicial or administrative interpretations of statutes as acquiescence or ratification.
D. Principles Designed To Promote Substantive Goals
I. Presumption against preemption of state law (questionable
when discrimination is at issue).
2. Presumption against implied repeals.
3. Construing statutes so as to harmonize with one another.
4. Narrow construction of statutes in derogation of common
law (obsolete).
5. Narrow construction of statutes abrogating sovereign immunity (obsolete).
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6. Construing statutes in favor of Indian tribes.
7. Presumption against implied causes of action (questionable).
8. Presumption against judicial review of agency inaction
(questionable).
9. Rule of lenity in criminal cases.
io. Presumption that laws apply only within territory of United
States.
x i. Presumption against standing for "regulatory harms" (questionable).
12. Broad construction of remedial statutes (indefensible except
as a corrective to 4 above).
13. Presumption against retroactivity.
14. Presumption against interference with traditional powers
of the President and federal courts.
II.

PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR THE REGULATORY STATE

A. ConstitutionalPrinciples
i. Avoiding constitutional invalidity and constitutional doubts.
2.

Federalism.

3. Political accountability; the nondelegation principle.
4. Political deliberation; checks and balances; the constitutional
antipathy to naked interest-group transfers.
5. Disadvantaged groups.
6. Hearing rights.
7. Property and contract rights.
8. Welfare rights.
9. Rule of law.
B. Institutional Concerns
x. Narrow construction of appropriations statutes.
2. Presumption in favor of judicial review.
3. Presumption against implied exemptions from taxation.
4. Presumption against implied repeals.
5. Question of administrative discretion.
6. Cautious approach to legislative history.
7. Ratification, acquiescence, stare decisis and post-enactment
history.
C. CounteractingStatutory Failure
x. Presumption in favor of political accountability.
2. Presumption against subversion of statute through collective
action problems.
3. Presumption in favor of coordination and consistency.
4. Presumption against obsolescence.
5. Narrow construction of procedural qualifications of substantive rights.
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6.
7.
8.
9.
io.

Understanding systemic effects of regulatory controls.
Presumption against irrationality and injustice.
Proportionality (to counteract overzealous implementation).
De minimis exceptions (same).
Narrow construction of statutes embodying interest-group
transfers (to counteract "deals").
iI. Broad construction of statutes protecting disadvantaged
groups.
12. Broad construction of statutes protecting nonmarket values.
13. Avoiding private law principles.

]III. PRIORITY AND

HARMONIZATION

A. Political Accountability and Political Deliberation As MetaPrinciples
B. Principles with Constitutional Foundations (e.g., protect disadvantaged groups, prevent interest-group deals, ensure against
proceduralunfairness)
C. Proportionality;Systemic Effects; de Minimis Exceptions
D. Other NonconstitutionalPrinciples
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